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ABSTRACT
Three Way Information Flow Between the President, News Media, and the Public.
(December 2009)
Han Soo Lee, B.A., Soongsil University, Seoul, Korea;
M.A., Kansas State University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. B. Dan Wood
Regarding presidential responsiveness and leadership, this study addresses two ques-
tions: Does the president respond to the public? Does the president lead the pub-
lic? Unlike prior research, this study tries to answer these questions by focusing on
the news media intervening in the relationship between the president and the pub-
lic. Rather than positing a direct relationship between them, this study points out
that information flows between the president and the public through the news me-
dia, which affect the president and the public. The public receives daily political
information including presidential messages from the news media. Also, presidents
recognize public sentiments from news stories. Accordingly, this study examines the
potentially multidirectional relationships between the three actors from 1958 to 2004
in the United States. This study estimates the reciprocal relationships between the
three actors by using Vector Autoregression (VAR) and Moving Average Response
(MAR) simulations. Analyzing the three actors’ issue stances, this study reveals that
the news media significantly influence the public and the president. However, the
direct relationship between the president and the public is negligible. Furthermore,
the empirical findings demonstrate that presidential responsiveness is more likely to
be observed when the news media report news stories consonant with past public
opinion changes.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Do elites respond to the public? Do elites lead the public? These questions are classic
for political scientists. Political scientists have delved into the questions but have not
found concrete answers to the questions. This study aims at answering the questions.
The questions are important because they are related to democratic representation
and leadership. If we are to understand the political process in democracy, it is
necessary to investigate the relationship between elites and the public. One part
of the relationship is the public’s influence on elites, which is related to democratic
representation. In modern democracies, citizens elect their representatives and expect
them to represent their interests. According to Pitkin (1967, 209), “representing here
means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them.”
Thus, democratic representation depends on whether or not representatives respond
to the public.
Democratic representation, on the one hand, is a normative argument. That is,
representatives should respond to the public because they are elected by the pub-
lic. On the other hand, representation is empirical. As long as representatives
are concerned about reelection, and citizens punish and/or reward their represen-
tatives in elections according to their evaluations of their representatives’ activities,
the elected have incentives to respond to their constituents’ interests. In fact, since
Miller and Stokes (1963), political scientists (e.g., Kuklinski and Elling 1977; Erikson
1978; Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1987; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Hur-
ley and Hill 2003) have shown empirical evidence that constituents’ policy preferences
The journal model is The American Political Science Review.
2(public opinion) significantly influence representatives’ behaviors (policy stances).1
The other part of the relationship between elites and the public is elites’ influence
on the public, which is related to elites’ leadership. Even though elected officials are
supposed to represent public interests, this does not exclude the possibility that they
can lead the public. Scholars (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974; Kingdon 1989) point out
that politicians, including representatives, pursue two goals in general. First, they
want to secure their electoral fortunes. Politicians want to be elected or reelected in
general. Second, they want to enact policies consistent with their ideology. These two
goals are closely related to each other. Politicians may want to be elected or reelected
in order to enact policies they prefer, not just to make a living. On the other hand,
being elected/reelected is the best way of influencing legislation.
In order to achieve the goals, politicians try to earn public support. Politi-
cians need public support to be elected and/or enact their most desired policies
(Neustadt 1990; Kernell 1993). Elites’ responsiveness to and leadership of the public
are associated with earning public support. By responding to the public’s interests,
politicians may earn public support as long as the public rewards their responsive-
ness. Also, politicians may lead or persuade the public to earn the public’s support
and enact their ideal policies because successful leadership implies that the public
supports their policies.
Representatives’ leadership and responsiveness have been interesting subjects
since Burke’s speech to the Electors of Bristol. Do representatives act like “dele-
gates” who respond to the public or “trustees” who lead the public? Some focus on
representatives’ responsiveness (e.g., Miller and Stokes 1963; Stimson, Mackuen, and
Erikson 1995). Others delve into politicians’ leadership (e.g., Geer 1996; Sigelman
1For review of the influence of public opinion on public policy, see Burstein (2003).
31980; Jones ed. 1989).
Politicians’ leadership and responsiveness, however, are not mutually exclusive
in reality. In other words, the relationship between elites and the public may be
reciprocal. Political elites can lead and follow the public. Hence, elites’ leadership
and responsiveness should be simultaneously examined (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000;
Canes-Wrone 2006; Wood 2009). Focusing on the relationship between the president
and public, this study offers a comprehensive understanding of elites’ leadership and
responsiveness.
1. The President and the Public
As a representative, this study focuses on the president. Arguably, the president is
the most important and visible political actor in the United States. The president
is the only representative who is elected by the entire nation in the U.S. Presidents
are elected by the people and are supposed to represent the people. In contrast,
people expect the president to lead the nation and guide the public with better
knowledge and judgment about issues and policies. That is, people’s expectations of
the president, a leader and representative, are somewhat contradictory, which is “the
core of the modern presidency” (Cohen 1999, 1). Without considering presidential
responsiveness and leadership simultaneously, we cannot grasp the modern presidency
comprehensively. To understand the relationship between the president and the pubic,
this study addresses the following questions: Do presidents respond to the public?
Do presidents lead the public? Many scholars have tried to answer these questions.
Yet the answers are inconsistent and inconclusive.
41.1. Presidential Responsiveness
Political scientists have been interested in presidential responsiveness. However, their
empirical results are mixed and even contradictory. In relation to presidential respon-
siveness to the public, scholars assume that presidents need to respond to changing
public opinion to earn public support and be reelected. Theoretically, presidents
can be reelected or earn public support by satisfying the median voter’s preferences
(Downs 1957). In addition, improvements of polling techniques offer presidents better
environment to understand public opinion changes (Geer 1996). In fact, some studies
(Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002) found
empirical evidence of presidential responsiveness to the public.
Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson (1995), examining “presidential policy liberal-
ism” and public opinion, show that public opinion significantly drives the presiden-
tial policy liberalism. Presidential policy liberalism is measured as presidents’ policy
stances based on presidential interactions with the Court and Congress. Mass policy
preferences are measured by using Stimson’s (1991) measure of public policy mood.
According to their results, presidents instantaneously respond to changes in public
opinion, and current presidential policy stances reflect past public opinion changes.
Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson (1995, 559) conclude that “when the public asks for
a more activist or a more conservative government, politicians oblige.”
Other scholars (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts 2001;
Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Canes-Wrone 2006; Rottinghaus 2006) also argue that
presidents respond to the public but conditionally. According to Canes-Wrone and
Shotts (2004), presidents respond to the public depending on their popularity and the
electoral cycle. Analyzing the congruence between presidential budgetary proposals
and public opinion, Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004, 702) conclude that “reelection-
5seeking presidents are more likely to endorse popular policies in the second half of the
term.” In addition, “when the next election is approaching the probability of policy
congruence increases as the president’s popularity shifts from low to average, but
decreases as popularity shifts from average to high” (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004,
702).2
A group of political scientists (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Cohen 1999; Wood
and Lee 2009; Wood 2009), however, maintains that presidents do not pander to the
mass public regardless of presidential popularity and the electoral cycle. Jacobs and
Shapiro (2000) argue that development of public polls give presidents more chances to
manipulate public opinion rather than to follow it. Furthermore, Wood (2009) argues
that presidents have sufficient potential supporters in general. The potential sup-
porters include their partisans, Independents, and opponents’ weak partisans (e.g.,
Independent Republicans or Democrats).3 Hence, presidents tend to pursue their
partisan preferences and persuade the public to achieve their political goals rather
than follow the public. Analyzing the relationship between presidential rhetoric and
public opinion, Wood and Lee (2009) and Wood (2009) empirically show that presi-
dents do not respond to public opinion changes regardless of presidential popularity
and the electoral cycle.4
These studies on presidential responsiveness have enhanced our understanding
of democratic representation in the U.S. Nevertheless, we cannot assert whether or
not the president responds to the public since the empirical results in the studies
2However, according to Rottinghaus (2006), presidents are not responsive during
the second half of their first term. Rather, presidential responsiveness is observed
during the first half of their first term, first half of their second term, and second half
of their second term.
3For more detail, see Table 2.1 in Wood (2009).
4See also Cohen (1999).
6on presidential responsiveness to the public are mixed and often contradictory. Why
are these empirical results discordant? Why do some find presidential responsiveness
while others do not? This research seeks to solve this puzzle by considering the role
of the news media in interactions between the president and public, which is omitted
in the previous empirical studies.
1.2. Presidential Leadership
One part of the relationship between the president and public, as mentioned earlier,
is presidential responsiveness to the public. The other part of the relationship is
presidential leadership of the public. Presidential responsiveness to the public does
not necessarily exclude presidential leadership of the public. Presidents can earn
public support by leading the public, not only by satisfying the public.
Scholars (Wayne 1982; Edwards and Wayne 1985; Cohen and Hamman 2003)
argue that the public expects presidential leadership. People want to see strong pres-
idents, strong leadership. Satisfying this expectation may result in high presidential
popularity. If presidents understand this, they try to lead the public to earn pub-
lic support. On the other hand, if the president successfully persuades the public,
presidential policy positions will be congruent with public opinion because successful
persuasion means that public opinion moves to presidential policy positions. Thus,
leading the public is a way of achieving the politicians’ goals, such as reelection and
enacting preferred policies. “Politicians’ attempt to change public sentiment toward
their favored position convinces them that they can pursue their policy objectives
while minimizing the risks of electoral punishment” (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000, 7).
Then, do presidents lead the public? Do presidents move public opinion?
Like the previous studies on presidential responsiveness, studies on presiden-
tial leadership of the public have found mixed answers to the questions. Some
7(Sigelman 1980; Ragsdale 1984; Cohen 1995; Meernik and Ault 2001; Cook, Barabas,
and Page 2002; Jacobs and Shapiro 1994; Druckman and Holmes 2004) argue that
presidents influence the public. Cohen (1995), examining presidents’ State of the
Union Addresses and public opinion, discovers that increases in presidential atten-
tion to particular issues influence public attention to the issues. Unlike conventional
wisdom, presidential popularity does not condition presidential leadership of the pub-
lic according to Cohen (1995). Also, Wood, Owens, and Durham (2005) reveal that
presidential rhetoric significantly influences the public’s economic perceptions. Even
they (Wood, Owens, and Durham 2005) show that presidential remarks on the econ-
omy can indirectly affect national economic growth and unemployment by affecting
people’s perceptions of the economic conditions and consumer sentiments. Both Ja-
cobs and Shapiro (1994) and Druckman and Holmes (2004) show that presidents
can influence their popularity by priming certain images and issues. These studies
support the argument that presidents affect the public.
Other scholars (Mondak 1993; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987; Simon and
Ostrom 1989; Ostrom and Simon 1989; Cohen and Hamman 2003; Canes-Wrone 2006)
also maintain that presidents lead the public but conditionally. For instance, Page,
Shapiro, and Dempsey (1987), examining public opinion and presidential messages
in the content of network television news, reveal that presidential messages have
some impacts on public opinion in general. However, presidential influence on the
public is conditioned by presidential popularity. When presidents are popular, their
messages tend to move public opinion in the way they intend. But when presidents are
unpopular, their messages do not affect public opinion. Mondak (1993) and Cohen
and Hamman (2003) also find that presidents are more persuasive when they are
popular. Mondak (1993) shows that people positively react to presidents’ positions
only if presidential popularity is high, and other information is scarce. Similarly,
8Cohen and Hamman (2003) find that presidential popularity conditions the impacts
of presidential foreign policy speeches on public expectations of the economy. These
studies support the argument of the conditional nature in presidential leadership of
the public.
However, some political scientists (Sigelman and Sigelman 1981; Glaros and
Miroff 1983; Edwards 2003) argue that presidents do not effectively move public
opinion. Edwards (2003, 74), analyzing aggregate data of national polls, concludes
that “even able communicators like Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton could not move
the public much on their own.” Glaros and Miroff (1983) also show that Reagan’s
address did not affect viewers’ predispositions. Sigelman and Sigelman (1981), exam-
ining Carter’s policy positions and public attitudes toward welfare policy and foreign
aid, reveal that people negatively reacted to Carter’s policy positions. Wood (2009),
examining the reciprocal relationship between presidential rhetoric and public opinion
with time-series data, show that presidential rhetoric does not Granger cause public
opinion changes, which is measured by utilizing Stimson’s Public Mood data. Also,
simulation results in his study do not support the argument that presidential rhetoric
influences public opinion.
Prior research on presidential leadership of the public shows mixed results. Some
show empirical evidence of presidential leadership, and others argue that presidential
leadership is a myth. That is, we do not know clearly whether or not the presi-
dent leads the public. The empirical evidence in the previous studies on presidential
leadership of the public is inconsistent and contradictory. Why are these empirical
results discordant? Why do some find presidential leadership while others do not?
This research addresses these questions. Prior research does not consider the possible
impacts of the news media on the relationship between the president and the public.
This study focuses on the omission of the news media in the interaction between the
9president and the public.
2. Omitted Variable: News Media
Prior research on presidential leadership and responsiveness has focused on two play-
ers, the president and the public, rather than including the news media in the interac-
tion between the president and the public. The news media are critical actors in order
to understand the relationship between the president and the public. Citizens receive
most of their political information, including presidential messages, through the news
media. According to Grossman and Kumar (1981, 3), “the president of the United
States ordinarily is brought to you by the news media.” The president also receives
information regarding the public through the news media since the news media often
report citizens’ views on issues. That is, the news media are information channels be-
tween the president and the public, which implies that the news media can affect both
the president and the public. If the news media have potential to affect the president
and the public simultaneously, omitting this variable in the interaction between the
president and the public may produce biased results. In other words, the discordant,
contradictory results from the previous studies on presidential responsiveness to and
leadership of the public might be caused by omitting this critical variable, the news
media.
This study pays attention to the fact that the news media independently interpret
and investigate the world (Graber 2006). The news media do not just carry objective
information from the president to the public, or vice versa. Also, the news media select
which information they carry. If the news media only carry objective information,
the influence of the news media on the president and the public are negligible and
dependent on the president and the public. The news media, however, can select
10
events and interpret reality and transmit the selected, interpreted information to
the public and the president. Rarely does information flow from the president to
the public and from the public to the president without the news media. Hence,
the manner in which the news media interpret reality is critical to understanding
presidential responsiveness and leadership. This study considers the news media as
information selectors and interpreters as well as information transmitters.
Another important fact that previous studies generally overlooked is the reci-
procity between the president and the public. The president can lead and respond
to the public. Presidential responsiveness and leadership are not mutually exclusive.
That is, both variables (the president and the public) are endogenous in their rela-
tionship. Nevertheless, most of the previous studies on presidential responsiveness
and leadership do not control the reciprocity between the president and the public.5
This unidirectional assumption in prior research on presidential responsiveness and
leadership might result in the mixed, contradictory results. This study understands
the possible reciprocal relationship between the president and the public.
This study, furthermore, argues that the relationships between the president, the
news media, and the public are potentially multidirectional. That is, even though
the news media can independently affect the president and the public, this study
does not exclude the possible influence of the president and the public on the news
media. Certainly, the president is one of the most important information sources for
the news media, and the White House is one of the traditional “beats” in the United
States (Grossman and Kumar 1981; Graber 2006). This means that the president can
manipulate information and send it to the news media (Cook 1998; Bennett 2008). As
long as the president is an important news source, the possibility that the president
5As representative exceptions, see Wood (2009), Jacobs and Shapiro (2000), and
Canes-Wrone (2006).
11
can influence the news media should not be ignored.
On the other hand, the news media also have some incentives to respond to the
public. As Graber (2006, 36) points out, “the overarching feature of media ownership
in the United States is that it is predominantly in private hands.” The private
news media, considering profits, seek to expand their readership and pursue higher
ratings. This means that the news media may need to satisfy the public by sending
harmonious messages with public sentiments on issues. Klapper (1960) argues that
citizens tend to expose themselves to the news media that are harmonious with their
predispositions. If the news media can increase their readership and ratings through
carrying information accordant with public sentiments, the news media will respond
to the public. This study considers the possible influence of the public on the news
media to examine the multidirectional relationship between the president, the news
media, and the public.
3. Questions
Unlike prior research, this study simultaneously examines the dynamic relationships
between the president, the news media, and the public. This research investigates
the possible multidirectional relationships between these three actors at the aggre-
gate level from 1958 through 2004. Specifically, in order to examine the direction of
the relationship between the president, the news media, and the public, this study
addresses the following questions: What are the relationships among presidential lib-
eralism, public liberalism, and media liberalism? Who affects whom? Do the news
media condition presidential leadership of and responsiveness to the public?
Another interest of this study is what factors, beyond themselves, affect the pres-
ident, the news media, and the public. Specifically, this study focuses on political
12
and economic conditions. Previous studies (e.g., Durr 1993; Wlezien 1995; Erikson,
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Wood 2009; Page and Shapiro 1992) have found that
political and economic factors significantly affect the president and/or the public.
However, these studies generally do not consider that the news media can simulta-
neously affect the president and the public. Regarding the news media as a critical
variable, this study addresses the question: Whether and how do the actors respond
to political and economic conditions?
These questions are important if we are to understand presidential behavior,
media bias, and public opinion changes in the U.S. But past research has provided no
comprehensive answer to these questions. Virtually no study simultaneously examines
the multidirectional relationship between the president, the news media, and the
public at the aggregate level. Also, no empirical study directly investigates how
the news media intervene in the relationship between the president and the public.
Examining the three actors’ issue stances from 1958 to 2004 in the United States,
this study answers the questions.
4. Chapter Outline
This first chapter introduces the research questions and discusses the importance of
the questions. Also, the limitations of prior research addressing the questions are
discussed in this chapter. This study points out that previous studies on presidential
leadership of and responsiveness to the public generally ignore the reciprocity between
the president and the public and the importance of the news media intervening in the
interaction between the president and the public. The main purpose of this study is
to analyze the multidirectional relationships between the president, the news media,
and the public.
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In order to address the research questions, this study theorizes the mutidiectional
relationships between the president, the news media, and the public in Chapter II.
This “Theory” chapter introduces theoretical answers to the following questions: who
affects whom? What factors determine the three actors’ behavior? Do the news media
affect the relationship between the president and the public? The basic answers to
the questions are the news media directly affect the president and the public. And
the direct relationship between the president and the public is weak and limited.
Furthermore, this study argues that the news media positively condition the impact
of the president on the public (presidential leadership of the public) and the impact
of the public on the president (presidential responsiveness to the public). Chapter II
theoretically addresses the research questions.
This study tests the theories in Chapter II with empirical data. Chapter III
introduces the data this study utilizes by focusing on the measurement of the three
actors’ issue stances. The public’s issue preferences are measured by using Stimson’s
(1991) Public Mood, which is constructed based on public opinion survey results.
Presidential issue stances are measured by using Wood and Lee’s (2009) Presidential
Liberalism, which is constructed based on presidential rhetoric. Finally, this study
measures media biases based on news stories. This “Study Design” chapter also in-
troduces political and economic variables that may simultaneously affect the three
actors. To analyze the potentially multidirectional relationships between the three ac-
tors, this study utilizes statistical methods such as the Vector Autoregression (VAR),
Granger causality test, and Moving Average Response (MAR) methods. They are
introduced in Chapter III.
Using the variables and the methods introduced in Chapter III, this study em-
pirically tests the theories presented in Chapter II. The test results are reported in
Chapter IV. First, this “Results” chapter reports whether and how the three ac-
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tors respond to political and economic conditions. Second, this chapter shows who
Granger causes whom. Third, the MAR results are reported and show how the three
actors interact with each other. These results generally support the theory that the
news media significantly and directly affect the president and the public. Also, the
test results show that the president and the public do not directly affect each other.
Finally, the conditional effects of the news media on the presidential leadership and
responsiveness are examined in this chapter. According to the results in this chapter,
presidents tend to respond to the public when the news media report news stories
consistent with past public opinion changes.
Chapter V concludes this study. This “Conclusion” chapter summarizes the
research questions, theory, methods, and test results of this study. This chapter con-
siders the implications of the empirical findings regarding democratic representation
and leadership. Finally, this chapter discusses further questions based on the test
results and suggest future research agendas.
15
CHAPTER II
THEORY
This study argued in the previous chapter that the mixed, contradictory results in
the prior research on presidential leadership and responsiveness might be caused by
omitting a critical variable: the news media. In addition, most of the previous studies
on presidential leadership and responsiveness did not systematically test the potential
reciprocity between the president and the public. This might be another source of
the contradictory evidence in the previous studies.
Unlike the prior research, this study argues a possible three-way information
flow between the president, the news media, and the public. Figure 1 illustrates
the theoretical framework of this study. As suggested by this figure, the news media
connect the president and the public, and information flows between the president and
the public through the news media. This figure also suggests that the relationships
between the president, the news media, and the public may be reciprocal.
1. Why Do the News Media Matter?
The news media play a role of transmitting information from the president to the
public and from the public to the president. Presidents send messages, and the
public receives them mostly through the news media. Presidents also sense public
opinion changes through the news media. However, as Figure 1 illustrates, this study
does not exclude the possible direct connection between the president and the public.
Rather, this study stresses that the public and the president receive daily information
directly from the news media.
Some news stories contain factual information without a modification, expla-
nation, or evaluation. For instance, the news media carry presidents’ State of the
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Figure 1. Information Flow between the President, the News Media, and the Public
President Media Public
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Union Addresses, successes and failures in Congress, public opinion poll results, and
descriptions of the world. If the news media carry only factual information without
a modification, explanation, and evaluation, the president and the public are likely
to consume only the factual information. Then, the president can directly influence
the public, and vice versa. The direct influence between the president and the public
implies that the news media may not have an independent impact on the president
and the public.
The news media, however, transmit more than factual information (Bennett 2008;
Graber 2006; Barnhurst and Mutz 1997; Hallin 1985). The news media autonomously
generate information. The media select which events they will report (gate-keeping)
and interpret issues in news stories (White 1964; Tuchman 1978; Iyengar 1991; Graber
2006; Bennett 2008). In addition, the news media enforce their opinions through
independent reporting and editorializing. According to Graber (2006, 9), the “media
not only survey the events of the day and bring them to public and private attention,
they also interpret the events’ meanings, put them into context, and speculate about
their consequences.” The news media “make news” even though they do not “make
up news” (Berkowitz 1997, 3).
The news media select and interpret information while they transmit it from the
president to the public, and vice versa. The news media can choose which presidential
messages they will report and interpret selected presidential messages (Edwards 2003).
The news media sometimes evaluate the president (Grossman and Kumar 1981). For
instance, presidents’ issue stances or policy agendas can be praised or criticized by
other politicians, experts, or journalists in news stories. The news media decide whose
voices they will publicize. From the news media, the public receives the interpreted
and evaluated information about policies and issues, including presidential messages
and issue stances.
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Grossman and Kumar (1981) and Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt (1998), for ex-
ample, empirically show that most news stories about the president are evaluative.
According to Grossman and Kumar (1981), less than a quarter of all news stories
about the White House were neutral in the New York Times, Time, and CBS news
from 1954 through 1977. That is, more than 75 percent of the news stories portrayed
the White House either negatively or positively. Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt (1998),
studying media effects on vote choice, also uncover that press coverage of the 1992
presidential campaign was evaluative overall. According to their content analysis re-
sults (Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998), only about one tenth of all news stories
contained no evaluative content, and about two thirds of the news stories negatively
or positively evaluated the presidential candidates, Bush, Clinton, and Perot, in the
1992 presidential election.
The public is another news source for the news media. As the news media
are interested in elites, the “media have always demonstrated a strong interest in
portraying public opinion” (Mutz 1998, 37). The news media often carry out their
own public opinion polls and announce the results. For instance, opinion poll results
in election campaigns are disproportionately carried by the news media, which is so
called “horse race coverage.” Journalists often refer to poll results while they discuss
social issues. Also, news stories contain interviews with ordinary citizens and coverage
of demonstrations, riots, and so on. According to Bennett (2008), the news media
tend to focus on stories of ordinary citizens rather than institutional, social, and
political context while they report social problems.
The news media report the public every day but selectively. Not all citizens’
voices become news. As the news media select politicians’ opinions, the news media
determine which stories about the public will be publicized and whose voices will be
introduced in news stories. Furthermore, as the news media interpret and evaluate
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presidential messages, public opinion changes are also interpreted and evaluated by
the news media. The news media sometimes announce only poll results but usually
report them with some comments. Thus, the news media can amplify or understate
public opinion changes in news stories.
The news media have independent influence on the president and the public and
should be considered as significant actors explaining presidential responsiveness and
leadership. This is because the news media select and interpret presidential messages
and public opinion changes, and the public and the president consume the selected
and interpreted information from the news media. The manner in which the news
media report news affects the president and the public. As long as the public and the
president perceive presidential messages, public opinion changes, issues, policies, and
events through the news media, the public and the president cannot be free from the
influence of the news media.
2. Who Affects the Public?
Political scientists have been interested in explaining public opinion changes and tried
to answer the question: what moves public opinion? Page and Shapiro (1992) argue
that general social changes, events, and elites play a key role of moving public opinion.
Because the public is “rational” in a collective sense, according to Page and Shapiro
(1992), the public responds to changing circumstances and events. The public has
incentives to respond to social changes and events in the world because the changes
and events can affect the public’s welfare.
General social changes are related to modernization including industrialization,
secularization, and urbanization. Page and Shapiro (1992) speculate that gradual
social and economic changes lead to demographic and socioeconomic changes, and
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the demographic and socioeconomic changes finally cause public opinion changes.
McClosky and Zaller (1984) also stress that urbanization affects the evolution of the
American ethos, which affects public opinion changes. In this perspective, public
opinion change is like a long term trend.
Public opinion changes, however, are not linear. Rather, they are, at times,
“abrupt” and “fluctuated” (Page and Shapiro 1992, 53). The abrupt public opinion
changes are likely to be associated with events such as domestic/international up-
heavals. The public reacts to these changes in the world because they can potentially
affect the public’s life.
Events affect the public. However, without interpretation, events are unlikely to
affect public opinion. As Page and Shapiro (1992, 340) state, this is because “events
seldom speak for themselves.” Bartels (1994), in fact, finds that citizens’ preferences
toward defense spending were not significantly influenced by the event of “the end of
the Cold War” even though this event was supposed to influence the public in theory.
Bartels’s study indirectly shows elites’ influence on the public because elites, such as
the president and the news media, interpret social, political, and economic changes.
The public also responds to changes in economic conditions because economic
conditions can influence the public’s welfare. The public tends to express conservative
attitudes toward social issues when the public perceives that economic conditions are
bad (Durr 1993). According to Durr (1993), this is because the public is likely to
focus on their own economic security rather than others’ welfare during an economic
downturn.
In an economic recession, on the other hand, elites are more likely to focus on rein-
vigorating the national economy rather than spending more resources for the needy
in general, which may also affect public opinion. Generally speaking, as national
economic conditions become worse, the public tends to become a miser regarding
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government social spending.
Durr (1993), analyzing changes in public opinion measured as Stimson’s (1991)
Public Mood and consumer sentiment measured as the University of Michigan In-
dex of Consumer Sentiment (Expectation Index) at the aggregate level, shows that
the public’s business expectations significantly influence the public’s domestic policy
sentiment. If the public expects that national economic conditions will be better
(worse), the public tends to support liberal (conservative) policies. Erikson, MacK-
uen, and Stimson (2002), furthermore, show that the public differently responds to
different economic conditions. According to their statistical results,1 the public tends
to express liberal preferences when unemployment rate increases and conservative
preferences when inflation rate increases. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson’s and
Durr’s study illustrate whether and how economic conditions influence the public.
Another political factor influencing public opinion is public policy. As long as
public policy affects the public’s welfare, the public has incentives to listen to policy
information and respond to the information. Wlezien (1995) argues that the public
thermostatically reacts to government spending. Wlezien (1995), analyzing annual
government spending and public opinion changes, reveals that people negatively re-
spond to increases in government spending. If government increases (decreases) social
spending, the public expresses conservative (liberal) attitudes toward the social spend-
ing. “Conservative (liberal) attitudes” toward social spending here mean decreases
(increases) in social spending. Wlezien’s study (1995) illustrates that the public is
not apathetic about public policy.
Wlezien (1995) and Durr (1993) shed light on the possible causes of public opin-
ion changes. These studies, however, do not seriously consider where the public
1See also Wood (2009).
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receives the information about government spending and national economic situa-
tions. As events rarely speak for themselves, information about policies and national
economic conditions can be interpreted. The public is likely to receive information
about national economic conditions and government spending from elites. The news
media and the president can interpret, explain, and/or evaluate government spending
(policies) and changes in national economic conditions.
The public reads, listens to, and/or watches the interpretations, explanations,
and/or evaluations with regard to the national economy and public policies from the
news media and elites. While the news media carry elites’ opinions on government
spending and changes in national economic conditions, the media select and evaluate
the opinions. In sum, elites, specifically the news media, should be considered as
significant actors influencing the public even though objective policy and economic
information may directly affect the public. The public receives not only the objective
policy and economic information but also elites’ opinions on policies and economic
conditions through the news media. Hence, this study argues that the effects of the
objective political and economic conditions on the public may be indirect and vary
depending on the manner in which the news media report the objective political and
economic conditions.
2.1. Three Conditions for Elites’ Influence on the Public
Unlike prior research, this study focuses on where and how the public receives policy
information, which can explain public opinion changes. This study argues that the
president and the news media send political information to the public and affect
public opinion. The president and the news media can move public opinion because
they have potential, incentives, and tools to influence the public.
Both the president and the news media have potential to influence the public.
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Policy information is asymmetrically distributed among the president, the news me-
dia, and the public in reality. The president and the news media have more, better
policy information than the public. The president and the news media play an ac-
tive role related to policy. The president is engaged in producing policies, proposing
budgets, and vetoing or signing bills. The news media describe, explain, and evalu-
ate policies and distribute policy information. The public is an information receiver
rather than an information sender regarding policy making. Zaller (1992) points out
that the public receives policy information from elites, including the president and
the news media. This information asymmetry between elites and the public is the
president’s and the news media’s potential to move public opinion.
Elites, specifically presidents, have incentives to influence the public. Presidents
need to persuade the public to earn the public’s support. The public’s support is
one of the precious resources for presidents to achieve their goals, such as enacting
policies consistent with their ideology and being reelected (Neustadt 1990; Edwards
and Wayne 1985). If the public supports presidential policies, presidents are more
likely to persuade Congress and receive more votes in elections. Presidents send their
messages to the public (and to the other elites) to persuade them.
The news media do not have the incentives the president has. The news media,
however, tend to act like a watchdog and perform a role of guiding society or “the
fourth branch of government” (Protess 1987; Graber 2006; Patterson 2008; Carter
1959). The news media observe politics and influence policy making. Introducing
“muckraking models,” Graber (2006, 152) argues that the news media can affect
policy making by influencing public opinion. According to her “simple muckraking
model,” the news media affect the public, and then politicians respond to the public.
If the news media want to influence politicians, the primary means of the news media
may be affecting public opinion. If the news media cannot influence public opinion,
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politicians generally will ignore the news media.
2.1.1. Tools and Evidence of Elites’ Influence on the Public
Elites affect the public by using a variety of tools. Elites can frame issues. Framing
can be defined as “the process by which a communication source, such as a news
organization, defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy” (Nelson,
Clawson, and Oxley 1997, 567). Hence, “framing effects occur when different pre-
sentations of an issue generate different reactions among those who are exposed to
that issue” (Jacoby 2000, 751). For instance, poverty can be framed either as a so-
cial problem, which implies that government should do something to solve it, or an
individual problem, which implies that government does not have to do something to
solve it.
Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) argue that the news media frame issues.
On the contrary, Jacoby (2000, 751) stresses that “issue frames typically originate
with political leaders; the mass media serve as the ‘conduits’ through which their
messages flow.” However, as stated previously, the news media do not just transmit
information from politicians to the public. The news media often produce their own
frames (Bennett 2008). Kellstedt (2000), analyzing time-series data of public opinion
on racial issues and news stories in Newsweek, shows that racial issues are framed with
egalitarian or individualism cues in the news stories, and the framed news stories affect
the public’s racial attitudes.2
The news media and the president can select which information they will send
2There are many empirical framing studies, such as Tversky and Kahneman
(1981), Jacoby (2000), Nelson and Oxley (1999), and Edy and Meirick (2007). Druck-
man and his colleague (Druckman 2001b; Druckman 2001a; Druckman 2004; Druck-
man and Nelson 2003) argue the limits of framing effects. However, all of these studies
are conducted at the individual level.
25
out, which is called gate-keeping power. Presidents are unlikely to spread information
that may negatively affect them. The news media can select news stories that they
think are important and/or interesting. This gate-keeping power is associated with
elites’ agenda-setting power. Elites can attract public issue attention by frequently
mentioning, reporting, or stressing one issue over the other. The president and the
news media can set public agendas through rhetoric and news stories. Cohen (1963,
13), studying the role of the press in foreign policy making, argues that the press
“may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.” Agenda setting is
related to the “what to think about.”
Since McCombs and Shaw (1972), many studies (Erbring, Goldenberg, and Miller
1980; Behr and Iyengar 1985; Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982; Sheafer 2007; Iyengar
and Kinder 1987) have found that the mass media influence public agenda setting.3
Iyengar and Kinder (1987), performing various experiments, show that the experiment
participants who are exposed to television news about specific issues tend to perceive
those issues as the most important problems the nation faces. Unlike McCombs and
Shaw (1972) and Iyengar and Kinder (1987), Behr and Iyengar (1985) test agenda
setting theory at the aggregate level. Examining the total number of news stories as
well as the number of lead stories aired on the weekday CBS national news related to
energy, unemployment, and inflation, Behr and Iyengar (1985) show that the number
of lead stories significantly affects levels of public concern in the cases of energy and
inflation.
As the news media set the public agenda, the president can also affect the public
agenda by stressing one issue over the other. Behr and Iyengar (1985, 50) not only
3See also Protess, Leff, Brooks, and Gordon (1985) for the limits of agenda setting
power.
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show the impact of the news media on the public but also reveal that “for both en-
ergy and inflation, public concern is shaped directly by the president.” Like Behr and
Iyengar (1985), Cohen (1995) finds that presidents can attract the public’s issue at-
tention. After analyzing the aggregate responses to the Gallup Poll’s Most-Important
Problem series and the State of the Union Addresses from 1953 to 1989, Cohen (1995,
102) concludes that “merely mentioning a problem to the pubic heightens public con-
cern with the policy problem.” However, the presidential influence on the public does
not last long. Thus, the prior research on agenda setting generally shows that both
the president and the news media can significantly affect public issue attention.4
Agenda setting can be extended to the priming effect. Priming refers to “changes
in the standards that people use to make political evaluations” (Iyengar and Kinder
1987, 63). For instance, when the news media disproportionately focus on foreign
affairs, the public tends to rely on this issue to evaluate politicians, such as the
president. Various studies (Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982; Iyengar and Kinder
1987; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Krosnick and Brannon 1993; Miller and Krosnick
2000; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002; Sheafer 2007) have revealed the priming
effect and conditions for the effect.
Miller and Krosnick (2000), for example, show that their experiment participants
rely on their evaluations of the issues primed by news stories when they evaluate
4However, Hill (1998), examining public issue attention before and after the State
of the Union Addresses, reveals that presidential issue attention is also influenced
by public issue attention. According to Hill (1998, 1331), “for foreign policy and
economic policy, presidents respond to prior public attention in the State of the
Union addresses, and the public responds to the president’s emphasis in the speech.”
Yates and Whitford (2005) also uncover that the public’s agenda attention and the
news media’s agenda attention positively and significantly affect presidential agenda
attention in the case of criminal justice issue. In sum, these studies (Hill 1998; Yates
and Whitford 2005) show that the relationship between the president and the public
may be reciprocal. This study considers this possible reciprocity, which is illustrated
in Figure 1.
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overall presidential performance. But priming effects are observed only among the
participants who are politically knowledgeable and trust the media. However, Iyengar
and Kinder (1987), conducting a series of experiments, show somewhat contradictory
results that the politically knowledgeable are less likely to be primed by news stories.
Even though controversies exist in relation to who are more likely to be the “victims
of priming,” studies on priming effects generally show that media attention produces
the priming effect.
2.1.2. Elites’ Persuasion
The previous findings related to agenda setting, priming, and framing are about which
issues the public thinks about and how the public thinks about the issues. However,
the evidence does not directly examine whether or not elites change the public’s issue
sentiments. This study is interested in this direct effect: persuasion.
Elites can directly argue what governments should and should not do (Mutz,
Sniderman, and Brody 1996). The president sends messages to the public and other
elites to persuade them through news conferences, speeches, and so on. The news me-
dia send messages to the public through news selection, independent reporting, and
editorializing. These efforts may affect public opinion. As long as information asym-
metry exists between elites and the public, and the public consumes the information
from elites, the president and the news media may persuade the public.
This study, however, does not ignore the possibility that the public directly
reacts to objective policy information, such as government spending. Rather, note
that objective policy information rarely reach the public without elites’ interpretation.
Even the objective information is selectively delivered to the public by elites. This
study argues that elites can interpret objective economic and political conditions
and send their messages to the public. The public is likely to be influenced by the
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interpreted information. As Page and Shapiro (1992, 340) state, “public opinion often
responds not to events or social trends themselves but to reported events.” Likewise,
the public responds to “reported” political and economic conditions.
Then, do or can the president and the news media alter the public’s issue atti-
tudes or policy sentiments? How does the public respond to the president and the
news media? Does the public negatively react to the president and the news media or
positively respond to the president and the news media? As mentioned before, studies
on presidential leadership have found some mixed, contradictory results. This study
argues that the mixed and contradictory results might be caused by omitting the
news media variable. Then, do the news media influence the public’s issue attitudes?
In the 1940s and 1950s, there was a strong belief that the mass media have a
direct and powerful impact on the public, which is often labeled “hypodermic needle”
or “magic bullet” theory. However, after Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1948) and
Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) found that people rarely change their vote
choice across party lines during election campaigns, scholars reconsidered the “bullet”
theory. Klapper (1960), based on the previous studies (e.g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and
Gaudet 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954), declared that the effects of
the mass media on the public are “minimal.”5
The observed minimal effects of the mass media, however, might originate from
inappropriate research designs and/or simple theoretical frameworks (Bartels 1993;
Zaller 1996). That is, “the persuasive effects of the mass media may be more fugi-
tive than minimal” (Bartels 1993, 267). In fact, later studies (Erikson 1976; Bartels
1993; Zaller 1996; Mutz and Soss 1997; Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998; Kahn
and Kenney 2002; Beck, Dalton, Greene, and Huckfeldt 2002; Gerber, Karlan, and
5See also Patterson and McClure (1976).
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Bergan 2009) with developed research designs and sophisticated theoretical frame-
works found significant persuasive effects of the news media on the public. For in-
stance, Bartels (1993), analyzing panel data from the 1980 American National Elec-
tion Study, shows that the effects of the news media are generally underestimated
because of measurement errors. Adjustment for the errors produces significant effects
of television news exposure on people’s candidate evaluations.
Erikson (1976, 222), examining the effects of newspaper endorsements on the
1964 presidential election results, concludes that “newspapers’ endorsements do in-
fluence presidential voting in their local communities.” Similarly, studying editorial
endorsements in the local press and Senate races between 1988 and 1992, Kahn and
Kenney (2002) show that the newspaper endorsement variable interacted with the
amount of news coverage on candidates significantly influences voters’ evaluations of
candidates. That is, when newspapers endorse a candidate, the increase in the num-
ber of news stories about the endorsed candidate positively and significantly affects
voters’ evaluations of the endorsed candidate.
Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt (1998), furthermore, show that newspapers’ edito-
rial contents significantly affect voters’ candidate evaluations and vote choice in the
1992 presidential election. They show that most of newspapers’ contents are evalua-
tive, which positively affect voters’ candidate evaluations and vote choice. Likewise,
Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan (2009), conducting a field experiment, found that peo-
ple who are assigned to read (subscribe) a liberal newspaper (Washington Post) are
more likely to vote for the Democrat candidate in the 2005 Virginia gubernatorial
election. However, people who are assigned to read (subscribe) a conservative news-
paper (Washington Times) do not show any different voting patterns from the people
in the control group who do not subscribe any newspaper.
The later studies illustrate that the persuasive effects of the news media on the
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public are present. These studies generally show that the news media positively
influence the public. Rather than negatively react to news stories, the public tends to
be persuaded by news stories, which is consistent with the theory this study proposes.
These studies, however, heavily concentrate on vote choice (candidate evaluation) or
vote share. Relatively few studies (e.g., Mutz and Soss 1997) directly investigate
the persuasive effects of the news media on public opinion. This study focuses on
the persuasive effects of the news media on public opinion and argues that the news
media affect the public’s issue attitudes. For instance, when the news media send
more liberal (conservative) news stories, the public tends to express more liberal
(conservative) issue attitudes.
2.2. Who Matters?
This study argues that the president and the news media have potential, incentives,
and tools to influence the public. Prior research has shown some empirical evidence
that the president and the news media affect the public through framing, gate keeping,
and persuasion. However, few studies simultaneously examine the impact of the
president and the news media on the public. Nor does prior research show if both
actors equally influence the public. This study argues that the news media, compared
to the president, directly and prominently affect the public. Furthermore, the news
media can affect presidential leadership of the public. That is, when the news media
report news stories consonant with presidential messages, presidents are likely to move
public opinion.
2.2.1. Some Clues
No study systematically examines the possible reciprocal relationship between the
president, the news media, and the public and show whether the news media or the
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president influences the public in relation to each actor’s issue preferences. However,
there are several agenda-setting studies (Wood and Peake 1998; Edwards and Wood
1999; Bartels 1996; Peake 2001; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2005) testing whether the
news media affect the president, or vice versa. Even though these studies do not
directly examine whether the news media or the president is more likely to move
public opinion, they offer some clues to address the question: Who matters?
One of the common findings in the studies (Wood and Peake 1998; Edwards
and Wood 1999; Bartels 1996; Peake 2001; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2005) is the
prominent influence of the news media on the president in relation to issue attention.
Wood and Peake (1998) show media issue attention significantly affects presidential
issue attention. They measure presidential issue attention as the number of sentences
related to the issues of Soviet Union, Abrab-Israeli Conflict, and Bosnian Conflict
in Public Papers of the President and media issue attention as the number of the
minutes devoted to the issues on the NBC, CBS, and ABC nightly news programs.
Edwards and Wood (1999), including congressional issue attention measured as
the number of days of hearings, also show that media attention significantly influences
presidential attention in foreign policy issues (U.S.-Soviet Relationship and Arab-
Israeli Relationship). Furthermore, media issue attention on domestic issues (crime
and health care) significantly leads presidential issue attention, but not vice versa. In
the case of education, according to their test results (Edwards and Wood 1999), the
relationship between the president and the news media is reciprocal.
Bartels (1996), including three different types of the news media (New York
Times, local newspapers, and ABC news), also shows some reciprocal relationship
between the president, Congress, and the news media depending on issues. However,
the impact of the news media, specifically the New York Times, on the other actors
is largest in general when the volume of messages is considered. Likewise, according
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to Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake (2005), the relationship between the president and the
news media is reciprocal in relation to their issue attention on economic issues: in-
flation/unemployment and international economic issues. However, Eshbaugh-Soha
and Peake (2005) show that the news media significantly affect the president in the
cases of spending issues and general economic issues, but not vice versa.
If both the president and the news media have power to set public agenda, but
one actor significantly affects the other actor in more issues, this may imply that
the actor influencing the other has more power to set public agenda. Even though
some studies (Bartels 1996; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2005; Edwards andWood 1999)
show a reciprocal relationship between the president and the news media depending on
issues, these studies (Wood and Peake 1998; Edwards and Wood 1999; Bartels 1996;
Peake 2001; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2005) generally illustrate that media issue
attention significantly leads presidential issue attention. Then, can the implication
of these studies that the news media generally have more power to set public agenda
than the president be extended to the case of studying public opinion changes? Are
the news media more likely to influence public opinion than the president?
2.2.2. The News Media Matter
Even though both the president and the news media can move public opinion, it is im-
portant that citizens receive most of their political information from the news media.
That is, people read, watch, and listen to the president through the news media. The
president wants to send messages to the public intact. However, presidential mes-
sages are delivered to the public through the news media in general. Moreover, the
news media not only transmit presidential messages to the public but also evaluate
and interpret them, which means that the news media have a direct and prominent
impact on the public. In contrast, presidential influence on the public is weak and
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indirect.
Nadeau et al. (1999) empirically show that the news media often distort economic
information from elites, and the public receives the distorted information from the
media. Hetherington (1996), examining voters’ economic evaluations and patterns of
media consumption in 1992, reveals that distorted economic information by the news
media significantly affected citizens’ national economic evaluations, which might have
affected people’s vote choice in the 1992 presidential election. Likewise, the news me-
dia can evaluate presidential messages. The public receives the evaluated presidential
messages from the news media and is likely to be affected by the evaluated presi-
dential messages rather than by the original presidential messages. The news media,
moreover, transmit policy information not only from the president but also from other
politicians and experts. Of course, presidents are covered more frequently than any
other actors by the news media. According to data from the Policy Agenda Project,6
since Kennedy, presidents have been more frequently mentioned than Congress in the
front-page news stories in the New York Times. However, this does not mean that
the president is the only dominant news source for the news media. Graber (2006,
273), examining the top ten issues on network evening news from July 2003 to June
2004, finds that a significant number of news stories are devoted to Congress (426)
even though the president is covered more (537).
The messages of the other elites can be either harmonious or discordant with
presidential messages, and the news media decide whose opinion appears in news sto-
ries. If the news media carry more opinions discordant/harmonious with presidential
messages, the influence of the president on the public will decrease/increase. In other
words, the news media can condition the impact of the president on the public.
6For more information, visit http://www.policyagendas.org/
34
The news media also express their own opinions through independent investiga-
tive reporting and editorializing. Often the editorials criticize presidents and their
policies. Furthermore, while articulating their arguments, news reporters or commen-
tators sometimes cut, weave, or reorder presidential remarks. That is, the public may
read distorted presidential messages in news stories (Edwards 2003), which implies
that presidential direct influence on the public may be limited by the news media.
Another reason the news media are more likely to influence the public than the
president is that the public is influenced by their perceptions of themselves (Noelle-
Neumann 1974; Mutz 1998; Gunther 1998). Noelle-Neumann (1974), suggesting a
theory called “spiral of silence,” argues that people are unlikely to express their
opinion when the majority’s opinion is different from their own opinion because people
are afraid of being isolated from the majority. Similarly, people who do not have
concrete preferences on issues tend to follow the majority’s opinions on issues. The
“bandwagon effect” in voting is an example. The bandwagon effect is observed “if
persons are more likely to vote for a candidate when they expect them to win than
when they expect them to lose” (Simon 1954, 246). More broadly, the bandwagon
effect refers to the idea that the information from majority opinion leads individuals
to adopt the majority opinion. Political scientists (Straffin 1977; Marsh 1984; Goidel
and Shields 1994; Nadeau, Cloutier, and Guay 1993; Wood and Doan 2003) have
found empirical evidence of the bandwagon effect.
People perceive public opinion changes from the news media rather than from
their personal experiences (Mutz 1998). Note that the public is one of the major
news sources. The news media often report and refer to public opinion poll results.
Since the 1970s, the number of stories mentioning “opinion poll” in the news media
has increased consistently (Kohut 2008, 193). Furthermore, the news media tend
to focus on individuals while they deal with social problems (Bennett 2008). If the
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public perceives public opinion changes through the news media, and the public’s
perception of public opinion affects the public in turn, the news media will influence
the public as long as the media deal with the public as news.
This study, in sum, argues that the news media compared to the president have
a direct, prominent impact on the public. This is, first, because the public directly
receives its political information mostly through the news media. Second, the news
media, reporting presidential messages, can select, interpret, and evaluate the mes-
sages. That is, the influence of presidential messages on the public can be limited
by the manner in which the news media deliver the presidential messages. Third,
the news media selectively carry other elites’ opinions including their own messages
which may or may not be supportive of the president. Finally, the public perceives
public opinion changes from the news media, and the public’s perceptions of public
opinion changes in turn influence the public.
This study explores how the president and the news media simultaneously affect
the public. Citizens receive information from both the president and the news media.
Hence, if only one information source is considered to examine who affects public
opinion, the other critical information source influencing public opinion is missed.
This study considers both the president and the news media as actors potentially
influencing the public but argues that the influence of the news media on the public is
more prominent than the influence of the president. Figure 2 shows this relationship.
Illustrated in this figure, the influence of the news media is stronger than the influence
of the president on the public. Also, this figure shows that the news media can affect
the influence of the president on the public. The other causal arrows will be added
and explained in the following sections.
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Figure 2. The Influence of the President and the News Media on the Public
President Media Public
: Strong Influence
: Weak or Limited Influence
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3. To Whom the President Responds?
Another question this study addresses is presidential responsiveness. Are presidents
responsive to the public’s issue sentiments? More broadly, who influences the presi-
dent? In order to understand presidential responsiveness, it is necessary to consider
what goals the president tries to achieve. This study regards the president as a goal-
oriented actor. That is, the goals presidents pursue generally determine or explain
their behavior. Because presidents are elected officials and are engaged in policy
making, like congressmen, they want to secure their political advantages and enact
policies consistent with their ideology (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974; Kingdon 1989). In
addition, presidents want to be remembered as successful politicians with historical
achievements (Light 1982). These goals are associated with presidential responsive-
ness.
3.1. Responding to Political Context
As the public responds to changing political and economic conditions, presidents also
respond to these political and economic changes to achieve their goals. Specifically,
the president has to respond to Congress because the president shares legislative
power with Congress. When Congress opposes presidential programs or reforms,
presidents have to reshape their programs or let them die if they cannot persuade
Congress. Also, the president responds to congressional bills by vetoing or signing
them. Thus, through their rhetoric or behavior, presidents respond to Congress. The
interactions between the president and Congress are inevitable as long as the president
and Congress share the power of policy making.
How, then, does the president respond to Congress? Do presidents strongly push
their partisan bills when they face a favorable Congress? Do presidents send more
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partisan messages when Congress is hostile to the president? According to Kernell
(1993), when they are unable to or are not interested in negotiating with Congress,
presidents tend to go public, which means sending more messages to the public. If
presidents successfully persuade the public and earn public support, they will be able
to use this public support as their leverage to bargain with Congress (Neustadt 1990).
In sum, presidents are likely to send more partisan messages when they expect that
Congress is unlikely to pass their agendas.
Presidents, however, are rational actors considering the costs and benefits of their
behavior. The president will not spend time and energy for the agendas that are un-
likely to be approved by Congress. Scholars (Edwards 1980; Bond and Fleisher 1990)
point out that presidential legislative success depends on congressional support. That
is, when the majority party in Congress is the presidential party, presidents tend to be
more active in legislation and send more messages because they anticipate enacting
their bills. In contrast, if Congress is hostile to presidential agendas, presidents tend
to be inactive in legislation and send fewer messages because they cannot anticipate
enacting their bills.
Wood and Lee (2009), in fact, reveal that Democratic presidents speak more
liberally when they face a Democratic Congress than when they face a Republican
Congress. Wood and Lee (2009) also find that as Democratic presidents gain stronger
support in Congress, they tend to speak more liberally. These results imply that
presidential behavior or rhetoric is constrained by institutional and political contexts.7
This study argues that when presidents face a Congress unfavorable to them, they
tend to modify their rhetoric and reduce their messages.
7See also Hager and Sullivan (1994) and Eshbaugh-Soha (2003). Even though they
seem to argue different theories, both find that presidents tend to be inactive when
they face divided governments.
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3.2. Responding to Economic Conditions
Presidents also need to respond to changing economic conditions to achieve their goals.
One of the general public expectations to the president is managing national econ-
omy. Economic voting and presidential approval studies (e.g., Kramer 1971; Fiorina
1981; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992; Kernell 1978;
MacKuen 1983; Kinder 1981) generally find that the public rewards or punishes the
president depending on national economic conditions, which implies that the presi-
dent has incentives to respond to changing economic conditions in order to achieve
public support. Also, no president wants to be remembered as a failed politician who
mismanaged the national economy.
As the public tends to express conservative attitudes toward government social
spending during an economic recession, the president is unlikely to pursue liberal
policies when the national economy is in a downturn. The president recognizes that
the public and other politicians are unlikely to support offering necessary resources
for liberal agendas when the national economy is weak.
However, it is noteworthy that different economic problems may need different
prescriptions. For instance, when the unemployment rate is skyrocketing, urgent
prescriptions are creating jobs and financially helping the unemployed. When inflation
is high, in contrast, one possible prescription is reducing the amount of money flowing
from government to market, which means reducing government spending. That is,
the president needs to respond to different economic problems in different manners.
When unemployment is high, presidents need to initiate liberal agendas, such as
welfare policies to help the unemployed and create new jobs. In contrast, when
inflation is high, the president focuses on reducing government spending including
liberal policies in order to reduce total amount of money circulation.
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Wood (2009), in fact, shows that presidents respond to specific economic condi-
tions in different manners. Presidents tend to speak more conservatively as inflation
increases. In contrast, presidents tend to speak more liberally as the unemployment
rate increases. These results illustrate that the president responds to objective eco-
nomic conditions in different manners depending on the types of economic problems.
3.3. Presidential Responsiveness to the Public
Presidents, as mentioned in the previous sections, pursue public support, and pres-
idential popularity is a critical resource to persuade the news media and other po-
litical elites (Neustadt 1990). One of the reasons presidents should manage the na-
tional economy successfully is that the public rewards or punishes presidents accord-
ing to national economic conditions. Certainly, the public’s support is valuable for
presidents in order to secure their electoral promises and to bargain with Congress
(Neustadt 1990; Edwards and Wayne 1985).
Then, how can presidents earn public support? As mentioned before, good poli-
cies and economic conditions increase presidential popularity. Besides these factors,
one possible way of earning public support is persuading the public. As discussed in
the previous section, presidents have incentives to persuade the public. If presidents
successfully persuade the public, this implies that the public supports presidents.
Another way of earning public support is responding to the public. According
to the “median voter theorem” introduced by Downs (1957), among candidates the
one who satisfies the median voter’s preference is most likely to be elected. This
theorem implies that presidents can earn public support by satisfying the public,
more correctly the median voter. For instance, when the public wants more liberal
policies, presidents can demand more liberal policies from Congress or announce more
liberal agendas. By doing so, according to the median voter theorem, presidents can
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earn public support because they satisfy or support the public’s demand.
In order to respond to the public, presidents should know what the public wants.
One way of recognizing the public’s interests is examining public opinion changes.
Presidents are interested in public opinion and maintain an apparatus to monitor it
(Heith 1998). That is, presidents have tools to read public opinion changes. One of
them is public opinion polling. The public opinion apparatus in the White House has
been in operation since Kennedy’s 1960 presidential campaign (Jacobs and Shapiro
1995). Since then, presidents have directly read public opinion changes. In addition,
due to the development of polling techniques, presidents can grasp public opinion
changes more accurately (Geer 1996).
Presidents, in sum, have incentives to respond to the public and can grasp
public opinion changes. Consistent with the argument of presidential responsive-
ness to the public, some studies show that presidential issue stances are affected by
changing public opinion (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Erikson, MacKuen,
and Stimson 2002). Some (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Canes-Wrone, Herron, and
Shotts 2001; Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Canes-Wrone 2006; Rottinghaus 2006)
reveal that presidents respond to the public depending on electoral cycle and their
popularity.
However, as shown previously, others (Cohen 1999; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000;
Wood and Lee 2009; Wood 2009) show that presidents do not respond to changing
public opinion. Wood (2009) argues that presidents do not have to respond to the
public to be reelected because the distribution of citizens’ preferences is bimodal
according to the two major parties: Democrat and Republican. If citizens are aligned
with partisanship into two groups, presidents have less incentive to respond to the
median voter because they can be reelected by satisfying their partisan median.
According to Wood (2009), presidents always have had sufficient “potential sup-
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port” (more than 50 percent of citizens) since 1952. In the case of Democrat/Republican
presidents, “potential support” means citizens who identify themselves as Strong
Democrat/Republican, Democrat/Republican, Independent Democrat/Republican,
Independent, or Independent Republican/Democrat. Even when presidents were from
the majority party, presidents had sufficient “natural support” that includes citizens
who identify themselves as Strong Democrat/Republican, Democrat/Republican, In-
dependent Democrat/Republican, or Independent (half of them) in the case of Demo-
cratic/Republican presidents. This implies that presidents are likely to opt for pur-
suing their partisan interests and trying to persuade Independents to be reelected
rather than satisfying the median voter.
Another reason that presidents respond to their partisans rather than the public
is that they need to be first approved by their partisans to be (re)elected (Alesina
and Rosenthal 1995). To become a presidential nominee of a party, candidates have
to satisfy their partisan median during their primary campaign (even though being a
presidential candidate is relatively easy for incumbent presidents). Also, it is impor-
tant that presidential candidates receive most of their resources, such as finance and
manpower for their election campaign, from their partisan supporters.
Once candidates promise or set their agendas to earn their partisan support in
their primary campaign, changing their promises or agendas after they passed the
first stage, a primary election, is difficult (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995). In other
words, during their presidential campaign, presidential candidates rarely change their
major policy agendas announced in their primary campaign in order to satisfy the
median voter. According to Iyengar and McGrady (2007, 129), one of the strategies
for managing the press during campaigns is “don’t waﬄe or ‘flip-flop’ on the issues.”
If candidates change their promises during campaigns, the candidates may look un-
reliable and not be elected. Likewise, after they are elected, presidents need to fulfill
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their promises to satisfy their partisans and be recognized as reliable leaders. Even
though presidents sometimes need to break or give up their promises because of pub-
lic, economic, and political pressures, presidents need to keep their promises as long
as they can do so in order to be remembered as reliable leaders.
Jacobs and Shapiro (2000), on the other hand, indicate that the development
of public opinion polls gave presidents a better chance to manipulate public opinion
rather than respond to public opinion. That is, presidents use public opinion polling
to lead the public, not to respond to the public. Both Wood (2009) and Jacobs
and Shapiro (2000) insist that presidents tend to pursue their partisan interests and
attempt to move public opinion. However, many scholars argue that the president
needs to respond to the public in order to earn public support because public support
is a precious resource for the president to be reelected and successful in legislation.
In sum, we do not know clearly whether or not the president responds to the
public even though numerous studies have investigated presidential responsiveness to
the public. Unlike the previous studies on presidential responsiveness to the public,
this study maintains that the president responds to the news media rather than to
the public. Hence, omitting the news media in the relationship between the president
and the public might have produced the contradictory results in the prior studies on
presidential responsiveness to the public.
3.4. Presidential Responsiveness to the News Media
This study argues that presidents have incentives to respond to the news media.
However, this does not mean that the president does not have incentives to respond
to the public. Presidents try to satisfy the public as long as responding to public
opinion increases public support for the president. As Heith (1998) argues, presidents
are interested in public opinion and examine public opinion changes through opinion
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polls.
Opinion polling, however, is not the only way for presidents to read the public.
Another approach is examining news stories, which is an older way of reading the
public for presidents compared to opinion polling. The news media carry information
about the public every day. For instance, the news media interview people and ask
citizens about issues. While the news media make news of the public, the media select
and interpret information regarding the public. These news stories about the public
can affect the president’s perceptions of the public. According to Graber (2006, 253),
“media coverage is the very lifeblood of politics because it shapes the perceptions that
form the reality on which political action is based.” In sum, presidents perceive public
opinion changes through the news media as well as opinion poll results (Cohen 1963).
Presidents’ perceptions of public opinion changes may be more important than
the actual public opinion changes in order to understand presidential responsive-
ness to the public. Miller and Stokes (1963) show that representatives respond to
their perception of constituency opinion rather than the actual constituency opinion,
and their perception of constituency opinion is often different from the actual con-
stituency opinion. Similarly, presidents’ perceptions of public opinion changes that
may be different from the actual public opinion changes are critical to understand
their responsiveness to the public.
If presidents’ perceptions of public opinion changes are different from actual
public opinion changes, their perceptions are likely to originate from the news media
because the news media are the major sources for presidents to perceive public opinion
changes besides public opinion polls. If presidents’ perceptions of public opinion
changes are influenced by the news media, presidential responsiveness to the public is
likely to be based on news stories in the media. That is, even though presidents intend
to respond to public opinion, their behavior and/or rhetoric in fact respond to news
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stories about the public. Thus, presidential responsiveness to the news media may be
a byproduct occurring during the process that the president intends to respond to the
public. In this case, presidential responsiveness to the news media is unintentional.
Presidential responsiveness to the news media, on the other hand, is intentional.
The president responds to the news media because of the influence of the news media
on the public. As presented previously, the news media have the potential to move
public opinion. If presidents recognize (or believe) that the news media can influence
the public (Cohen 1963; Tipton 1992; Pritchard 1992; Cook 1998), they are likely to
respond to news stories. By responding to news stories in advance, the president can
earn public support or avoid losing it.
Introducing “leaping impact muckraking model,” Graber (2006) argues that
politicians often respond to news stories before these stories influence the public. In-
vestigative journalism, which is prevalent today, alerts policy makers and the public
about some social issues/problems (Protess 1987). If the president does not respond
in a timely manner to the problems raised by the news media, the news media are
likely to blame the president as long as the president is responsible for the problems.
And, the public consumes the news stories containing the problems and accusations.
If the public is influenced by the news stories blaming the president, the president
finally will lose public support. Hence, in order to prevent losing public support or
enhance it, presidents need to respond to news stories in a timely manner before the
public is influenced by the news stories that in turn negatively affects the president.
For instance, if the news media publicize problems of firearm accidents and ad-
vocate stricter gun control, the president has incentives to send messages responding
to the news stories. Presidents may or may not send harmonious messages with the
news stories. If presidents think that they can persuade the public despite the op-
position of the news media, presidents will send messages discordant with the news
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stories. However, if presidents are concerned about the influence of the news media
on the public, they are likely to send harmonious messages with the news stories. If
the president does not respond to the news stories, the public may perceive that the
president is apathetic about resolving social problems. If the public perceives that the
president is not willing to resolve social problems, the public is unlikely to support
the president. It is important that the social problems and the solutions for them are
likely to be brought to the public by the news media.
If presidents positively respond to news stories, presidential responsiveness to
the public is more likely to be observed when the news media report news stories
consistent with public opinion changes.8 If the news media ignore public opinion
changes and do not make news regarding the changes, presidents are also likely to
ignore them as long as they recognize or believe that the public is significantly affected
by the news media.
Figure 3 suggests who affects the president and the public. In the previous sec-
tion, this study argues that the major actor influencing the public is the news media.
This figure includes who influences the president and shows that presidential respon-
siveness to the news media is prominent compared to presidential responsiveness to
the public. This figure suggests that the news media directly affect the president and
the public while the direct relationship between the president and the public is weak.
Furthermore, this figure shows that the news media intervene in the relationship be-
tween the president and the public. The following section discusses the relationship
between the president and the news media and between the public and the news
media.
8Previous studies, such as Canes-Wrone (2006) and Wood (2009), have found that
presidential responsiveness is conditional. For instance, presidents are responsive to
public opinion changes when elections are imminent.
47
Figure 3. Who Affects the President and the Public?
President Media Public
: Strong Influence
: Weak or Limited Influence
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4. Who Affects the News Media?
Figure 1 suggests that the news media receive information from the president and
the public, which implies that the president and the public can affect news coverage.
However, before discussing the influence of the president and the public on the news
media, it is worth addressing a more general question: what factors determine news
stories?
One potential factor affecting news making is related to who produces news sto-
ries. Events become news stories through several steps. Simply speaking, reporters
initially choose which events and voices they will write as news, and editors accept
or reject the news stories submitted by reporters (Graber 2006).9 Because journalists
write news stories and determine newsworthiness, their social backgrounds, organi-
zational environments, and role perceptions in society can affect their news selection
and making (Fishman 1980; Gans 2004; Tuchman 1978; Graber 2006).
However, journalists’ social backgrounds, working environments, and role percep-
tions have not changed much or changed linearly rather than abruptly. For instance,
journalists in general are college graduated (94 percent), white (83 percent), and male
(67 percent) according to the 2004 Pew research center survey (PEW 2004). These
statistics have not changed notably even though the number of minorities and females
has been steadily increasing (PEW 2004; Weaver and Wilhoit 1991). Likewise, orga-
nizational environments and journalists’ perceptions of their role in society have not
changed notably (Johnstone, Slawski, and Bowman 1976; Weaver and Wilhoit 1991).
9Sometimes executives participate in news production. Also, depending on media
outlets, more actors may be engaged in the news making process (Gans 2004).
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4.1. Economic and Political Conditions
Economic and political conditions, as well as who produces news stories, can af-
fect news stories.10 More correctly, the news media respond to changing economic
and political conditions. As the president and the public tend to express conserva-
tive attitudes toward government social spending when the national economy is in a
downturn (Durr 1993; Wood 2009), the news media are likely to carry more conser-
vative messages when the nation is in an economic recession. This is, first, because
the news media receive information from their sources, such as the public, politicians,
and experts. If elites, such as the president, and the public express more conser-
vative opinions in an economic recession, the news media are likely to receive more
conservative information from their sources and make them as news stories.
Second, because of journalists’ role perceptions, the news media respond to the
national economy. Journalists generally accept the idea that the news media should
perform a role of guiding society as well as informing unbiased news (Weaver and
Wilhoit 1991). According to Tuchman (1978, 1), “the news aims to tell us what
we want to know, need to know, and should know.” In other words, journalists
determine what we need to know and should know. The view of “civic journalism”
enables journalists to give their prescriptions for social problems including economic
problems.
The news media tend to focus on economic reinvigoration rather than redistri-
bution of wealth during economic downturns. Furthermore, as presidents do, the
news media respond to different economic problems with different prescriptions. For
instance, the news media are likely to carry more liberal messages for high unem-
10Behr and Iyengar (1985), testing the agenda-setting theory, uncover that current
objective conditions affect public issue attention related to energy and unemployment
issue.
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ployment and conservative messages for high inflation because high unemployment
implies that government needs to offer more resources to help the unemployed and
create jobs. In contrast, high inflation implies that government needs to reduce the
volume of money by decreasing government spending.
The news media respond to changing political situations, which is also related to
journalists’ role perceptions. According to Weaver and Wilhoit (1991) and Johnstone,
Slawski, and Bowman (1976), more than 75 percent of journalists think that their
roles are investigating government claims or serving as an adversary of government.
If journalists consider themselves as participants in government, they try to check
government. If government policies lean toward the liberal (conservative) side, the
news media tend to send more conservative (liberal) messages to check government. In
other words, the news media tend to act like a checker or balancer of policy making.
For instance, when one party holds both the executive and legislative branch, the
news media are likely to send more messages opposing the dominant party.
News stories, on the contrary, can be more harmonious with the party that holds
both the presidency and Congress. Note that journalists receive information from
news sources, such as the president and Congress, and make the received information
as news. If both the president and Congress speak harmoniously, the news media
receive the same information from the sources and produce news stories based on the
information. For instance, when the Democratic (Republican) party holds both the
presidency and Congress, the news media is more likely to carry liberal (conservative)
messages because both of the sources speak liberally (conservatively).
Bennett (1990), in fact, found that the news media sent out more aggressive
opinions to the president (measured as the number of news stories in editorial/co-op
pages in the New York Times between January 1, 1983 and October 15, 1986) when
Congress more frequently acted against the president (measured as the number of
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congressional activities reported in the Times during the same period). Bennett’s
study (1990) implies that news sources matter for news making. If the president and
Congress send similar messages, the news media tend to make the messages news
rather than criticize them.
4.2. A Tug of War between the President and the News Media
Bennett’s study (1990) shows that news stories are inevitably influenced by the news
sources as long as the news media receive information from news sources and make
them news. Some news sources often try to manipulate information for their inter-
ests. Rather than the news media, biased sources are likely to produce biased news
stories (Soley 1992; Manheim 2008). Journalists, however, recognize the possibility
that their news sources can manipulate information (Patterson 2008). Journalists
want more but uncontrolled information from their news sources while the sources
want to send more, controlled information to the news media. Gans (2004) illustrates
this tension between sources and journalists as a tug of war:
“The source-journalist relationship is therefore a tug of war: while sources at-
tempt to ‘manage’ the news, putting the best light on themselves, journalists concur-
rently ‘manage’ the sources in order to extract the information they want” (Gans 2004,
117).
The president as a news source wants to manage news stories and can control the
time and frequency of information dissemination. For instance, the president sched-
ules when and how often press conferences will be held. Certainly, the president can
control the content of information disseminated. Rarely does the president send out
messages against the presidency. Rather, the president tries to control and manipu-
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late information and benefit from the information. For instance, when the Vietnam
war occurred, the White House controlled and manipulated information about the
war and publicized the information in order to earn public support for the war.
The president is more likely to influence the news media when information asym-
metry exists between the president and the news media. When the president monop-
olizes information, the news media have to rely on the presidential information. For
instance, presidents enjoy the information asymmetry between the news media and
themselves at the beginning of war. Also, presidents have more chances to influence
the news media when they announce new programs, such as the honeymoon period.
Behr and Iyengar (1985), studying the impact of the news media on public agenda,
show that presidential issue attention in the State of Union Addresses significantly
affects media’s issue attention.
Journalists, however, “fear that self-serving officials will try to manipulate them”
(Patterson 2008, 32). Journalists sometimes adopt the frames from their sources, such
as the president, but they also exercise some independence in source use (Dunwoody
and Shields 1986). In order to avoid possible information manipulation, journalists
search various sources and try to balance their stories. That is, the news media
alter the information asymmetry by contacting other experts or politicians. Even
though presidents monopolize policy information from time to time, the presidential
dominance of policy information does not last long in general. For instance, as the
Vietnam war proceeded, the news media received more information about the war
beyond government sources including the president, which finally reduced presidential
influence on the news stories of the war.
Bennett (1990), testing the “indexing hypothesis”, reveals that opinion on the
op-ed pages in New York Times criticizing the Reagan administration was positively
associated with Congressional opposition to Reagan administration. Bennett’s study
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(1990) shows that the news media search information beyond the president. Zaller and
Chiu (1996), extending Bennett’s study (1990), reveal that news coverage on foreign
policies depends on both Congressional opinion and presidential policy stances. These
studies (Bennett 1990; Zaller and Chiu 1996) imply that presidential influence on the
news media is limited and conditioned by other news sources, such as Congress and
the public.
In sum, this study argues that the influence of the president on the news media
is limited and conditional. The president has the potential to influence the news
media as long as the president is an important news source for the news media.
Presidents also have incentives to manipulate information for their benefit. Presidents
can control time and methods of distributing their messages to the news media.
However, journalists recognize the possible manipulation by the president and try
to avoid the manipulation. In addition, the news media receive policy information
not only from the president but also from other experts and politicians. Hence, it is
difficult to assert that presidential influence on the news media is present in general.
Rather, presidential influence on the news media varies across time and is conditioned
by other news sources.
4.3. Responsiveness to the Public
The public is another news source even though the public does not appear in news
stories as often as government sources, such as the president. Brown, Bybee, Wear-
den, and Straughan (1987, 48-49), analyzing front page news stories in the New
York Times, the Washington Post, and four North Carolina newspapers during 1979
and 1980, found that “only one-quarter (of all news sources) were affiliated with
non-governmental organizations and barely 4 percent (of all news sources) were non-
affiliated U.S. citizens.” Their study (Brown et al. 1987) shows that the news media
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receive a relatively small amount of information from the public compared to gov-
ernment sources (about 43.6 percent). Furthermore, Behr and Iyengar (1985) show
that public concern about the inflation issue does not significantly affect the volume
of news coverage on this issue. However, this fact does not necessarily mean that the
public does not influence the news media or is less influential than the president.
As long as the news media search various news sources, the public’s voices are
reflected in news stories. Furthermore, if the news media want to play a role of the
“fourth branch of government” or a democratic institution, the news media should re-
flect public opinion changes in news stories. For instance, if the public demands more
liberal policies, the news media should publicize the public’s preference and urge the
need of liberal policies for the public. If the news media never reflect public opinion,
the news media will lose the cause of their arguments regarding policies/issues.
Beyond the normative concerns, the news media need to respond to the public
because of economic concerns. The news media in the United States are generally in
private hands. The commercial news media pursue economic profits, and most media
enterprises earn their profits from subscriptions and advertisers. If a TV station or a
newspaper increases its ratings or readership, the company will make more profits. In
order to increase their audiences and finally earn more profits, the news media need
to appeal to the public.
The profit pressures affect the patterns of news coverage and writing. According
to a survey report of the Pew research center (PEW 2004), significant majorities of
local and national journalists think that profit pressures affect news coverage. The
news media try to appeal to the public in several ways. Bennett (2008) argues that the
news media dramatize and personalize social problems rather than focus on complex
political realities while making news. The dramatization and personalization are to
attract audience attention. The efforts of appealing to the public have increased the
55
proportion of soft news. Graber (2006, 111) found that “between 1977 and 1997, soft
news increased by an average of 25 percent in all news venues, at the expense of hard
news.”
The news media can increase their ratings and readership by responding to pub-
lic opinion. People selectively expose themselves to the news media (Klapper 1960).
People do not always read all newspapers but regularly read a small number of news-
papers. Furthermore, people tend to pay attention to news stories consistent with
their ideologies. Conservative (liberal) citizens tend to consume conservative (liberal)
newspapers.11 If the public wants to read something consistent with its interests, the
news media can satisfy this demand by producing news stories consistent with public
opinion. If a newspaper consistently ignores public opinion changes, this paper will
finally lose its readership. In sum, by responding to the public, the news media may
be able to attract a larger audience.
Responding to the public, however, does not mean that all news stories in all
news media outlets converge into the median voter’s view point. Rather, this study
argues that the news media move to the direction that the public moves. The news
media send relatively more liberal (conservative) news stories compared to their mean
number of liberal (conservative) news stories when public opinion moves to the liberal
(conservative) side. For instance, theWall Street Journal increases liberal news stories
when the public wants more liberal policies. However, still the Journal is conservative
compared to the New York Times because the Times also increases liberal news stories
by responding to the public.
Figure 4 suggests that the public influences the news media. This study argues
11Certainly, the opposite inference is possible. People who read conservative (lib-
eral) newspapers are likely to express conservative (liberal) attitudes toward issues.
This argument is discussed in the previous section. One of the purposes of this study
is to examine this reciprocity.
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that the news media are sensitive toward alienating the public because of the norma-
tive and economic concerns. In contrast, this study argues that presidential influence
on the news media is limited and conditional because the news media understand
presidential incentives of manipulating information and can alter the information
asymmetry between the president and themselves.
Figure 4. Theoretical Framework: Who Affects Whom?
President Media Public
: Strong Influence
: Weak or Limited Influence
5. Conclusions
Figure 4 summarizes the theories used in this study. First, this study argues that
the news media significantly explain presidential leadership of and responsiveness to
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the public because information generally flows through the news media between the
president and the public. In other words, the news media can condition presidential
leadership of and responsive to the public. This study notes that the news media can
select and interpret information while they make news regarding the president and
the public. The news media intervene in the relationship between the president and
the public.
Second, this study argues that the relationships between the president, the news
media, and the public may be reciprocal. The news media can influence both the
public and the president. However, the news media may also be influenced by the
public and the president as long as the news media receive information from the
public and the public. Specifically, the news media may need to respond to the
public because of normative and economic concerns. In contrast, the influence of the
president on the news media is conditioned by political environments and other news
sources because the news media search/index various information sources.
Presidents try to influence the news media and the public for their own bene-
fit. However, the president also needs to respond to the news media and the public
to achieve their purposes, such as reelection and enacting their ideal policies. Fur-
thermore, this study stresses that presidential responsiveness to the news media is
more prominent than presidential responsiveness to the public primarily because the
president recognizes or believes the influence of the news media on the public.
Receiving most political information from elites, such as the president and the
news media, the public is likely to be influenced by the president and the news media.
However, the influence of the news media on the public is stronger than the influence of
the president on the public primarily because the public receives information directly
from the news media rather than the president. In addition, the news media often
interpret and evaluate presidential messages in news stories. In sum, this study argues
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that the reciprocity between the president, the news media, and the public should be
considered in order to explain the relationships between the three actors.
Even though this study considers the reciprocal relationships between the three
actors, this study stresses that the news media have a stronger impact on the public
than the president. Because the public receives most political information, such as
presidential messages, experts’ opinions, and public opinion changes, from the news
media, the public is more likely to be influenced by the news media. This study also
argues that the president is more directly and prominently respond to the news media
than to the public. As long as the president recognizes the impact of the news media
on the public, the president tends to respond to the news media in order to enhance
public support or avoid losing it. Finally, the relationship between the president and
the news media is like a tug of war. In contrast, the news media tend to respond to
the public because the news media are concerned about their ratings and readership.
To examine the relationships between the president, the news media, and the
public, this study measures each actor’s issue stance based on rhetoric, news stories,
and survey evidence. The following chapter introduces the data used this study uses.
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CHAPTER III
STUDY DESIGN
The main theory of this study is that the president, the news media, and the public
dynamically interact with one another in the democratic process. Specifically, this
study theorizes that the news media directly affect both the president and the public.
As the theoretical framework in Figure 1 shows, each actor may influence the other
actors. The first hurdle to examine the potentially reciprocal relationships between
the president, the news media, and the public is measuring each actor’s general issue
stances. The following sections introduce the methods and data used for measuring
the three actors’ issue stances and control variables. The second hurdle to examine
the reciprocal relationships between the three actors is modeling and empirically test-
ing the relationships. This chapter also includes econometric models and statistical
methods to test the theory.
1. Measuring Public Issue Stances
This study argues that the president and the news media may both affect and respond
to the public. To examine these arguments, the public’s issue stances should be
measured. The public’s issue stances are generally measured through public opinion
surveys. For instance, the Gallup organization asks respondents, “Do you consider
the amount of federal income tax which you have to pay as too high, about right, or
too low?” Each respondent’s answer can be aggregated as a percentage. For instance,
what percentage of respondents think that the amount of federal income tax is too
high, about right, and too low. The aggregated respondents’ attitudes form mass
public opinion.
Survey organizations ask citizens about their preferences on issues. Some issues
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have been asked about consistently while other issues have been asked about tem-
porarily. For instance, the Gallup organization has been asking citizens about their
preferences on the amount of federal income tax since 1952. In contrast, the Gallup
organization asked citizens about their preferences on the issue of having Alaska ad-
mitted as a state in the union in 1957 and 1958. Stimson (1991), analyzing various
survey questions from eight survey organizations,1 finds that nine domestic issues have
been consistently asked by survey organizations. The nine issues are race, welfare,
the environment, crime, education, urban problems, health care, military spending,
and size of government.
If some issues have been asked regularly by survey organizations, we can track the
public opinion changes through time. One way of examining public opinion changes
is tracking public opinion changes issue by issue. Shapiro and Jacobs (2001) argue
that the public develops issue preferences regarding specific issues. In other words,
“public opinion toward specific proposals apparently has moved in different direc-
tions” (Shapiro and Jacobs 2001, 154). If the public’s preferences change depending
on issues, presidential responsiveness to and leadership of the public should be studied
depending on issues.
Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson (1994), however, argue that the public tends
to fail at developing preferences on specific issues. Rather, according to Stimson
(1999, 20), “publics see every public issue through general dispositions.” That is,
one who thinks that government is responsible for social issues (or problems) is likely
to support more spending on social policies, such as welfare, education, race, health
care, and urban problems. Stimson (1991) shows that public attitudes toward the
1The eight survey organizations are Gallup, Harris, American National Election
Studies, National Opinion Research Center, Opinion Research Corporation, Roper,
Trendex, and Daniel Yankelovich (Stimson 1999, 143-149).
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nine domestic issues share a common issue space and change through time in a parallel
fashion. Based on his analysis, Stimson (1991) extracts a time series of the common
movement in public opinion changes for the nine domestic issues and labels the series
“Public Mood.”
Stimson’s global measure of public opinion changes reflects the relative liberalism-
conservatism of mass issue preferences. Certainly, not all political issues can be
categorized as liberal or conservative. However, the liberal-conservative categorization
is widely used in order to simplify political phenomenon and behavior. For instance,
parties can be categorized into the liberal (left) and conservative (right) party. The
median ideology of the Supreme Court can be estimated as a liberal-conservative
scale (e.g., Segal and Cover 1989; Martin and Quinn 2002). According to Poole and
Rosenthal (1991), most roll call votes in the postwar period can be placed on the
unidimensional liberal-conservative continuum. Also, legislators’ ideal positions can
be placed on the unidimensional liberal-conservative continuum (Poole and Rosenthal
1991; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004).
Stimson (1991) considers more government spending (less spending in military
and crime issues) and involvement in solving social problems as liberal preferences
and less government spending (more spending in military and crime issues) and in-
volvement in solving social problems as conservative preferences.2 Stimson’s public
issue liberalism measure captures the common movement in public opinion on the
nine domestic issues.
Stimson’s Public Mood is a general measure of public opinion changes. Stimson’s
quarterly Mood series runs from 1958 to 2008.3 Figure 5 graphs the quarterly public
2Survey questions and the rules of classifying liberal-conservative preferences Stim-
son (1999) used are listed in the Appendix.
3Stimson offers updated public liberalism data on his website.
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issue liberalism series (Public Mood). Even though Stimson (1991) uses a specific
algorithm to create the Public Mood series,4 it is based on the “Liberalism Index”,
which is the ratio of liberal policy preferences. For example, if 30 percent of respon-
dents prefer more welfare spending while 20 percent of respondents prefer less wel-
fare spending, the Liberalism Index score for welfare policy is 60=[30/(30+20)]*100.5
That is, basically, Public Mood reflects the public’s relative liberal preferences on the
nine domestic issues.
Figure 5. Standardized Public Mood
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4Stimson’s algorithm is presented in his book (Stimson 1999, 133-137).
5For more details about the Liberalism Index, see Stimson (1999, 40-44).
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Public Mood is presented in Figure 5. Since the public’s relative liberalism can
be more clearly illustrated through standardization, the public liberalism series is
standardized with its mean and standard deviation.6 The vertical (Y) axis is the
standard deviation from its mean. Zero on the Y axis means the mean of the public
mood. Positive (negative) numbers on the Y axis mean the public’s relative preference
for liberal (conservative) policies. According to this figure, the public seems to prefer
liberal policies to conservative policies in the early 1960s, the early 1970s, the late
1980s, and the early 1990s. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, however, the public
seems to prefer conservative policies to liberal policies.
Public Mood is widely used as a measure of general public issue preferences.
Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson (1995), for example, utilize Stimson’s public liberal-
ism series to examine democratic representation. Durr (1993) also utilizes this series
to explain public opinion changes. Wood and Lee (2009) use the standardized Public
Mood series to examine presidential responsiveness to the public.
As prior studies utilize Public Mood to examine public opinion changes, this
study uses Stimson’s quarterly Public Mood series as a measure of public issue stances.
Stimson’s measure fits for this study because one of the purposes of this study is to
investigate presidential and media responsiveness to the public. Also, this study
aims at explicating presidential and media leadership of the public. In addition,
since this study is interested in the general aspects of the relationships between the
president, the news media, and the public, the global measure of public issue stances
is appropriate for this study.
6Here standardization means that z = µ−µˆ
σ
.
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2. Measuring Presidential Issue Stances
This study aims at explaining presidential leadership and responsiveness. More specif-
ically, this study is interested in the questions: Do presidential issue stances affect the
public and the news media? Are presidential issue stances influenced by the public
and the news media? In order to address these questions, presidential issue stances
should be measured.
Previous studies have measured presidential issue stances in various ways. For
instance, Zupan (1992) utilizes presidential Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)
scores. He applies the ADA scores to presidential position taking on ADA identified
legislation. In his study (Zupan 1992, 356), presidential preferences are measured as
the percentage of presidential support for selected ADA votes (“Pro-ADA percent-
age”). Zupan’s presidential ADA rating data runs annually from 1947 to 1989.
McCarty and Poole (1995) apply the NOMINATE method developed by Poole
and Rosenthal (1985, 1991) to estimate presidential issue stances. Their measure is
based on presidential position taking on all congressional roll call votes. McCarty
and Poole (1995) treat presidents as if they were legislators and examine presidential
position taking on roll call votes. Since their spacial models consider that presidential
ideal position is fixed, each president’s issue stance is constant within the presidency.
Some studies investigating presidential responsiveness and leadership, such as
Kiewiet and McCubbins (1988), Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004), and Canes-Wrone
(2006), utilize presidential budget proposals as a proxy for presidential issue stances.
The basic idea of this approach is comparing presidential budget proposals with con-
gressional proposals and public preferences on specific issues related to presidential
budget proposals.
Others (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson
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2002; Bailey 2007) use mixed measures. Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson (1995)
measure presidential issue stances through examining presidential interactions with
the legislature and judiciary. To measure presidential issue stances, they (Stimson,
Mackuen, and Erikson 1995) use three indicators: presidential position taking on
the Congressional Quarterly key votes, the mean ADA rating of each party’s sup-
port/opposition group, and presidential position taking on judicial issues through
amicus curiae briefs filed by the Solicitor General. Similarly, Bailey (2007) measures
presidential liberalism by combining presidents’ positions on Supreme Court in Public
Papers of the Presidents and Solicitors General amicus filings and presidential posi-
tion taking on Senate and House roll call votes.7 In Bailey’s data, each presidency
has a fixed policy stance except Reagan and Clinton.8
Unlike these measures, Wood and Lee (2009) measure presidential issue stances
based on presidential rhetoric reported in Public Papers of the Presidents, which
includes all official presidential remarks. They name this measure “Presidential Lib-
eralism.” Wood and Lee (2009) code every presidential remark related to the nine
domestic issues from 1945 through 2005 into liberal and conservative, which is com-
parable with Stimson’s classification of public issue liberalism.
Wood and Lee (2009) code presidential remarks by utilizing both electronic
(Practical Extraction and Report Language: PERL) and human coding. Electronic
coding is used to extract appropriate sentences related to the nine domestic issues
by using keywords. Human coders then determine whether each sentence is liberal
or conservative. Their coding rules are basically identical to Stimson’s. That is, if
7Bailey (2007) uses McCarty and Poole’s data (1995) for presidential positions on
congressional votes.
8Bailey (2007) does not explain why he assumes that Reagan’s and Clinton’s issue
stances change unlike the other presidents’.
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sentences are about “more government spending or involvement in solving social is-
sues,” they are coded as liberal, and vice versa.9 The nine issues are chosen for the
comparability with Stimson’s Mood data.
Coding produces a count of liberal and conservative sentences in presidential re-
marks. Simply speaking, Presidential Liberalism is the difference between the number
of liberal sentences and the number of conservative sentences in a given time interval.
That is, Presidential Liberalism shows how frequently presidents mention their issue
preferences. Wood and Lee (2009) standardize each series of the nine issues and sum
the nine series to produce one general presidential issue liberalism series. Hence, each
issue is naturally weighted in the general presidential issue liberalism series. Because
Wood and Lee (2009) code day-to-day presidential rhetoric and record the date of
each remark, the data can be flexibly managed as monthly, quarterly, and yearly data.
Wood and Lee’s quarterly Presidential Liberalism is presented in Figure 6.
This figure clearly illustrates that presidents are ideological and partisan. Demo-
cratic presidents, Johnson, Carter, and Clinton, tend to speak liberally while Repub-
lican presidents, Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan, and Bush, tend to speak conservatively
in general. Since Wood and Lee’s Presidential Liberalism series is standardized with
its mean and standard deviation, more liberal means more liberal relative to its mean.
The X-axis represents time, and the Y-axis represents standard deviation. Positive
(negative) deviation means presidents send more liberal (conservative) messages.
Wood and Lee’s measure is comparable with other presidential liberalism mea-
sures. Figure 7 includes four presidential liberalism measures: Wood and Lee (2009),
Bailey (2007), McCarty and Poole (1995), and Zupan (1992). For the purpose of
comparability, all of these measures are standardized, and Wood and Lee’s measure
9The keywords and coding rules are presented in the Appendix
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Figure 6. Standardized Presidential Liberalism (Wood and Lee 2009)
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is transformed into annual data. Positive (negative) deviation means liberal (conser-
vative) in the panels. Noticeably, all of the measures seem to track together in the
figure. For instance, during the 1960s and the middle and late 1990s, all measures
show that presidential issue stances were liberal. During the 1980s and the early
1990s, presidents spoke and behaved conservatively according to the measures. The
most noticeable difference among the four measures is Eisenhower’s issue stances.
Wood and Lee’s and McCarthy and Poole’s measure show that Eisenhower was rela-
tively conservative during his entire two terms. However, Bailey’s measure suggests
that Eisenhower’s issue stances were relatively liberal and very close to the mean
level. According to Zupan’s measure, Eisenhower’s issue stances did not stay liberal
or conservative within his presidency.
As expected from Figure 7, the four measures are highly correlated with each
other. Table 1 lists the correlation coefficients between the presidential liberalism
measures. The correlation coefficients between Wood and Lee’s measure and the
other three measures are around .64 (Bailey), .77 (McCarthy and Poole), and .77
(Zupan), which implies that Wood and Lee’s presidential liberalism moves similarly
with the other three measures.
The correlation coefficients between Bailey’s, McCarthy and Poole’s, and Zupan’s
measure are larger than .9 in Table 1. This may be because all of these measures ba-
sically use presidential position taking on congressional votes. Also, unlike Wood and
Lee’s measure, McCarthy and Poole’s and Bailey’s measure do not vary within pres-
idencies.10 Hence, the correlation coefficients between Wood and Lee’s measure and
the other measures are relatively small compared to the other correlation coefficients
10Bailey (2007) allows within presidency variation exceptionally for Reagan and
Clinton. As Figure 7 illustrates, both Reagan and Clinton became more conservative
exponentially as time goes by (Bailey 2007, 441).
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Figure 7. Standardized Four Presidential Liberalism Measures
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in the table.
Table 1. Correlation between Presidential Issue Liberalism Measures
Wood and Lee Bailey McCarthy and Poole Zupan
Wood and Lee 1.00
Bailey 0.64 1.00
McCarthy and Poole 0.77 0.91 1.00
Zupan 0.77 0.90 0.93 1.00
This study uses Wood and Lee’s Presidential Liberalism as the measure of presi-
dential issue stances. Compared to the other measures, Wood and Lee’s measure has
several advantages for this study. First, the most common tool presidents use to per-
suade and respond to the public is their day-to-day rhetoric (Tulis 1987; Hart 1987).
“Since the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, popular or mass
rhetoric has become a principal tool of presidential governance” (Tulis 1987, 4). In
addition, Druckman and Holmes (2004) show that presidential rhetoric is an effec-
tive tool for priming and affects presidential popularity. Presidents converse with the
public with their rhetoric.11
Second, unlike other measures (McCarty and Poole 1995; Bailey 2007), Wood
and Lee’s Presidential Liberalism shows the variation in presidential issue liberalism
within each presidency. This study assumes that presidential leadership and respon-
siveness can vary within each presidency, not only between presidencies. Note that
public opinion changes within each presidency and even within years. If presidential
issue stances are fixed for four or eight years, it means that presidential issue stances
11Cohen (1999) also measures presidential issue stances based on presidential
rhetoric. However, Cohen’s measure is only based on presidents’ annual State of
the Union messages for 35 years (from 1953 through 1987), which may not be com-
prehensive and enough for a rigorous time-series analysis.
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do not affect public opinion changes during that time period, and vice versa. Some
studies (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Cohen 1999; Zupan 1992) and the bud-
get measures (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988; Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Canes-
Wrone 2006) allow the variation of presidential issue stances within each presidency
(annual). Wood and Lee’s measure, unlike any other measures, even tracks quarterly
changes in presidential liberalism.
Third, Wood and Lee’s Presidential Liberalism may be a comprehensive and
general measure of presidential issue stances. Unlike other studies, Wood and Lee
(2009) do not rely on interest group ratings (Zupan 1992) or budget proposals (Kiewiet
and McCubbins 1988; Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Canes-Wrone 2006) to measure
presidential issue stances. According to Snyder (1992), interest group ratings, such
as ADA scores, tend to exaggerate the degree of extremism. Also, since interest
group ratings are based on a limited number of issues selected by interest groups at
a given time, these measures may be biased (McCarty and Poole 1995). Similarly,
the budget estimates do not cover most political issues (McCarty and Poole 1995).
Furthermore, the budget estimates may not reflect true presidential issue preferences
because presidents strategically propose their proposals depending on the political
environment (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988).
Finally, Wood and Lee’s Presidential Liberalism is directly comparable with
Stimson’s public mood in terms of using the nine domestic issues to measure pres-
idential issue stances. For these reasons, this study uses Wood and Lee’s quarterly
Presidential Liberalism to examine presidential leadership and responsiveness.
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3. Measuring Media Biases
This study argues that the news media simultaneously affect the president and the
public. In the previous chapter, this study argues that the manner in which the news
media report social issues may affect presidential and public issue stances. Hence,
this study needs to measure how the news media cover social issues.
While public and presidential issue stances are gauged by using measures from
prior research, the relative liberalism of the news media is a product of this research.
This study measures the media’s ideological biases on the nine domestic issues used
by Stimson (1991) and Wood and Lee (2009). This study labels this measure “Media
Liberalism.” Virtually, no study empirically measures the relative liberalism of the
news media (media bias) through time.12
To investigate media influence on the public and the president, this study ex-
amines the relative liberalism and conservatism of media coverage regarding the nine
domestic issues. As presidents lead or respond to the public through their rhetoric,
the news media also influence presidential audiences using news stories. Thus, the
news media also affect policy making through the news they report and its impact
on public opinion and policymakers..
The manner in which the news media report issues and policies can be measured
as a count of liberal and conservative news stories regarding the issues and policies.
If the news media express liberal preferences, there will be more news stories favoring
liberal policies than conservative policies. Since this study measures media biases
regarding the nine domestic issues based on the liberal and conservative concept, this
relative measure of media liberalism is comparable with the liberalism measure of the
12Some studies (e.g., Groseclose and Milyo 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; Ho
and Quinn 2008) measure media bias (liberal-conservative) across media outlets.
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public (Stimson 1991) and the president (Wood and Lee 2009).
This study codes news stories related to the nine domestic issues into liberal and
conservative stories, just as Public Mood (Stimson 1991) and Presidential Liberalism
(Wood and Lee 2009) are constructed. The criteria for coding news stories into
liberal and conservative follow the same criteria that the previous studies (Stimson
1991; Wood and Lee 2009; Wood 2009) use. Basically, liberal news stories contain the
messages that government should take more active roles in solving social problems.
In contrast, conservative news stories contain the messages that government should
take less active roles in solving social problems.13
3.1. News Source: New York Times
As a news source, the New York Times is chosen to retrieve news stories. First, this
study chooses a newspaper rather than an electronic media outlet because print media
generally carry quantitatively and qualitatively various information about social issues
(Bartels 1996; Graber 2006). In addition, according to Graber (2006, 182), “most
people view print media as sources of information, whereas people view electronic
media as sources of entertainment.” Since this study measures media biases regarding
social issues, this study chooses a print media source rather than an electronic media
source.
Among various print media outlets, the New York Times is selected because this
newspaper is arguably the most influential elite newspaper. Journalists often use peer
sources to select news. According to Gans (2004, 126) who studies news selection of
the news media, “the New York Times is a primary peer source inasmuch as the
size and quality of its editorial and reporting staff are taken as guarantors of the
13The details of the coding rules are listed in the Appendix.
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best professional news judgment.” In other words, the Times affects other media’s
news selection. Explaining “pack journalism,” Graber (2006, 40) also states that “for
political news, the New York Times is the lion whom the jackals follow,” which means
that the Times leads news stories in other news media outlets.
Bartels (1996), in fact, shows that the New York Times has a larger impact
on agenda setting than other news media outlets and lead news stories. Certainly,
due to the representativeness and the impact of the Times on the other news media
outlets, this newspaper has been widely used in prior research (e.g., Sigal 1973; Brown
et al. 1987). For instance, in political science, Blood and Phillips (1995) and De Boef
and Kellstedt (2004) have utilized the New York Times to analyze news stories in
the news media. In practice, unlike other newspapers, we can retrieve news stories
(printed version) in the New York Times from 1851 to 2004, which includes the time
span of the other data sets this study uses.
3.2. Sampling News Stories
To construct the media liberalism measure, both machine and human approaches are
utilized. Machine searches are used to retrieve news stories related to the nine issues.
Specifically, “Proquest” (http://www.proquest.com/) is used to retrieve news stories
in the New York Times from 1958 through 2004, which matches with the time span
of the other two data sets. Proquest offers keyword searches. Using the keyword
searches, we can extract news stories related to each issue.14
Wood and Lee (2009) also use keywords to retrieve relevant presidential remarks
from Public Papers of the President. However, their keywords are so general that the
results often retrieve too many news stories. As a result, some stories are relevant,
14The keywords are listed in the Appendix.
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but others are irrelevant. To extract news stories more efficiently, this study modifies
some of the keywords in Wood and Lee (2009).
Even though this study uses the modified keywords, still too many news stories
contain the keywords. It is virtually impossible to code all of the news stories retrieved
by using the keywords in the Appendix. Hence, first, this study extracts news stories
including the modified keywords in their abstract (for the appropriateness of using
keywords and abstract, see Althaus, Edy, and Phalen 2001).15 Second, this study
randomly selects 10% of the news stories from the retreived news stories.16 These two
steps reduce the number of news stories and make it practical to code a manageable
sample of news stories.
Even though this study uses modified keywords, not all extracted news stories
on each issue are relevant to the target issue. The articles from the ten percent
random sampling should be checked as to whether or not they deal with the target
issue. Hence, first, the abstracts of selected news stories are read and judged for their
relevance to the target issue. Second, after this relevance check, ten percent of the
news stories are randomly selected and coded into liberal and conservative stories.
In order to code news stories into liberal and conservative, the full texts of selected
news stories are examined, not just the abstracts.
An example is helpful to explain the coding procedures. Assume that there are
15However, Woolley (2000) criticizes this approach. Especially, he questions the
appropriateness of using this approach to count the number of news stories related
to specific issues without verifying the contents in abstracts.
16Ten percent sampling is determined based on sampling theory (Cochran 1977;
Bartlett, Kotrlik, and Higgins 1994). According to Cochran’s formula for calculat-
ing sample size, ten percent sampling produces enough samples for this study. The
number of news stories about the Size of Government issue is over 4,000, which is
the smallest number among the nine issues. In this case the sample size based on
ten percent sampling is 400. When the size of population is 4,000, the appropriate
sample size is 362 with ±5 percent sampling error.
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6,000 articles extracted by using keywords on an issue. First, randomly select ten
percent from the 6,000 articles, which is 600. Second, check the 600 articles as to
whether the stories are relevant to the target issue. If the number of relevant stories
is 400, the proportion of relevant stories is 2/3 of the 6,000 stories. Because the
proportion of relevant stories is 2/3, it is possible to infer that 2 out of 3 stories
are relevant in the 6,000 extracted articles. That is, 4,000 stories might be the right
number of relevant stories among the 6,000 extracted stories. If 4,000 is the potentially
right number of relevant stories, ten percent of 4,000 is 400. Accordingly, 400 stories
are randomly sampled from the 6,000 extracted articles. These 400 stories are then
coded. If the articles are not about the target issue, then replace them and re-sample
them until all 400 articles are relevant to the target issue.
3.3. Coding News Stories
Sampled news stories are coded into liberal (1), neutral (0), and conservative (-1)
based on the intentions of news stories. For efficient coding, this study first retrieves
news stories issue by issue. However, since Proquest does not show a large number of
news stories at one time, news stories are monthly searched. For instance, by using
the keywords in the Appendix, 162 news stories regarding the race issue are retrieved
in October 1958. According to the ten percent sampling, sixteen news stories are
read. Among the sixteen stories, six stories are about racial issues. Finally, six news
stories about racial issues are extracted and coded into the three categories according
to the coding rules in the Appendix. In this instance, two stories are coded as neutral,
and four are coded as liberal.
Common stories containing specific intentions regarding the nine issues are in-
troducing politicians’, experts’, and/or journalists’ opinions (including investigative
news stories). Liberal news stories basically contain the arguments that government
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is responsible for social problems and should take active roles to resolve them. In
contrast, the conservatives generally argue that individuals are responsible for social
problems, and they should be resolved by individuals, private organizations, and/or
religious organizations rather than by government. These are general rules and can-
not be applied to some issues, such as the crime issue. Depending on issues, more
specific rules are needed.
Related to the issues of welfare, education, health care, race, and urban problems,
liberal arguments generally mean that government should be more active and spend
more money to resolve these issues. News stories are coded as conservative when they
report the arguments that government should take less active roles and/or spend less
money to resolve the issues. If news stories are about supporting/suggesting/praising
liberal policies, such as medicaid, public housing, desegregation/integration, and
affirmative action, they are coded as liberal. If news stories are about support-
ing/suggesting/praising conservative policies, they are coded as conservative. Some-
times, the news media report public opinion poll results regarding specific policies.
If news stories report that the majority of survey respondents support/prefer liberal
policies, they are basically coded as liberal, and vice versa, as long as the stories do
not show any specific intention or interpretation related to the poll results.17
Regarding the environment issue, liberal news stories generally contain the ar-
guments that we need more regulations (for industries) to protect the environment
and spend more public money for the environment. In contrast, the conservatives
prefer private measures to resolve the environmental issues. If news stories introduce
the arguments that the environmental problems are overrated and support industrial
development rather than environmental protection, they are coded as conservative.
17More specific coding rules for the issues are listed in the Appendix.
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Some news stories deal with global environmental problems. If news stories state
that the U.S. should take active roles to solve global environmental problems, they
are generally coded as liberal.18
Liberal news stories related to the crime issue generally report the arguments
that crime problems can be solved by rehabilitation and/or prevention rather than by
stronger punishment and/or stricter law enforcement, and government should spend
more money for rehabilitation and prevention measures. Conservative news stories
stress stronger punishment and/or stricter law enforcement to reduce crime problems
and more government spending for punishment and law enforcement measures. The
gun control issue is categorized as the crime issue. Supporting stricter gun control
is basically coded as liberal, and vice versa. The crime issue also includes the issue
of death penalty. Supporting death penalty is coded as conservative. Liberal stories
generally oppose death penalty.19
In relation to the issue of military spending, liberal stories favor reducing expen-
ditures for national defense, security, and the military. Conservative stories advocate
increasing these expenditures. Generally speaking, conservative stories regarding the
issue of size of government support the measures that would reduce government regu-
lations, spending, or taxation. Some of the news stories regarding the issue of size of
government are about taxation. Supporting a progressive tax is coded as liberal. If
news stories contain the argument that the rich should be taxed more than the poor,
they are coded as liberal. If news stories are about opposing progressive taxation
and stress the principle of equal tax rate regardless of income level, they are coded as
conservative. News stories supporting tax cut for the rich are coded as conservative.
18More specific coding rules for the issue of the environment are listed in the
Appendix.
19The Appendix lists more coding rules in detail about the crime issue.
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News stories are coded as neutral if the arguments in news stories are not clearly
expressed. Also, when news stories contain both liberal and conservative arguments,
they are coded as neutral. However, if one argument is disproportionately more
covered than the other argument in news stories, news stories are coded according to
the more covered argument. Similarly, if one argument is supported in news stories,
they are coded according to the supported argument. Some news stories contain
only objective information, such as introducing objective policies and vote results
in the House/Senate. The objective information is coded as neutral. Depending on
issues, specific rules are applied to determine neutral stories. More coding rules about
neutral news stories are introduced in detail in the Appendix.
3.4. Constructing Media Liberalism
Like Presidential Liberalism (Wood and Lee 2009), Media Liberalism is measured as
the difference between the sum of liberal stories and the sum of conservative stories
during each quarter. Note that news stories are extracted monthly and issue by
issue.20 Hence, nine time series according to the nine issues are produced after coding.
Each monthly series is transformed into a quarterly series through aggregation. Then,
each series is standardized with respect to its mean and standard deviation. Finally,
the nine standardized quarterly series are summed up into one general series and
divided by nine: Media Liberalism.
The standardization process reduces the possibility of overemphasizing the re-
spective counts of news stories. For instance, if the nine series are summed without
20In the cases of size of government and military spending, news stories are retrieved
based on a multiple year term. Since the number of news stories regarding these issues
is relatively small, the news stories are extracted based on a multiple year term to
avoid dropping news stories due to the ten percent sampling. However, because each
coded news story’s year and month are recorded, this special extraction does not
affect the aggregation and standardization process.
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standardization, the most frequently dealt issue is likely to be overemphasized in the
final series and dominantly affect the final series. However, if each series is standard-
ized and summed into one series, the number of stories related to the most frequently
dealt issue becomes normalized. On the other hand, the standardization and aggre-
gation process gives natural weights on each issue. If one series varies more than
other series in a given time period, this series is automatically weighted through the
standardization and aggregation process.
The aggregation process also drops out possible coding errors as long as they are
not systematic. For instance, a neutral story is mistakenly coded as liberal (1) in one
issue, and another neutral story is mistakenly coded as conservative (-1) in another
issue. Then, the aggregation process cancels out these two errors. Because this study
codes news stories separately and sums them up quarterly, possible coding errors do
not significantly affect the final media liberalism series as long as the coding rules are
valid and consistent with the liberal-conservative concept.
The number of news stories this study utilizes to construct Media Liberalism is
listed in Table 2. The “Race” issue is the largest (2,369) issue, and the smallest issue
is the “Military Spending” issue (266). In total, 22,455 news stories are read, and
9,013 news stories are coded into the liberal (4,365), neutral (3,588), or conservative
(1,060) category. Certainly, a lot of stories are neutral, but as illustrated in this table,
the Times send more liberal stories in general (the total mean is .320).
Figure 8 illustrates quarterly Media Liberalism from the fourth quarter of 1958
through 2004, which is standardized with its mean and standard deviation. This
media liberalism series shows the general dynamics of the news media’s issue stances.
Generally speaking, during the 1960s, the news media seemed to produce more liberal
news stories. However, during the 1970s and the early 1980s, the news media seemed
to produce more conservative news stories. Since the mid 1980s, the series seems to
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Table 2. Coding Summary: Media Liberalism
Issue Extracted Read Coded Lib. Neu. Con. Mean
Education 13,252 1,325 871 431 299 141 .739
Health 14,687 1,469 869 441 266 162 .321
Crime 32,244 3,224 908 277 472 159 .129
Urban Problem 18,910 1,891 677 267 364 46 .326
Welfare 21,238 2,124 927 456 300 171 .307
Race 84,880 8,488 2,369 1,486 756 127 .573
The Environment 29,595 2,960 1,751 837 820 94 .424
Military Spending 5,710 571 266 76 147 43 .124
Size of Government 4,028 403 375 94 164 117 -.061
Total 224,544 22,455 9,013 4,365 3,588 1,060 .320
oscillate around the mean.
4. Control Variables
Again, these three variables are potentially endogenous, mutually causing one an-
other. However, this study also considers exogenous variables that can affect the
endogenous variables. For example, economic and political conditions and events can
affect the president, the news media, and the public. This section introduces the
exogenous variables.
Durr (1993) argues that economic conditions significantly affect public issue lib-
eralism. People who expect bad national economic conditions are less likely to support
liberal social policies. People tend to support benevolent social policies when their
economic expectations are rosy. This logic can be extended to the other actors. Pres-
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Figure 8. Standardized Media Liberalism
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idents are unlikely to support more social spending when economic conditions are
declining as long as they consider public opinion. Economic conditions can affect
news stories as they affect the public and the president. In addition, the economy
itself may affect the number of news stories dealing with social issues. When the
national economy is down, the news media may focus more on the national economy
rather than social issues. In general, by extending Durr’s arguments, we can theorize
that the actors focus on reinvigorating the national economy rather than spending
more money for the social problems when national economic situations are cloudy.
To control the effects of the economy on the actors’ issue stances, this study
83
measures people’s evaluations of national economic conditions and objective economic
conditions. The Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) is used to measure people’s
evaluations of national economic conditions. The ICS is constructed based on survey
questions on economic conditions. To measure the general state of the economy, the
Conference Board’s Composite Index of Coincident Indicators (CICI) is used. This
index is constructed based on four time series chosen by the Conference Board.21
The Composite Index comprehensively reflects current national economic conditions
(Conference-Board 2001).
Previous studies (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Wood 2009), however,
show that the public and the president differently react to different economic prob-
lems. Both Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) and Wood (2009) show that the
president and the public tend to express more liberal preferences when unemploy-
ment is high but more conservative preferences when inflation is high. As stated in
the previous chapter, this study also argues that the news media are likely to support
liberal policies when the unemployment rate is high. In contrast, the news media
are likely to support conservative policies when inflation rate is high. To control this
possibility, this study considers unemployment and inflation rate as control variables.
Another exogenous variable is the political environment. Who controls the pres-
idency and Congress may affect the presidential, public, and media liberalism. What
types of Congress presidents face may be important for presidential issue liberalism.
For instance, when presidents are not supported by Congress, they are likely to go
public (send more partisan messages) to earn public support and attain power for ne-
gotiating with Congress (Neustadt 1990; Kernell 1993). On the contrary, presidents
21The four time series comprising the Composite Index are payroll employment,
personal income, industrial production, and manufacturing and trade sales (The last
three are in 1996 dollars.). (Conference Board. 2001. Business Cycle Indicators
Handbook. New York: The Conference Board.).
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are likely to send fewer partisan messages when they expect that Congress is unlikely
to support their agendas. Note that presidents are rational actors considering the
costs and benefits of their behavior. In fact, Wood and Lee (2009) and (Wood 2009)
reveal that presidents tend to send fewer partisan messages when they face a Congress
unfavorable to them.
The political environment can also influence the news media and the public.
The news media may try to check unified governments if they play a role of the
fourth branch of government (Carter 1959). On the contrary, under unified govern-
ments, news stories may reflect the dominant party’s arguments because the major
news sources, the president and Congress, send similar messages to the news media
(Bennett 1990). Similarly, the public may react or respond to the political environ-
ment. According to Wlezien (1995), the public tends to thermostatically react to
changing policies to check government. By the same reasoning, the public may react
to the government thermostatically. For instance, if the Democratic (Republican)
party holds both the presidency and Congress, the public may express more conser-
vative (liberal) issue attitudes. On the contrary, if the public receives most of their
political information from the news media and political elites, the public may posi-
tively respond to government. Especially, when one party holds both the presidency
and Congress, the dominant party is likely to affect the public because the public
is likely to receive similar political messages from the dominant party and the news
media.
To control for political conditions, this study measures possible government
types, which is a mixture of who controls each branch and government type (e.g.
Democrat President and Congress, Republican President and Democrat Congress,
Republican President and Congress, and so on). In addition, to controlling for the
possible influence of Congress on the three actors, this study includes the ideological
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stances of the House and Senate by utilizing the DW-NOMINATE median score of
Senate and the House (Poole and Rosenthal 1991). Poole and Rosenthal (1991) found
that legislators’ voting patterns and their ideal positions are two-dimensional. The
first dimension is about social policies, such as welfare. This dimension is catego-
rized as liberal and conservative. The second dimension is about civil rights (regional
politics), supporting civil rights or not.22
Finally, political events are included as control variables. Political events can
affect the president, the news media, and the public simultaneously. For instance,
the September 11th attack might affect issue stances of the public, the news media,
and the president. Based on Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002, 52), a critical
events series is created, which includes updated events: the September 11th tragedy
(September 2001) and the U.S. invasion of Iraq (April 2003). If an event is assumed
to move actors to the liberal (conservative) side, it is coded as 1 (-1). For instance,
the September 11th tragedy is coded as -1, and the Iran-Contra scandal is coded as
1.
5. Models and Methods
In order to consider the potential reciprocity between the three actors and address
the question, “who affects whom?”, each actor should be treated simultaneously as
a dependent variable and the other variables as independent variables. This study
measures presidential, media, and public issue stances as Public Mood, Presidential
Liberalism, and Media Liberalism. Denote Presidential Liberalism, Media Liberalism,
and Public Mood as x, y, and z. Consider that current Presidential Liberalism (xt)
is affected by its own past realization (xt−1), current Media Liberalism (yt), current
22The DW scores are presented in the website: http://voteview.com/default.htm.
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Public Mood (zt), and their past realizations (yt−1 and zt−1). If each actor is treated
as a dependent variable and the other actors as independent variables, it can be
expressed as the multivariate system:
xt = b10 − b12yt − b13zt + γ11xt−1 + γ12yt−1 + γ13zt−1 + xt
yt = b20 − b21xt − b23zt + γ21yt−1 + γ22xt−1 + γ23zt−1 + yt
zt = b30 − b31xt − b32yt + γ31zt−1 + γ32xt−1 + γ33yt−1 + zt
where it is assumed that the error terms (xt, yt, zt) are white-noise disturbances
and uncorrelated each other: E(i)=0, E(ii)=σi, E(ij)=0 (i 6= j). These multi-
variate equations include contemporaneous effects: b12, b13, b21, b23, b31, b32. Hence, a
usable reduced form is required. The equations in the multivariate system can be
transformed as:
BHt = C0 + Γ1Ht−1 + Ut (3.1)
where Ht =

xt
yt
zt
, B =

1 b12 b13
b21 1 b23
b31 b32 1
, C0 =

c10
c20
c30
, Γ1 =

γ11 γ12 γ13
γ21 γ22 γ23
γ31 γ32 γ33
,
Ht−1 =

xt−1
yt−1
zt−1
, and Ut =

xt
yt
zt
.
Multiply B−1 to both sides. Then, an estimable equation is derived:
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Ht = A0 + A1Ht−1 + Et. (3.2)
where A0 =

a10
a20
a30
 , A1 =

a11 a12 a13
a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33
, and Et =

ext
eyt
ezt
.
This study basically estimates the multivariate vector autoregression model:
VAR(p), VAR model of order p. This Vector AutoRegression method is used to
estimate the possible multidirectional relationships between variables (Sims 1980;
Lu¨tkepohl 2005). In order to provide comparability, this study standardizes each of
the three liberalism measures with its mean and standard deviation.
This study tests stationarity of the series. If these series are cointegrated, any
hypothesis test results based on the VAR may be incorrect Phillips (1986). Various
stationary tests are used to test stationarity of the three series.23 The test results
are presented in the Appendix. The unit root test results generally show that Media
Liberalism and Presidential Liberalism are stationary. However, Public Mood may be
non-stationary according to the ADF and KPSS test results but stationary according
to Bayesian Odds Ratio test results.
Even though the Public Mood series might be non-stationary, using VAR is
appropriate without differencing the series. Sims and his colleagues (Sims 1980; Sims,
Stock, and Watson 1990) argue that the major purpose of the VAR analysis is to
23Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller 1979; Dickey and Fuller
1981), KPSS test (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin 1992), and Bayesian
Odds Ratio test (Sims 1988) are used.
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examine the direction of relationships between endogenous variables, not to examine
the parameter estimates. Since differencing eliminates the information about the
co-movements of endogenous variables, they do not recommend differencing for non-
stationary series in a VAR system. In case of hypothesis testing, according to Phillips
(1986), using non-stationary series is appropriate as long as endogenous variables are
not cointegrated. Hence, the VAR approach is appropriate for this study. Note that
only one of the variables might be integrated.24
The VAR approach is used to examine the direction of the relationships between
the three variables. Using the VAR method, we can control the inertia of each variable
by including multiple lags in the system (Sims 1980; Freeman, Williams, and Lin
1989). Based on the results of likelihood ratio test and information criteria, such as
Akaike’s Information Criterion (Akaike 1973), this study includes four lags of each
variable in the VAR system. The Granger causality test (Granger 1969) treats the lags
as a block and examines whether the lags collectively affect the endogenous variables
in the system.
The Granger (1969) test is used to examine Granger causality between the three
variables. As Lu¨tkepohl (2005) shows, however, the absence of Granger causality does
not necessarily mean no causal relationship between variables. Also, the Granger test
does not show the magnitude and polarity of relationships. That is, from the Granger
causality tests we cannot know whether the relationship is “strong and weak” and
“negative or positive.”
As an approach to sorting out these concerns, this study uses the Moving Average
Representation (MAR) method, which is a simulation based on the estimated VAR
system (Sims 1980). Note that the equation (3.2) can be rewritten as “moving average
24Note that prior studies using Stimson’s Public Mood consider that the Public
Mood series is stationary. Stimson also claims that the series is stationary.
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representation” under the stability assumption: |aij| < 1 in A1 matrix. That is, the
process Ht has a representation,
Ht = µ+
∞∑
i=0
AiEt−i (3.3)
where µ is

x
y
z
.
Note that Et = B
−1Ut. Hence, (3.3) is equivalent to
Ht = µ+
∞∑
i=0
AiB−1Ut−i = µ+
∞∑
i=0
φiUt−i (3.4)
where φi is a 3 x 3 matrix, A
iB−1 =

φ11(i) φ12(i) φ13(i)
φ21(i) φ22(i) φ23(i)
φ31(i) φ32(i) φ33(i)

This φ matrix in the (3.4) shows the effects of the disturbances (xt−i, yt−i, zt−i)
on the dependent variables (xt, yt, zt). The elements in the φ matrix are called “im-
pulse response functions” (Enders 2004, 274). If a shock (innovation) is given to the φ
matrix, the impact of the shock on the dependent variables can be traced by plotting
the impulse response functions. Since AiB−1 cannot be identified, however, additional
restriction needs to be imposed on the B matrix. By utilizing the Choleski decompo-
sition, the B matrix can be orthogonalized. The Choleski decomposition transforms
the B matrix into a triangular matrix, which means that this decomposition forces
(n2 − n)/2 values of the B matrix to equal zero. For instance, b21, b31, and b32 in the
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B matrix can be restricted as zero. Then, the AiB−1 matrix becomes identifiable,
and the impulse responses are traceable. However, when using the Choleski factoriza-
tion, if there are significant contemporaneous correlations between the residuals, the
results of the Moving Average Representation (MAR) analysis can be affected by the
ordering of the endogenous variables. Hence, it is important to check the contempo-
raneous covariance matrix of disturbances, as well as evaluate alternative orderings
for robustness of the results. This study acknowledges this concern and discusses it
in the following chapter.
The MAR analysis shows how a simulated shock to one variable influences the
other variables. The simulation results will show the direction and magnitude of
each relationship. In this study, confidence intervals of the effects are calculated by
using Monte Carlo integration and the fractile method recommended by Sims and
Zha (1999). The simulation results show who influences whom and the direction and
magnitude of the influence. The VAR-X variant is used to include exogenous variables
in the system.
6. Conclusions
This study investigates the potentially reciprocal relationships between the president,
the news media, and the public. In order to examine the relationships, each actor’s
issue stances should be measured. This chapter discusses the measurement and data
for the three actors’ issue stances and control variables.
Stimson (1991) measures the public’s issue stances based on survey results. An-
alyzing the public’s attitudes toward domestic issues, Stimson constructs a general
public opinion movement, Public Mood. This movement is plotted on the liberal-
conservative continuum through time. If Public Mood moves toward the liberal (con-
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servative) side, this generally means that the public prefers more (less) government
spending/involvement regarding social issues, such as welfare, health care, and edu-
cation. Stimson’s Public Mood is a global measure of public opinion changes, which
fits for this study investigating the general relationships between the president, the
news media, and the public.
As a measure of presidential issue stances, this study uses Wood and Lee’s Pres-
idential Liberalism (2009). Compared to other measures of presidential issue stances,
this presidential liberalism measure has some major advantages for this study. First
of all, Presidential Liberalism is based on presidential rhetoric. Presidents mainly use
their rhetoric to persuade the public and other elites. Also, presidents respond to the
public and other elites through their rhetoric. Second, unlike other measures, Wood
and Lee’s Presidential Liberalism varies within presidencies and years. Hence, we can
examine presidential responsiveness and leadership in detail. Finally, this presidential
liberalism measure is comparable with Stimson’s Public Mood because Presidential
Liberalism is measured based on the liberal-conservative concept and based on the
nine domestic issues.
This study measures media biases on social issues to construct a media liberalism
measure and labels it “Media Liberalism”. This study codes news stories into liberal
and conservative. Simply speaking, liberal (conservative) news stories contain the
messages about more (less) government spending/involvement to solve social prob-
lems. As presidents converse with the public and other elites through their rhetoric,
the news media use news stories to converse with the public and the president. The
news media make news of the public and the president. The public and the president
consume news stories. Hence, constructing a media liberalism measure based on news
stories is appropriate for this study investigating the influence and responsiveness of
the news media. For the purpose of comparability with Public Mood and Presidential
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Liberalism, this study measures media biases on the nine domestic issues. This me-
dia liberalism measure comprehensively shows changing media biases through time
(1958-2004).
Beyond these three actors’ issue stances, some control variables are introduced
in this chapter. The variables are political and economic conditions and events.
The control variables may simultaneously affect the president, the news media, and
the public. Political conditions are measured as types of government (e.g., Democrat
president, Democrat House, Republican Senate) and median legislator’s issue position
in Senate and the House. Economic conditions are measured as the public’s economic
perceptions (Index of Consumer Sentiment) and the state of the national economy
(Conference Board’s Composite Index of Coincident Indicators and unemployment
and inflation rate). Finally, critical political events are included as control variables.
These variables are used to test the theories presented in the previous chapter.
Since this study theorizes multidirectional relationships between the president, the
news media, and the public, the VAR approach is applied to test the theory. The
Granger causality test is utilized to examine who Granger causes whom. However,
because the Granger causality has some limitations, this study also applies the MAR
method to examine the magnitude and polarity of the influence of one variable to the
other variables. In the following chapter, this study examines the reciprocity between
the president, the news media, and the public and tries to answer to the question:
“who affects whom?”
93
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
One of the purposes of this study is analyzing the relationship between elites and
the public. More specifically, this study focuses on presidential leadership of and
responsiveness to the public. Unlike prior research, this study argues that the news
media significantly intervene in the interaction between the president and the public
and theorizes that the relationships between the president, the news media, and the
public are potentially reciprocal. However, while the direct relationship between
the president and the public is weak and indirect, the news media significantly and
directly affect both the president and the public. The theoretical framework of this
study is summarized in Figure 4.
To answer the question, “who affects whom?,” this study analyzes three actors’
issue stances from 1958 through 2004. As statistical methods, the VAR, Granger
causality test, and MAR methods are utilized. To examine how the news media
interact with the other actors, interaction models are utilized. The measures and
statistical methods were introduced in the previous chapter. This chapter presents
the results from the statistical tests.
1. VAR Results
Before answering the question, “who affects whom?”, this section introduces what
factors affect the three endogenous variables besides themselves. Each variable in
the VAR should be affected by a set of exogenous variables as well as being mu-
tually determined by one another. The effects of the exogenous variables can be
examined through the VAR regressions. Note that the three endogenous variables
are simultaneously treated as the dependent and independent variables. Four lags of
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each endogenous variable are included as independent variables to control the inertia
of the endogenous variables.1 The Granger causality test treats these four lags as
a block and examines whether the blocks of the four lags of the endogenous vari-
ables collectively affect the dependent variables (The Granger causality test results
are introduced in the following section).2 This section introduces the VAR results by
focusing on the exogenous variables.
1.1. Explaining Presidential Issue Stances
This study considers that political and economic conditions may affect the endogenous
variables. As the political environment, government types and congressional policy
positions are included in the VAR system. In this study, “government type” means
which party holds the presidency and Congress, such as Republican Congress and
Democratic Congress in Model 1 and 4 in Table 3. Divided Congress is represented
in the constant term, and presidential party is coded as a dummy variable (Republi-
can=1, Democrat=0). Also, as seen in Table 3, this study includes all possible types
of government formation in Model 2. Republican President/Divided Congress is rep-
resented in the constant term (There is no case of Democratic President/Divided
Congress during the time span (1958-2004) this study examines.). Another polit-
ical environment variable is congressional policy positions, which are measured as
the median legislator’s policy position in Senate and the House based on the DW-
1This study utilizes information criteria, such as AIC and BC, and likelihood ratio
tests to determine the appropriate lag length.
2Interpreting the individual coefficients on the endogenous variables is inappro-
priate because collinearity and feedback effects between variables can make the coef-
ficients misleading. Hence, the tables reporting the VAR results do not include the
lagged variables.
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NOMINATE scores.3
As long as presidents are politicians, the argument that political conditions signif-
icantly influence presidential behavior is quite obvious. The results in Table 3 support
this argument. The statistical results in Model 1 and 4 illustrate that presidential
rhetoric is significantly explained by their partisanship. Republican presidents, as ex-
pected, speak conservatively, and Democratic presidents send more liberal messages.
Model 2 in Table 3, beyond the simple explanation, shows how presidents respond to
who controls Congress.
Some studies, such as Kernell (1993), argue that presidents tend to go public
and send more partisan messages when they face unfavorable Congresses. When
the public supports presidential agendas, presidents can use the public’s support as
their leverage to bargain with Congress (Neustadt 1990). In order to persuade the
public to support their policies, presidents need to send more messages to the public.
Accordingly, presidents are likely to send more partisan messages when they expect
that Congress is unlikely to pass their agendas.
In contrast, Wood and Lee (2009) reveal that presidents tend to reduce liberal
messages when they face unfavorable Congresses (see also, Wood (2009, 115)). If
presidents expect that Congress will support their liberal agendas, presidents send
more liberal messages. However, when Congress is unlikely to support presidential
liberal agendas, presidents are less likely to speak about their agendas as long as
presidents are rational actors considering costs and benefits of their behavior. The
results in Table 3 are consistent with this reasoning.
According to the results from Model 2, Democrat presidents tend to increase
3Certainly, alternative measures might be used, such as the proportion of one party
in the House and Senate, ideological distance between the two parties’ median voters,
and ideological distance between the president and the House and Senate (Wood and
Lee 2009; Wood 2009).
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Table 3. VAR Results: Explaining Presidential Liberalism
V ariables Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
Constant 0.692 0.114 0.124 0.188
(1.95) (0.35) (0.26) (0.37)
Event 0.097 0.089 0.131 0.088
(1.16) (1.05) (1.26) (1.04)
ICSt−1 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.000
(-1.66) (-1.61) (-0.26) (-0.09)
CICIt−1 0.112 0.106 0.175
(0.85) (0.81) (1.00)
Unemployment(∆)t−1 0.044
(0.41)
Inflationt−1 0.018
(0.95)
Rep. Congress 0.600 0.602
(5.34) (8.40)
Dem. Congress 0.106 0.092
(0.93) (0.76)
Rep. President -0.556 -0.587
(-6.22) (-6.21)
Dem. President/Rep. Congress 1.237
(8.28)
Rep. President/Dem. Congress 0.124
(1.08)
Dem. President/Dem. Congress 0.666
(6.37)
Rep. President/Rep. Congress 0.490
(3.23)
House-DW-1st 0.006
(0.01)
Senate-DW-1st 0.214
(0.25)
House-DW-2nd 0.212
(0.26)
Senate-DW-2nd -0.191
(-0.12)
N 179 179 179 179
p(Q) 0.18 0.16 0.02 0.21
AIC 138.99 154.67 155.14 154.58
Note: The numbers in the table are coefficients and t-statistics (in paren-
theses). All models include the lagged endogenous variables. Four lags
of each endogenous variable are included in the system. N : Number of
observations. p(Q): p value of the Q statistic (Ljung and Box 1978).
AIC: Akaike’s Information Criterion.
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liberal messages when they face Democrat Congresses. In Model 2, the coefficient of
the Democratic President/Democratic Congress variable is .666, which is statistically
significant (t=6.37) at the α level .10. Note that the numbers in the parentheses in
the table are t-statistics. These results are consistent with Wood and Lee (2009) and
Wood (2009).
Another case of unified government is Republican President/Republican Congress.
In Table 3, the statistics of this variable illustrate that Republican presidents tend
to send more liberal messages when the Republican party holds Congress in Model 2
(coefficients=.490, t=3.23), which is consistent with Wood and Lee’s argument that
presidents tend to send more liberal messages when they expect congressional support
for liberal agendas. However, this may just explain the case of G.W. Bush’s last two
years of his first term because the case of Republican President/Republican Congress
only occurred during the G.W. Bush presidency (2003-2004). Figure 6 in the previ-
ous chapter shows that president G.W. Bush noticeably increased liberal messages
during 2003 and 2004 even though he significantly sent more conservative messages
in general during his entire term.4
The results in Table 3, however, show that Democrat presidents send more liberal
messages even when Democrat presidents face Republican Congresses. The coefficient
of the Democratic President/Republican Congress variable is 1.237, which is statis-
tically significant (t=8.28) in Model 2. This statistically significant result seems to
support the argument that presidents tend to go public and send more partisan mes-
sages when they face unfavorable congresses. However, from 1958 through 2004, the
4See Table 14 in the Appendix reporting ARIMA results (Box and Jenkins 1976).
In the ARIMA model, Presidential Liberalism is set as the dependent variable, and
each president is treated as an independent variable. According to the results in this
table, president G.W. Bush significantly sent more conservative messages than the
mean level of all presidents. The coefficient of the G.W. Bush variable is -.405, and
the t-statistic of this coefficient is -2.50.
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case of Democrat President/Republican Congress occurred only during the Clinton
presidency (1995-2001). That is, it is difficult to generalize this finding.5
Another case where presidents face unfavorable Congresses is Republican Pres-
ident/Democrat Congress. The Republican President/Democrat Congress variable
shows positive coefficients (.124) in Model 2, which means that presidents tend to
reduce their partisan messages when they do not expect congressional support. How-
ever, the effects are not statistically significant (t=1.08). Also, the constant term
representing the case of Republican President/Divided Congress does not show sta-
tistical significance. Hence, it is difficult to assert whether or not presidents tend to
be more partisan when they face unfavorable Congresses.
Instead of government types, Model 3 includes congressional issue positions mea-
sured by the DW-NOMINATE scores. Note that Poole and Rosenthal (1991) code
conservative votes/positions as positive numbers and liberal votes/positions as nega-
tive numbers. Hence, if the president positively responds to Congress, the DW score
variables should show negative signs. The results from Model 3 seem to illustrate that
the president positively responds to congressional issue positions in general. However,
all of the effects of congressional positions on the president are statistically insignif-
icant. That is, the president does not significantly respond to congressional issue
positions.6 Rather, presidents tend to respond to who controls Congress. Specifically,
5One may argue that president Clinton sent relatively more liberal messages than
other presidents. Using the ARIMA model, this study examines this argument more
systematically. According to the ARIMA results in Table 14 in the Appendix, presi-
dent Clinton significantly sent more liberal messages than the mean level of all presi-
dents. The coefficient of the Clinton variable is .771, which is statistically significant
(t=5.93).
6One may argue that presidential issue liberalism is a function of the interaction
between presidential partisanship and congressional issue positions. To examine this
argument, this study uses interaction models between presidential partisanship and
congressional issue positions based on the DW-NOMINATE scores. The results in
Table 15 show that most of the interaction terms are statistically insignificant.
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presidents tend to send more liberal messages when their party holds Congress. The
Ljung-Box Q statistic shows that some autocorrelation exists between the residuals
from Model 3.
Besides the political environment, this study considers that economic conditions
may affect presidential issue liberalism. As economic variables, the public’s economic
perceptions (Index of Consumer Sentiments, ICS) and the state of the national econ-
omy (Composite Index, CICI and unemployment and inflation rate) are included in
the VAR system. These variables can show presidential responsiveness to economic
conditions. All economic variables are included as lagged variables, t−1.7 The Unem-
ployment variable is included as unemployment rate change (∆). Since the Composite
Index includes various information of current economic conditions including employ-
ment data, this study does not include the CICI, unemployment rate change, and
inflation rate in one model. Model 1, 2 and 3 use the Composite Index while Model
4 uses the unemployment rate change and the inflation rate to examine the effects of
objective economic conditions on the endogenous variables.
The results in Table 3 show that presidents do not respond to the public’s eco-
nomic perceptions in general. According to the results in Model 1 in this table,
presidents tend to negatively respond to the public’s economic perceptions. However,
this significant result is not held in the other models, and the effects are nearly zero
in all models. Similarly, presidents do not respond to objective economic conditions
in all four models. The CICI, Unemployment, and Inflation variables do not show
statistical significance. In sum, the VAR results in Table 3 illustrate that presidents
tend to respond to the political environment, more specifically government types, but
not economic conditions. These results are different from Wood (2009). Wood (2009)
7This is because presidential rhetoric and news stories can contemporaneously
affect the public’s economic perceptions and economic conditions (Wood 2007).
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shows that presidents respond both the political and economic conditions. However,
the models in Wood (2009) do not simultaneously include both the political and eco-
nomic conditions. Neither are the news media included in the models. The omitted
variables might cause the different results.8
1.2. Explaining Media Biases
Table 4 shows the VAR results when Media Liberalism is considered as the dependent
variable. Like Table 3, Table 4 reports the statistics of the exogenous variables but
not the statistics of the lagged endogenous variables.
Some have argued that the media is like a fourth branch of government (Carter
1959)e.g.,, checking the actions of the president, Congress, and courts. For instance,
when presidents, Congress, and the courts become too liberal, the media move in the
opposite direction to contain extreme movements that might be inconsistent with the
mass public.
According to the results in Table 4, unlike the president responding to the polit-
ical environment, the news media seem not to respond to the political environment.
Except the case of Democrat Congress in Model 4, all political variables are statis-
tically insignificant. These results generally illustrate that the news media do not
act like the fourth branch of government. If the news media checked government, we
should observe some negative effects of the Democrat President/Democrat Congress
variable (i.e., they should send more conservative news stories when the Democratic
party holds both the presidency and Congress) and some positive effects of the Re-
publican President/Republican Congress variable (i.e., they should send more liberal
8Wood (2009) uses the Newey-West estimator to control autocorrelation instead
of the ARIMA approach, which might also cause the different results. Generally, the
ARIMA results are more conservative (less likely to reject the null hypothesis).
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Table 4. VAR Results: Explaining Media Liberalism
V ariables Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
Constant -0.283 -0.304 -0.243 0.196
(-0.90) (-1.05) (-0.73) (0.46)
Event 0.023 0.018 0.024 0.037
(0.31) (0.24) (0.32) (0.52)
ICSt−1 0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.001
(1.04) (1.06) (0.78) (-0.34)
CICIt−1 -0.024 -0.027 -0.019
(-0.21) (-0.24) (-0.15)
Unemployment(∆)t−1 0.219
(2.41)
Inflationt−1 -0.051
(-3.07)
Rep. Congress -0.049 -0.063
(-0.49) -(0.67)
Dem. Congress 0.021 0.168
(0.21) (1.65)
Rep. President -0.007 0.075
(-0.09) (0.95)
Dem. President/Rep. Congress 0.005
(0.04)
Rep. President/Dem. Congress 0.031
(0.31)
Dem. President/Dem. Congress 0.031
(0.34)
Rep. President/Rep. Congress -0.112
(-0.84)
House-DW-1st 0.016
(0.05)
Senate-DW-1st -0.120
(-0.20)
House-DW-2nd 0.128
(0.22)
Senate-DW-2nd 0.376
(0.35)
N 179 179 179 179
p(Q) 0.66 0.62 0.65 0.41
AIC 138.99 154.67 155.14 154.58
Note: The numbers in the table are coefficients and t-statistics (in paren-
theses). All models include the lagged endogenous variables. Four lags
of each endogenous variable are included in the system. N : Number of
observations. p(Q): p value of the Q statistic (Ljung and Box 1978).
AIC: Akaike’s Information Criterion.
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news stories when the Republican party holds both the presidency and Congress).
Also, the news media do not respond to congressional issue positions in Model 3.
These insignificant results might be caused by the measurement of the political
environment, which is static rather than dynamic. Note that the House and Senate
median DW scores and government types are fixed for at least two years in general.
However, Media Liberalism noticeably changes within years according to Figure 8 in
the previous chapter. Probably, Media Liberalism is the most dynamic series among
the three endogenous variables as Figure 9 in the following section illustrates. If
the news media instantaneously respond to changing political conditions, and their
responsiveness decays quickly, the measures of the political environment this study
uses may not effectively capture the impact of the political environment on the news
media. In other words, if we can utilize more dynamic measures of political conditions,
we may with more certainty conclude whether and how the news media respond to
political conditions.
The news media, however, seem to clearly respond to economic conditions. This
study argues that the news media may respond to objective economic conditions
in different manners depending on economic problems. As stated before, one of
the possible prescriptions for unemployment is more government intervention in the
economy. That is, government should actively engage in the economy and propose
liberal programs to help the unemployed and create jobs when the unemployment
rate is increasing. This study argues that the news media recognize this and prescribe
liberal measures when the unemployment rate is high. The results from Model 4 in
Table 4 support this argument. The coefficient of the Unemployment variable is .219,
and its t-statistic is 2.41. That is, the news media tend to report more liberal news
stories as the unemployment rate increases.
The significant effect of unemployment on media biases may imply that the news
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media are sympathetic to the plight of people in an economic decline. When the
national economic conditions are declining, the unemployed are seriously suffered
from losing income and need government support. The response to unemployment is
consistent with Keynesian prescriptions. That is, when economic conditions are bad,
government should more actively involve itself in the market and resolve economic
and social problems. The impact of unemployment on news stories may illustrate
that the news media demand more government actions to resolve economic and social
problems.
Another theoretical expectation regarding the economic impact on the news me-
dia is that the news media tend to produce more conservative news stories as the
inflation rate increases. This is because one of the possible solutions for high inflation
is reducing government spending including social spending in order to decrease the
total amount of money in circulation. This theoretical expectation is also supported
by the results from Model 4 in Table 4. The coefficient of the Inflation variable is
-.051 and statistically significant (t: -3.07). The negative sign of the Inflation variable
illustrates that the news media tend to send more conservative stories as the inflation
rate increases.
Other economic variables, however, do not show any statistical significance. The
Composite Index does not significantly explain media issue liberalism according to
the results in Table 4. This may indirectly support the argument that the news
media respond to specific economic problems in different manners, not to the general
economic state in a uniform manner. Like the president, the news media do not
respond to the public’s economic perceptions. Both the president and the news media
seem to ignore how the public perceives economic conditions according to the results
in Table 3 and 4. In sum, the VAR results in Table 4 show that the news media tend
to respond to specific economic problems in different manners but not to political
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conditions in general.
1.3. Explaining Public Policy Sentiments
This study, finally, shows the VAR results when Public Mood is set as the dependent
variable. Like the president and the news media, this study considers that the public
may respond to political and economic conditions. According to Durr (1993), the
public tends to positively respond to their economic perceptions. More correctly, he
reveals that the public supports liberal policies when the public’s business expectation
is rosy. The ICS variable shows the positive sign in Model 1, 2, and 3, which is
consistent with Durr’s argument. However, the results are statistically insignificant.9
The VAR results in this table illustrate that the public’s economic perceptions do not
influence public issue liberalism.10
Like the public’s economic perceptions, the current state of the economy mea-
sured as the Composite Index consistently seems not to affect public opinion. In
all models, the CICI variable does not show statistical significance even though this
variable shows the negative sign in all models (Model 1, 2, and 3). The negative sign
means that the public expresses more liberal preferences as the national economy
becomes worse. However, the impact of the nation economy on the public is not
9These results are not changed noticeably when the public’s economic perceptions
are measured as the public’s business expectations instead of the ICS series. This
study uses the ICS series because this index contains more comprehensive information
about the public’s economic perceptions including the public’s business expectations.
10These results may be caused by including the ICS variable as a lagged term. If the
public issue liberalism is explained only by the public’s contemporaneous economic
perceptions, the lagged ICS variable will not show statistical significance. In fact,
when the ICS is included as a current term, this variable shows statistical significance
in the following section. However, these results may be also caused by including the
news media in the system. When only the president and the public are considered
as endogenous variables, the lagged ICS variable significantly affects Public Mood in
two models.
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Table 5. VAR Results: Explaining Public Mood
V ariables Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
Constant -0.846 -0.569 -0.066 -0.293
(-1.91) (-1.40) (-0.13) (-0.46)
Event 0.115 0.108 0.116 0.126
(1.10) (1.02) (1.08) (1.21)
ICSt−1 0.005 0.005 0.001 -0.000
(1.28) (1.30) (0.35) (-0.06)
CICIt−1 -0.228 -0.232 -0.227
(-1.40) ( -1.43) (-1.27)
Unemployment(∆)t−1 0.169
(1.26)
Inflationt−1 -0.037
(-1.52)
Rep. Congress 0.186 1.830
(1.33) (1.31)
Dem. Congress 0.281 0.356
(1.98) (2.38)
Rep. President 0.294 0.361
(2.65) (3.09)
Dem. President/Rep. Congress -0.043
(-0.23)
Rep. President/Dem. Congress 0.296
(2.06)
Dem. President/Dem. Congress -0.009
(-0.07)
Rep. President/Rep. Congress 0.098
(0.51)
House-DW-1st 0.169
(0.38)
Senate-DW-1st 0.301
(0.34)
House-DW-2nd 0.921
(1.14)
Senate-DW-2nd -0.014
(-0.00)
N 179 179 179 179
p(Q) 0.55 0.57 0.47 0.62
AIC 138.99 154.67 155.14 154.58
Note: The numbers in the table are coefficients and t-statistics (in paren-
theses). All models include the lagged endogenous variables. Four lags
of each endogenous variable are included in the system. N : Number of
observations. p(Q): p value of the Q statistic (Ljung and Box 1978).
AIC: Akaike’s Information Criterion.
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significant.
The results from Model 4 in Table 5 also show that the public does not respond to
change economic conditions, which is different from the results in Erikson, MacKuen,
and Stimson (2002, 233). The insignificant influence of economic conditions on the
public may be caused by including the news media in the model. If the news media
interpret economic information, and the public consumes the interpreted information,
the news media rather than objective and subjective economic conditions are likely
to affect the public.11 In fact, when only the president and the public are considered
as endogenous variables, the public seems to negatively, significantly react to the
inflation rate.12
Unlike the economic variables, according to the results in Table 5, the public
seems to respond to certain political conditions. Specifically, the results in Model
1 and 4 show that the public tends to express significantly more liberal preferences
when the Democratic party holds Congress. Unlike the public’s responsiveness to
Congress, the public tends to react to the president. That is, the public expresses
significantly more liberal preferences when the Republican party holds the presidency,
and vice versa.
Certainly, when the Republican party holds the presidency and the Democratic
party holds congress, the public tends to prefer liberal policies according to the results
from Model 2 in this table (coefficient: .296, t: 2.06). However, the other government
formation variables in Model 2 do not show any statistical significance.
According to Wlezien’s (1995) argument, the public thermostatically reacts to
11Also, these results may be caused by including the economic variables as lagged
terms. The results in Table 10 show that the current CICI variable significantly,
negatively affects the public.
12The results are reported in Table 17 in the Appendix.
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changing policies. Broadly speaking, the “thermostat” theory means that the pub-
lic tends to express more liberal preferences when conservative policies are enacted.
Assume that more conservative policies are likely to be produced when a conserva-
tive party holds both the presidency and Congress. If this assumption is reasonable,
based on the “thermostat” theory we can expect that the public expresses more lib-
eral preferences when the Republican party holds both the presidency and Congress,
and vice versa. On the contrary, this study also acknowledges that the public may re-
spond to the dominant party’s issue stances because the public receives similar policy
information from the president and Congress.
The VAR results in Table 5, however, do not support any of these theoreti-
cal expectations. The unified government cases, Democratic President/Democratic
Congress and Republican President/Republican Congress, do not significantly ex-
plain public issue liberalism. In other words, these results may imply that the public
does not rely on political information from unified governments or dominant parties
holding both the legislative and executive branches.
2. Who Affects Whom?
The previous section shows what exogenous factors affect the relative liberalism of
issue stances by the president, media, and public. This section focuses on the endoge-
nous relationships between these actors. To examine the direction of the relationships
between these actors, this study again utilizes the Granger causality test and MAR
methods.
Before examining statistical test results, we can graphically examine the co-
movements of the three measures. Presidential Liberalism, Media Liberalism, and
Public Mood are simultaneously presented in Figure 9. Note that these three series
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are standardized with their respective means and standard deviations. Hence, “more
liberal” implies more liberal “with respect to its mean.”
Figure 9. Three Liberalism Measures
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The top panel in Figure 9 shows Presidential Liberalism, the middle panel shows
Media Liberalism, and the bottom panel shows Public Mood. This figure does not
clearly illustrate whether or not the Presidential Liberalism series moves together with
the other series. However, one noticeable pattern is found between Media Liberalism
and Public Mood. According to this figure, media and public liberalism move together
during the early and mid 1970s. Later the relationship seems more random. Thus, it
is difficult to assert that one series leads the other series based on the figure.
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This visual examination gives a sense of the actors’ changing issue stances through
time. This ocular test suggests an absence of common trends among the three series.
Nevertheless, statistical analyses are required to test the multidirectional relation-
ships between the president, the news media, and the public. If we want to know who
affects whom, rigorous tests are necessary.
2.1. Granger Causality between the President, the News Media, and the Public
Previous studies found some mixed results in relation to presidential responsiveness
to and leadership of the public. No empirical study rigorously tests the reciprocity
between the president, the news media, and the public. This study considers the reci-
procity and examines who Granger causes whom. As explained before, the Granger
test treats multiple lags of the endogenous variables as a block and examines whether
each block affects the endogenous variables. Hence, simply speaking, significant
Granger causality means that past movements significantly and collectively explain
the current movement.13
In Table 6, the arrows indicate Granger causality of the independent variables
(right-hand side) to the dependent variables (left-hand side) at the α level .10. Each
of the independent variables includes four lags to control the inertia of the variables.
The Granger causality test shows the significance of each block coefficient of the lags.
Table 6 presents p values from F tests for the null hypothesis of no Granger causality.
Hence, no Granger causality implies that a group of four lags does not significantly
13Note that the Granger test is based on the VAR. In the previous section, this
study runs four different models. Among the four models, this study chooses Model
1, which shows the lowest AIC statistics. The AIC is a measure of the goodness of
fit of an estimated statistical model. The smaller the AIC statistic is, the better the
model is (Akaike 1973). The Granger test results in this section are based on Model
1.
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Table 6. Granger Causality Test Results: Three Liberalism Measures
DependentV ariable IndependentV ariables pvalue
Presidential Liberalism ← Presidential Liberalism .00
Media Liberalism .31
Public Mood .72
Media Liberalism Presidential Liberalism .76
← Media Liberalism .03
Public Mood .38
Public Mood Presidential Liberalism .94
← Media Liberalism .08
← Public Mood .00
forecast the current realization.14
The most prominent finding in Table 6 is that each of the endogenous variables
is inertial. For instance, the current presidential rhetoric is significantly explained
by previous presidential rhetoric. If a president spoke liberally in the past, he is
likely to speak more liberally or conservatively in this quarter. Media Liberalism is
also inertial. The p-value of the Media Liberalism variable is .03 when the Media
Liberalism is considered as the dependent variable. That is, today’s news reporting
is significantly explained by past news reporting. Public Mood is also significantly
explained by its past movements. If the public expressed more liberal issue preferences
in past quarters, the public is likely to express more liberal or conservative preferences
today.
14Note that the Granger test results do not show the direction of the relationship
between the endogenous variables. That is, from the results we can only know that
the past movements of Presidential Liberalism and Public Mood contain significant
information about their current state.
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Beyond the inertia of the series, this study is interested in whether one variable
Granger causes the other variables. This study argues that the news media influence
the public basically because the public receives most of their political information from
the news media. This study considers that the public is likely to be an information
receiver rather than an information sender in terms of policy information (Zaller
1992). Furthermore, the public tend to receive most of their political information from
the news media even though other elites disseminate political information. Hence,
this study argues that the news media should directly influence the public.
The Granger test results in Table 6 support this argument. Considering Public
Mood as the dependent variable, the p-value of the Media Liberalism variable is .08,
which is statistically significant at the α level .10. This result means that media
biases Granger cause the public’s issue stances. If the news media sent more liberal
news stories in the past, the public tends to express more or less liberal preferences
today. The Granger results show that the influence of the news media on the public
exists even though the results do not show how the news media affect the public.
Unlike the news media, however, the president seems to fail to affect the public
according to the results in Table 6. When Public Mood is considered as the dependent
variable, the p-value of the Presidential Liberalism variable is .94, which means that
changes in presidential rhetoric in the past do not affect the current public opinion
changes. As proposed in the theory chapter, because presidential messages are rarely
transmitted intact to the public, it is difficult to observe presidential direct influence
on the public. The Granger causality results in this table support this argument.15
The Granger causality results show that presidential leadership of the public is
15Wood (2009) examines the bivariate Granger causality between the president and
the public. He also found that presidential issue liberalism does not Granger cause
public issue liberalism.
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absent. This study argues that presidents fail to move public opinion successfully
because the public generally receives presidential messages through the news media
selecting/interpreting/modifying/evaluating their messages. That is, the direct im-
pact of the president on the public is weak. These results in this table seem to support
the argument and are consistent with previous studies maintaining lack of presiden-
tial leadership of the public, such as Glaros and Miroff (1983), Edwards (2003), and
Wood (2009).
This study also argues that the direct relationship between the president and
the public is weak. As presidential issue stances in the past do not affect the current
public opinion changes, presidential responsiveness to the public is not supported
by the statistical results in Table 6. When Presidential Liberalism is considered as
the dependent variable, the p value of the Public Mood variable is .72. That is,
past public opinion changes do not affect the current presidential issue stances. The
Granger causality test results in this table show that both the president and the
public seem to be oblivious of each other, which is consistent with the findings in
Wood (2009).
In the second chapter, this study argues that the president tends to respond to
the news media rather than directly to the public due to the influence of the news
media on the public. However, the Granger test results in Table 6 do not support
this argument. When Presidential Liberalism is considered as the dependent variable,
the p value of the Media Liberalism variable is .31. This result means that expressed
media biases during past quarters do not affect presidential rhetoric today. The
Granger test results in this table generally show that the current presidential issue
liberalism cannot be explained by past behavior of the public and the news media.16
16These results are consistent with Wood and Peake (1998) and Edwards and Wood
(1999) investigating public agenda setting at the aggregate level.
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Figure 1 shows that the news media receive information from the president and
the public. That is, the president and the public potentially affect the news media.
However, this study stresses that the news media are more likely to respond to the
public because of the profit pressures. In contrast, the news media are less likely to
respond to the president because the news media tend to index various news sources
beyond the president. According to the test results in Table 6, both the president
and the public do not Granger cause the news media.
When the dependent variable is Media Liberalism, the p value of the Presidential
Liberalism variable is .76. This result illustrates that past presidential issue stances
do not affect the current news media biases. Also, past public opinion changes do
not affect the current media biases. When Media Liberalism is considered as the
dependent variable in the VAR system, the p value of the Public Mood variable is
.38. The test results in Table 6 only partially support the theory of the responsiveness
of the news media to the public and the president.
In sum, the Granger causality test results in Table 6 show that only one Granger
causal relationship exists between the three actors. Media biases Granger cause the
public’s issue preferences.
However, as mentioned before, the Granger causality test has limitations. First,
the Granger causality test results in the tables do not show the direction of rela-
tionships, which means that we do not know how the past media biases affect the
current public issue liberalism. Second, from the Granger causality test results, we
cannot know the size of the influence of the news media on the public. Finally, an ab-
sence of Granger causality does not necessarily mean no causality (Lu¨tkepohl 2005).
Contemporaneous feedback between the endogenous variables can veil the cause and
effect relationship between them. Hence, this study uses the MAR methods to ex-
plore the cause and effect relationship between the three actors. The MAR results
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are introduced in the following section.
2.2. MAR Results: How Do the Actors Affect Each Other?
MAR methods are used to observe the dynamic responses of the endogenous variables
to a simulated shock given to one endogenous variable. In this study, the shock is
one positive standard error of each series.17
This study argues that the news media should be considered in order to explain
presidential leadership and responsiveness correctly because the news media play a
role of information channel between the president and the public. The mixed results
in prior research on presidential leadership of and responsiveness to the public may
be caused by the omission of the news media. Figure 10 shows who affects whom and
how.
Depending on the correlations among the residuals from the VAR regressions, the
MAR results may be affected by ordering the endogenous variables.18 In Figure 10, the
order of the endogenous variables is Presidential Liberalism, Media Liberalism, and
Public Mood.19 This order is selected based on the theory that policy information
generally flows from the president to the public through the news media and the
Granger causality test results that Media Liberalism Granger causes Public Mood.
17The shock is given to the φ matrix in the equation (3.4) in the third chapter.
Note that if the endogenous variables are contemporaneously uncorrelated, the B
matrix becomes an identity matrix. Hence, the effects of the simulated shock varies
according to Ai matrix, which represents the past effects of the endogenous variables.
18If the residuals are contemporaneously correlated, the off-diagonal elements of the
B matrix are not zero. Hence, the E matrix in the equation (3.2) is not equal to the
U matrix in the equation (3.1). In other words, if there are strong contemporaneous
correlations between the residuals from the VAR, the order of endogenous variables
in the VAR system may affect the MAR results. Table 18 in the Appendix presents
the correlation coefficients.
19An alternative order is also used. The results are presented in Figure 11 in the
Appendix. The major findings in Figure 10 are consistent with the results in Figure
11.
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Also, the order is based on statistical testing.20
The Granger causality test results in Table 6 support the argument that the
news media move public opinion. However, the results do not show how the news
media influence the public. The panel in the second row and third column (2,3) in
Figure 10 shows how the public responds to a simulated shock to the news media.
A one standard error increase in Media Liberalism produces positive movements of
Public Mood. The initial effect of Media Liberalism on Public Mood is positive and
statistically significant. The positive effects increment till about the third quarter
after the shock. Then, the effects decay over time but last for longer than five quarters
even though the later effects are small. That is, if the news media increase liberal
news stories, the public immediately expresses more liberal preferences. Along with
the Granger causality test results in Table 6, the simulation results in this figure
support the argument that the news media positively influence the public.
The persuasive effect of the news media on the public in Figure 10 is consis-
tent with some voting studies, such as Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt (1998), Bartels
(1993), Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan (2009), and Kahn and Kenney (2002). These
20Note that the impulse response function recursively identifies the structural
shocks by using the Choleski decomposition of the covariance matrix. That is, the
variable ordered first in the VAR is contemporaneously unaffected by all other vari-
ables. This means that the endogenous variable that is least correlated contempora-
neously with the other variables should be placed first when the endogenous variables
are correlated with each other. According to the contemporaneous correlation be-
tween the residuals in Table 18 in the Appendix, the appropriate order is Presidential
Liberalism - Media Liberalism - Public Mood. Presidential Liberalism is least cor-
related with the other measures, and Public Mood is most correlated with the other
measures. Also, the decomposition of variance from the VAR can be utilized to de-
termine the order of the variables in the impulse response function. Since the variable
first ordered implies that this variable is least explained by the other endogenous vari-
ables at first, its variance should be least explained by the other endogenous variables
at the first stage of the recursive identification process. The decomposition of vari-
ance from the VAR shows that Presidential Liberalism is least explained by the other
endogenous variables at the first stage. Public Mood is most explained by the other
two variables at the first stage. Table 19 in the Appendix shows the decomposition
of variance.
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Figure 10. MAR: Presidential Liberalism, Media Liberalism, and Public Mood
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studies show that news stories significantly affect voters’ candidate evaluations and
vote choice. Generally speaking, these studies show that when the news media dis-
proportionately report news stories supporting/favoring one candidate over the other
candidates, voters tend to positively evaluate and/or vote for the supported candidate.
Likewise, the results in this figure show that when the news media disproportionately
report news stories supporting/favoring liberal policies, the public tends to support
liberal policies.
Another argument of this study is that the news media should influence the
president. This argument is not supported by the Granger causality test results in
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Table 6. However, as shown by Lu¨tkepohl (2005), this does not necessarily mean that
no cause and effect relationship exists between the news media and the president.
In fact, Figure 10 illustrates that news stories do affect presidential rhetoric. The
panel in the second row and first column (2,1) in Figure 10 shows the influence of
the news media on the president. When the news media increase liberal news stories
one standard error from their mean, the president does not immediately respond
to the increase. About a quarter later, however, the president begins significantly
responding to the shock in a positive way. This means that presidents speak more
liberally after the news media increase liberal news stories. The impact of Media
Liberalism on Presidential Liberalism becomes larger by the third quarter after the
shock. Then, the impact decays. The significant impact seems to persist for about
three quarters after the innovation. The results in this panel support the theory that
the president positively responds to the news media.21
The results in Table 4 show that the news media do not react to political condi-
tions, and this study concludes that the news media do not act like a fourth branch of
government in terms of checking a dominant party holding both the presidency and
Congress. However, the results in Figure 10 show that the news media significantly
affect presidential rhetoric and public opinion. As long as presidential rhetoric regard-
ing social issues reflects presidential issue positions, the significant influence of news
stories on presidential rhetoric may imply that the news media affect presidential pol-
icy making. Likewise, as long as congressmen are affected by their constituency’s issue
preferences (Miller and Stokes 1963), the news media can affect policy making through
moving public opinion, which supports Graber’s muckraking model (Graber 2006).
In sum, the MAR results illustrate that the news media can significantly influence
21This one-way relationship is consistent with previous agenda setting studies, such
as Wood and Peake (1998) and Edwards and Wood (1999).
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politics.
Unlike the presidential responsiveness to the news media shown in the panel (2,1),
presidential responsiveness to the public is not supported by the simulation results
in Figure 10. The panel in the third row and first column (3,1) shows the effects of
an innovation in Public Mood on Presidential Liberalism. This panel illustrates that
public opinion changes do not affect presidential rhetoric, which means that presi-
dents do not directly respond to the public. Like the results in Table 6, presidential
responsiveness to the public is absent in Figure 10. According to the results in this
figure, presidents directly respond to the news media rather than to the public.
This study argues that presidential leadership of the public is weak or limited
because the public receives political information mostly through the news media. The
panel in the first row and third column (1,3) in Figure 10 shows how a simulated shock
to Presidential Liberalism affects Public Mood. According to this panel, the impact
of the president on the public seems to be positive. A positive shock to Presidential
Liberalism produces positive responses of Public Mood, and the responses last for
about three quarters. However, the responses are barely significant. These weak
results suggest that presidents do not successfully lead the public.
The results in Figure 10 also illustrate whether and how the president and the
public influence the news media. The Granger causality test results reported above
in Table 6 show that both presidential and public issue liberalism do not Granger
cause media biases. Corresponding with these results, the panel in the first row
and second column (1,2) shows presidential influence on the news media. When
presidents increase liberal messages, the news media seem to report more liberal
news stories immediately. However, the increased number of liberal news stories due
to the increased number of presidential liberal messages quickly moves back to its
mean number. The impact of the president on the news media is barely significant
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and does not last very long. This again suggests that presidents do not lead the mass
media.
The panel in the third row and second column (3,2) in Figure 10 shows the
influence of the public on the news media. According to this panel, the news media
seem to positively respond to the public for about a quarter. However, the impact of
the public on the news media is almost insignificant. These results again imply that
regarding their news making, the news media do not seriously consider public issue
stances.
The results in Figure 10 generally support the theories presented in Figure 4.
The news media significantly and directly affect the president and the public. The
direct relationship between the president and the public is weak. On the other hand,
the results show that the news media are not very responsive to the president and
the public. In other words, the news media is an independent actor in reporting news
about the presidency and nation-at-large.
3. The Possible Indirect Influence between the President and the Public
The MAR simulation results show that the news media directly affect the president
and the public. In contrast, the direct relationship between the president and the
public seems to be insignificant. Presidents tend to generally ignore public opinion
changes. Also, presidents fail to lead the public successfully. However, these results
do not simultaneously deny the possibility that the president and the public might
affect each other indirectly through the news media. Hence, this section examines
the possibility of the indirect influence between the president and the public on one
another through the news media.
120
3.1. Indirect Presidential Leadership
The results in the previous section show that the influence of the president on the
news media is slight and fleeting, but marginally significant. Then, does this imply
that the president indirectly moves public opinion? In other words, by influencing
the news media, can presidents in turn affect the public?
To address these questions, Media Liberalism is separated into two components.
One component is explained by Presidential Liberalism, and the other component is
the residual component. Since this study analyzes time series data, a regression model,
Media Liberalismt = β0 + β1*Presidential Liberalismt−1 + , is utilized to extract the
two components. The predicted Media Liberalism from the model represents the
component in the Media Liberalism variable explained by the Presidential Liberalism
variable. The  in the model represents the rest of the variation in Medial Liberalism.22
Instead of the Medial Liberalism variable, the two components are included in
Table 7 in order to test the indirect influence of the president on the public. Hence,
the dependent variable is Public Mood.23 In this table, the M̂LPL variable represents
the information of media biases predicted by presidential rhetoric. That is, if the
president affects the public through the news media, this variable should show statis-
tical significance. The ResidMLPL variable shows the variation of Media Liberalism
unexplained by Presidential Liberalism.24
22More lagged Presidential Liberalism variables can be included in the model.
Adding more lagged variables does not change the findings in Table 7.
23The lagged Public Mood variable in Table 7 is to control the inertia of public
opinion changes.
24Since the news media do not instantaneously respond to public opinion changes
according to the MAR results, this study includes the variables as current terms. Also,
to replicate Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) and Wood (2009), the economic
variables are included as current terms. These studies assume that the public cannot
affect economic conditions contemporaneously.
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Table 7. Indirect Presidential Leadership
V ariables Coefficient(t)
Public Moodt−1 0.747
(15.13)
M̂LPL 0.446
(0.49)
ResidMLPL 0.304
(3.50)
ICS 0.008
(2.17)
CICI -0.298
(-2.02)
Event 0.129
(1.48)
Rep. Congress 0.179
(1.48)
Dem. Congress 0.407
(3.30)
Rep. President 0.307
(2.62)
Constant -1.187
(-2.92)
N 180
p(Q) 0.19
Note: The dependent variable is Public Mood. “PL” repre-
sents Presidential Liberalism. “ML” represents Media Liberalism.
M̂LPL represents predicted Media Liberalism by Presidential Lib-
eralism. The predicted Media Liberalism is derived from the re-
gression model: MLt = β0+ β1 ∗PLt−1+ . ResidMLPL represents
the residuals () in the equation. The numbers in the table are co-
efficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The coefficients are esti-
mated by least squares, and the t-statistics are calculated by using
Newey and West (1987) autocorrelation- and heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. N : Number of observations. p(Q): p
value of the Q statistic (Ljung and Box 1978).
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The regression results in Table 7 negate the possibility that the president in-
directly moves public opinion through affecting news stories. The coefficient of the
M̂LPL variable is positive but statistically insignificant.
25 According to the MAR
results, the direct impact of presidential rhetoric on public opinion is very small and
barely significant. This may be the reason why the indirect impact of the president
on the news media is absent.
Unlike the M̂LPL variable, the coefficient of the ResidMLPL variable is positive
and statistically significant. That is, the impact of the news media on the public is
independent, which is consistent with the results in the previous sections. As argued
in the theory chapter, the news media do not just transmit objective information but
also independently report their views and interpret information. The results in this
table may support this argument .
The results regarding economic conditions are consistent with Durr (1993), Erik-
son, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002), and Wood (2009). Public issue liberalism is
significantly and positively affected by the public’s economic perceptions. When the
public perceives that economic conditions are better, they are more likely to support
liberal policies. However, according to the results in this table and Wood (2009), the
public tends to express more liberal preferences when the national economy is in a
downturn. These economic variables are insignificant in the VAR results, where the
variables are included as lagged variables. From the results, we may infer that the
public is sensitive to economic conditions and instantaneously respond to changing
economic conditions.
25The Presidential Liberalism variable may be included in the model. However,
adding Presidential Liberalism does not alter the findings, and the Presidential Lib-
eralism does not show statistical significance when it is included.
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3.2. Indirect Influence of the Public on the President
Like the presidential indirect influence on the public, it is possible to presume that the
indirect impact of the public on the president is through the news media. According to
the MAR simulation results, presidents tend to respond to news stories even though
the responses are delayed. Also, the public seems to affect news reporting even
though the impact is small and short lived. Hence, one may argue that the public
can affect the president through affecting news stories. This study examines this
possible argument.
Like the model in Table 7, the Media Liberalism is separated into two compo-
nents. One component is predicted by the Public Mood variable: M̂LPM in Table 8.
To extract the predicted component of the Media Liberalism variable by the Public
Mood variable, this study uses a regression model: MLt = γ0 + γ1 ∗ PMt−1 + u.
The predicted values from the regression model is M̂LPM . The residuals from the
regression, u, represents the unexplained component of Media Liberalism by Public
Mood, which is ResidMLPM in Table 8.
To control the seasonal and autoregressive characteristics in the Presidential Lib-
eralism series, the ARIMA approach is utilized (Box and Jenkins 1976). In Table 8,
the AR(1) and SAR(1) variables represent the first-order autoregressive and first-
order seasonal autoregressive components in the Presidential Liberalism series, which
are statistically significant in all models. According to the Q statistic, the model
successfully controls autocorrelations in the series. The political and economic con-
ditions are also included as control variables in this table. The economic variables
are included as lagged variables because presidential rhetoric may affect the public’s
economic perceptions and objective economic conditions according to Wood (2007).
The political conditions are included as current terms.
124
Table 8. Indirect Presidential Responsiveness
V ariables Coefficient(z)
AR(1) 0.244
(3.21)
SAR(1) 0.411
(21.11)
M̂LPM 0.775
(0.87)
ResidMLPM 0.112
(1.17)
ICSt−1 -0.004
-(0.64)
CICIt−1 0.204
(1.05)
Event 1.31
(1.44)
Rep. Congress 0.690
(3.39)
Dem. Congress -0.014
(-0.06)
Rep. President -0.760
(-6.61)
Constant 0.732
(1.07)
N 179
p(Q) 0.86
Note: The dependent variable is Presidential Liberalism. To control
the seasonal and autoregressive components in Presidential Liber-
alism, the ARIMA approach is applied (Box and Jenkins 1976).
AR(1): Autoregressive component. SAR(1): Seasonal autoregres-
sive component. “PM” represents Public Mood. “ML” represents
Media Liberalism. M̂LPM represents predicted Media Liberalism
by Public Mood. The predicted Media Liberalism is derived from
the regression model: MLt = γ0+γ1∗PMt−1+u. ResidMLPM repre-
sents the residuals (u) in the equation. N : Number of observations.
The numbers in the table are coefficients and z-statistics (in paren-
theses). p(Q): p value of the Q statistic (Ljung and Box 1978).
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If the public significantly affects the president by influencing the news media, the
M̂LPM variable should show a significant and positive coefficient. However, unlike
the presumption, the results in Table 8 illustrate that the public does not indirectly
affect the president through the news media. The M̂LPM variable show a positive but
insignificant coefficient (0.775, t:0.87). Along with the Granger causality and MAR
results, the results in this table seem to confirm that presidents are irresponsive to
public opinion changes in general.
Like the VAR results, presidential rhetoric is significantly explained by presi-
dential partisanship. Republican presidents speak conservatively, and Democratic
presidents tend to send more liberal messages. The economic conditions do not signif-
icantly affect presidential rhetoric.26 Presidents tend to ignore the public’s economic
perceptions and objective economic conditions when they speak about domestic poli-
cies.
The regression results in this section general illustrate that the indirect influence
between the president and the public through the news media is absent. Even though
presidents may affect news stories, it is unlikely to affect the public through the
news media. This may be because the impact of the president on the news media
is slight, and because the news media send messages independent of presidential
rhetoric. Likewise, the public does not affect presidential issue stances directly and
indirectly. Generally, presidents seem to ignore public opinion changes.
4. The News Media Intervening in Presidential Responsiveness and Leadership
Beyond the question, “who affects whom?”, this study is interested in whether and
how the news media intervene in the relationship between the president and the
26When the economic variables are included as current terms, the variables do not
show statistical significance.
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public. This study argues that the news media can condition presidential leader-
ship of and responsiveness to the public. This section presents the regression results
regarding the conditional effects of the news media on presidential leadership and re-
sponsiveness. To examine how the news media interactively affect the president and
the public, this study utilizes interaction models. In this section, this study addresses
the question: When are presidential leadership of and responsiveness to the public
likely to be observed?
4.1. News Media and Presidential Leadership
Table 9 reports the regression results regarding presidential leadership of the public
based on two interaction models.27 Hence, the dependent variable is Public Mood in
the models.28 In this table, Presidential Liberalism is interacted with Media Liberal-
ism in order to examine whether and how the president and the new media interac-
tively affect the public. Besides these two variables, political and economic conditions
are included as control variables, which are used in the previous Granger causality
test and MAR simulations.
Table 9 presents the test results from two different interaction models: PL1ML1
and MLPL1. In the second column of this table, the lagged Presidential Liberalism
and lagged Media Liberalism variables are interacted. This interaction represents the
case in which the president and the news media simultaneously move.
According to the MAR results in Figure 10, the news media and the president
27The models are estimated by least square methods. To control possible autocorre-
lations between residuals, this study uses Newey andWest (1987) autocorrelation- and
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The Ljung and Box (1978) Q statis-
tics show that the null hypothesis (No autocorrelation between the residuals after
regression) cannot be rejected in all models in the table.
28To control the inertia of public opinion changes, the lagged Public Mood variable
is included in the models.
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Table 9. News Media and Presidential Leadership of the Public
V ariables PL1ML1 MLPL1
Public Moodt−1 0.752 0.747
(15.76) (15.50)
Pres. Liberalismt−1 0.033 0.010
(0.48) (0.16)
Media Liberalismt−1 0.174
(1.76)
PLt−1*MLt−1 -0.191
(-1.86)
Media Liberalismt 0.302
(3.61)
MLt*PLt−1 0.015
(0.12)
ICS 0.010 0.008
(2.58) (2.24)
CICI -0.330 -0.297
(-2.45) (-2.12)
Event 0.139 0.128
(1.50) (1.47)
Rep. Congress 0.142 0.180
(1.15) (1.43)
Dem. Congress 0.413 0.407
(3.34) (3.30)
Rep. President 0.309 0.307
(2.71) (2.61)
Constant -1.306 -1.186
(-3.21) (-2.97)
N 181 180
p(Q) 0.38 0.37
AIC 667.66 658.51
Note: Dependent variable: Public Mood. “PL” represents Presi-
dential Liberalism. “ML” represents Media Liberalism. “*” rep-
resents interaction. The numbers in the table are coefficients and
t-statistics (in parentheses). The coefficients are estimated by least
squares, and the t-statistics are calculated by using Newey andWest
(1987) autocorrelation- and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors. N : Number of observations. p(Q): p value of the Q statistic
(Ljung and Box 1978).
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positively affect the public even though the impact of presidential rhetoric on public
opinion is small. Hence, it may be plausible to hypothesize that the public is more
likely to be influenced by both the president and the news media when they move
together (synergy effect). On the contrary, it is also reasonable to argue that the
public may react to the simultaneous movement of the president and the news media
because the public does not want radical social/policy changes. That is, the public
may thermostatically check the simultaneous movement of the news media and the
president.29
The synergy effect of the news media and the president on the public can be
examined from the interaction term (PLt−1 ∗MLt−1) in Table 9. This interaction
variable is negative and statistically significant. These results mean that the public
negatively reacts to the simultaneous movement of the president and the news media.
The president and the news media do not more successfully move public opinion when
they simultaneously send similar messages.30
The negative interaction term demonstrates that the president negatively con-
ditions the impact of the news media on the public, and vice versa. For instance,
when the news media sent one standard deviation more liberal messages from their
mean level, and presidents sent two standard deviations more liberal messages, then
29 Wlezien (1995) reveals that the public thermostatically reacts to government
spending. For instance, when defense spending is increased, the public tends to
express preference for less defense spending.
30Certainly, when both the president and the news media increased liberal messages
at the same time, the public may move toward the liberal side. Simply assume that
both the president and the public moved to the liberal side about one standard
deviation. In this case, the total impact of the simultaneous movement on the public
is 0.016 (= 0.033 (Presidential Liberalismt−1 = 1) + 0.174 (Media Liberalismt−1 =
1) - 0.191 (Interaction = 1)), which means the public moves toward the liberal side.
However, also note that the lagged Presidential Liberalism variable is statistically
insignificant. If this variable is regarded as zero, the total impact is -0.017.
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the public expresses more conservative preferences rather than liberal preferences.31
In other words, the negative interaction term in the second column implies that
the public tends to thermostatically react to the simultaneous movement of the pres-
ident and the public. When the president and the news media simultaneously moved
to one direction, the public seems skeptical about the movement and reacts to the
movement. The results in the second column in Table 9 seem to support the “ther-
mostat” theory (Wlezien 1995).
The results in the second column also illustrate that the news media indepen-
dently and significantly affect the public. Assume that the president did not move,
but the news media sent one standard deviation more liberal news stories. Then, the
public responds to this increase in liberal news stories and expresses more liberal issue
preferences. The coefficient of the lagged Media Liberalism variable is 0.174, which
is statistically significant (t=1.76) at the α level .10.32 These results are consistent
with the MAR results that the news media independently affect the public.
Another case is that the media did not move, but the president sent more liberal
messages. In this instance, according to the MAR results, the public may positively
respond to the president (Set the lagged Media Liberalism variable as zero, then the
interaction term is also zero.). The sign of the Presidential Liberalism variable is
positive but statistically insignificant. That is, presidents do not independently affect
the public, which is also somewhat consistent with the Granger causality test and
MAR simulation results.
The results from the PL1ML1 model show how the president and the news
media interactively affect the public. However, this model does not systematically
310.033*2+0.174*1-0.191*2=-0.142. When the lagged Presidential Liberalism is
regarded as zero, the total impact is -0.208
32Note that if Presidential Liberalismt−1=0, PLt−1*MLt−1=0.
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test whether and how the news media condition presidential leadership of the public.
Because it uses time-series data, this study can analyze the interaction between the
president and the news media by considering the order of the actors’ movement.
The MLPL1 model interacts the current Media Liberalism variable with the
lagged Presidential Liberalism variable. This interaction indicates that the president
moves first, and the news media move next.33 In other words, this model considers
the president as the first mover as presented in the second chapter.34 This interaction
helps to systematically address the question: Do the news media condition the effects
of presidential rhetoric on public issue liberalism?
This study argues that the news media can amplify or diminish the influence of
the president on the public by producing consonant or dissonant news stories with
presidential messages. If the news media positively condition presidential leadership
of the public, the interaction term in the third column (MLt ∗ PLt−1) will show a
positive sign. As expected, the sign of the interaction term is positive. However, the
conditional impact is statistically insignificant, which means that the news media do
not amplify or diminish presidential leadership.
The results in Table 9 do not support the theory that the news media positively
condition the effects of presidential messages on public opinion changes. Rather,
the empirical findings in this section show that the public negatively reacts to the
simultaneous movement of the president and the news media. For instance, if the
33Including the current term of Media Liberalism implies that the public does not
contemporaneously affect the news media, which is supported by the MAR results.
In contrast, the public instantaneously responds to the news media according to the
simulation results.
34The MAR simulation results show that the news media significantly affect the
president. However, the impact of the president on the news media is barely signifi-
cant. Hence, the current Media Liberalism variable does not contain much informa-
tion about the past Presidential Liberalism.
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president and the news media sent more liberal messages at the same time, the public
is unlikely to rely on the messages and tends to react to the similar messages .
4.2. News Media and Presidential Responsiveness
Another argument of this study is that the news media can condition presidential
responsiveness to the public. According to the statistical results in the previous
sections, presidents are not responsive to public opinion changes. In other words, the
public does not independently affect the president. However, this does not necessarily
mean that the president never responds to the public. In fact, some studies (e.g.,
Canes-Wrone 2006; Wood 2009) argue that under certain conditions presidents are
responsive to the public. This study focuses on whether and how the news media
affect presidential responsiveness to the public. Specifically, this section addresses
the following question: Do presidents become more responsive to the public when the
news media send news stories consonant with public opinion changes?
Table 10 reports the regression results regarding how the news media condition
presidential responsiveness to the public. Hence, the dependent variable is Presiden-
tial Liberalism in the models: PM1ML1 and MLPM1.
35
To examine how the public and the news media jointly affect the president, this
study first interacts the lagged Public Mood variable and the lagged Presidential Lib-
eralism variable.36 This interaction term shows the current movement of Presidential
35To control the seasonality and autoregressive characteristics in the Presidential
Liberalism series, the ARIMA models are utilized (Box and Jenkins 1976). The
AR(1) and SAR(1) variables represent the first-order autoregressive and first-order
seasonal autoregressive components, which are statistically significant in all models.
According to the Q statistics, no significant autocorrelation remains after regression
in both models.
36The political and economic variables are also included as control variables in the
models.
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Table 10. News Media and Presidential Responsiveness to the Public
V ariables PM1ML1 MLPM1
AR(1) 0.342 0.316
(4.57) (4.21)
SAR(1) 0.559 0.572
(8.22) (8.42)
Public Moodt−1 0.027 -0.006
(0.45) (-0.11)
Media Liberalismt−1 -0.047
(-0.59)
PMt−1*MLt−1 -0.137
(-1.75)
Media Liberalismt 0.053
(0.67)
MLt*PMt−1 0.156
(1.81)
ICSt−1 -0.000 0.001
-(0.06) (0.34)
CICIt−1 0.006 -0.108
(0.04) (-0.77)
Event -0.032 -0.032
(-0.48) (-0.49)
Rep. Congress 0.631 0.691
(3.59) (4.02)
Dem. Congress 0.137 0.199
(0.76) (1.15)
Rep. President -0.775 -0.759
(-5.96) (-5.97)
Constant 0.387 -1.186
(0.75) (-2.97)
N 174 174
p(Q) 0.99 0.99
AIC 557.29 557.14
Note: The dependent variable is Presidential Liberalism. To control
the seasonal and autoregressive components in Presidential Liberal-
ism, the ARIMA models are used (Box and Jenkins 1976). AR(1):
Autoregressive component. SAR(1): Seasonal autoregressive com-
ponent. N : Number of observations. “PM” represents Public
Mood. “ML” represents Media Liberalism. “*” represents interac-
tion. The numbers in the table are coefficients and t-statistics (in
parentheses). p(Q): p value of theQ statistic (Ljung and Box 1978).
AIC: Akaike’s Information Criterion.
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Liberalism when the public and the news media simultaneously moved in the past.
The model, PM1ML1, tests the synergy effect of the public and the news media on
the president. The results of this interaction regression are presented in the second
column in Table 10.
According to the Granger causality test and MAR simulation results, presidents
seem unresponsive to public opinion changes. In contrast, the MAR results illustrate
that the news media significantly affect presidential issue liberalism. Figure 10 shows
that presidents positively respond to news stories even though the responses are
somewhat delayed. However, these results do not tell whether presidents become
responsive when the public and the news media simultaneously express similar issue
preferences.
This study argues that the news media condition presidential responsiveness to
the public. If presidents become more responsive when the news media report more
news stories consonant with the public’s issue preferences, the interaction term in the
second column in Table 10 will show a positive sign. However, unlike the theoretical
expectation, the interaction term, PMt−1 ∗MLt−1, is negative and statistically sig-
nificant. That is, presidents negatively react to the simultaneous movement of the
public and the news media.
The results from the PM1ML1 do not support the theory that the news media
positively condition presidential responsiveness to the public. Rather, the results
present that the news media negatively condition the influence of the public on the
president. This model tests how presidents respond to the simultaneous movements
of the public and the news media. Since this study utilizes time-series data, the
conditional effects of the news media may be more systematically examined.
Unlike the interaction term in the PM1ML1 model, theMLPM1 model interacts
the lagged Public Mood variable with the current Media Liberalism variable in Table
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10. This model shows whether the news media induce presidential responsiveness
today when the public expressed its issue preferences in the past. The regression
results from this model are presented in the third column.37
The interaction term (MLt∗PMt−1) in Table 10 has a positive coefficient (0.156),
which is statistically significant at the α level .10 (t=1.81). These results mean that
the news media significantly and positively affect presidential responsiveness to the
public.
According to the results from the MLPM1 model, the past movement of the
public does not influence the current presidential rhetoric if the news media do not
increase or decrease liberal or conservative news stories today. Note that the coeffi-
cient of the lagged Public Mood variable is -0.006, which is statistically insignificant.
As illustrated in Figure 10, the president does not instantaneously respond to the
news media. Similarly, the coefficient of the current Media Liberalism is 0.053, which
is not statistically significant. These results mean that the news media do not con-
temporaneously independently affect the president.38
When the news media increase news stories consonant with past public opinion
changes, however, presidents respond to the changes. Certainly, if the news media
increase news stories dissonant with past public opinion changes, presidents send more
messages dissonant with public issue preferences but consonant with news stories.
That is, presidential responsiveness to the public is likely to be observed when the
news media increase news stories consistent with past public opinion changes.
37According to the Granger causality test and MAR simulation results reported
earlier, this order is plausible. First, the public does not Granger cause the news
media. Hence, the news media can be included as a current term while the public
is included as a lagged term. Second, the president rarely influences the news media
contemporaneously. Hence, the news media can be included as a current term.
38Note that the responses of the president to the news media are somewhat delayed
(about 2-3 quarters).
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The ARIMA results in Table 10 illustrate that presidential responsiveness is
somewhat complex. When the public and the news media simultaneously moved to
the same direction in the last quarter, presidents tend to react to this movement in
this quarter. In other words, presidents thermostatically react to the simultaneous
movement of the news media and the public. This finding may not support the
positive conditional impact of the news media on presidential responsiveness to the
public. However, when the public’s issue preferences are expressed in the last quarter,
the news media affect presidential responsiveness to the public. When news stories
are consonant with past public opinion changes, presidents tend to send messages
consonant with public opinion changes.
5. Conclusions
This chapter introduces the statistical results from the VAR, Granger causality test,
and MAR simulations. The most prominent finding regarding the relationship be-
tween the president, the news media, and the public is the impact of the news media
on the public. This study argues that the news media move public opinion since the
public receives most of their political information from the news media. According to
the test results, political biases in news stories Granger cause public opinion changes.
Also, changes in media bias significantly forecast changes in the public’s issue stances.
When the news media send more liberal news stories, the public’s policy sentiments
tend to move toward the liberal side.
As well as the public, presidents seem to respond to the news media. Presidents
have incentives to respond to news stories in order to earn public support or avoid
losing it. This argument is supported by the MAR results: Media Liberalism signif-
icantly affects Presidential Liberalism. That is, when the news media report more
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liberal news stories, presidents also tend to send more liberal messages by responding
to the increase in liberal news stories.
The president, however, seems to not directly affect the news media. As argued in
the theory chapter, the news media index various information sources and interpret
presidential messages. Hence, presidential influence on news stories is weak even
though the president is one of the major news sources. According to the Granger
causality test and MAR simulation results, presidential rhetoric does not affect media
bias. That is, even though presidents send more liberal messages, the news media do
not significantly report more or fewer liberal news stories.
As the news media ignore presidential rhetoric, the news media rarely signifi-
cantly consider public opinion changes while making news. This study theorizes that
the news media may positively respond to public opinion changes. However, the em-
pirical results do not support this argument. Rather, the results show that the public
has little direct effect on the media, which imply that the news media tend to act like
opinion leaders rather than representatives. Note that the news media significantly,
positively affect the public.
As the news media are unresponsive to the public, presidents seem to be unre-
sponsive to public opinion changes. In other words, the public has no direct effect
on the president. Some scholars (e.g., Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Erikson,
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002) argue that presidents respond to the public because
presidents can earn public support by responding to the public. On the contrary,
others (e.g., Jacobs and Shapiro 1995; Wood 2009) insist that presidents tend to lead
public opinion rather than follow it or respond to their partisan issue stances. The
results in this study illustrate that presidents do not significantly respond to the
public.
Neither does the public positively, significantly respond to the president. Pres-
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idential leadership, according to the theory in this study, is rarely observed because
presidential messages are generally indirectly transmitted to the public through the
news media. The test results support this argument and show that presidential mes-
sages do not significantly explain public opinion changes. These results imply that
direct, independent presidential leadership of the public is absent. In sum, the direct
relationship between the president and the public is weak. However, this does not
necessarily mean that the indirect relationship between the president and the public
is also absent.
Beyond the direct relationship between the president and the public, this study
examines whether or not the president indirectly influences the public. The regression
results in this chapter show that the president does not indirectly affect the public
through the media. Even though there is a slight chance that presidents can affect
the news media, they cannot significantly move public opinion by affecting the news
media, which may be because the impact of presidential rhetoric on news stories is
too small and barely significant. In addition, the news media do not significantly,
positively condition presidential leadership of the public. Rather, the public seems to
negatively react to the simultaneous movement of the news media and the president
in the past. That is, when both the president and the news media simultaneously
sent liberal messages yesterday, the public tends to express more conservative policy
sentiments today.
Unlike the insignificant results regarding the indirect impact of the president on
the public, there is some evidence that public opinion indirectly affects the president
through the media. Specifically, when the public expressed more liberal policy senti-
ments in the past, presidents tend to send more liberal messages if the news media
report liberal news stories today. That is, presidents become responsive to the public
when the news media send consonant news stories with past public opinion changes.
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However, when the news media and the public simultaneously move toward one di-
rection in the past, the president seems to move toward the other direction today.
On the other hand, as the president does not indirectly move public opinion by af-
fecting the news media, neither does the public influence presidential issue stances by
affecting news stories. In sum, presidential responsiveness to the public is likely to be
observed when current news stories are consistent with past public opinion changes.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
This study begins with two fundamental questions: Do elites respond to the public?
Do elites lead the public? These questions are closely associated with democratic
representation and leadership. To investigate these topics, this study focuses on the
relationship between the president and the public because the president is the only
representative elected by the entire nation and arguably the most important individual
elite in the U.S.
According to the normative representative democracy theory, presidents should
respond to the public’s interests because they are elected by the people. On the other
hand, the president is a commander-in-chief and an elected leader, which suggests
leading the public, rather than following. People expect presidents to be leaders and
not passive followers. Hence, more specifically, this study addresses the following
questions: Do presidents respond to the public’s issue preferences? Do presidents
move public opinion? When are presidential leadership of and responsiveness to the
public more likely to be observed? Do the news media intervene in the relationship
between the president and the public?
1. Study Summary
Presidential leadership of and responsiveness to the public have been investigated
by numerous studies. Some (e.g., Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Canes-
Wrone and Shotts 2004) argue that beyond the normative rationale, presidents have
incentives to respond to the public’s issue preferences. If presidents respond to the
public, the public rewards presidential responsiveness with supporting presidential
agendas and reelection. On the other hand, others argue that presidents do not need
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to respond to the public’s issue preferences to earn public support. According to Wood
(2009), presidents usually have enough (potential) public support to enable following
their own partisan preferences. Further, Wood argues that presidents can attempt to
lead public preferences, rather than being passive followers of public opinion. Jacobs
and Shapiro (2000) also argue that presidents tend to move public opinion rather
than follow it. Furthermore, studies found that some factors condition presidential
leadership (e.g., Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987; Ostrom and Simon 1989; Cohen
and Hamman 2003; Canes-Wrone 2006) and responsiveness (e.g., Canes-Wrone and
Shotts 2004; Canes-Wrone 2006; Rottinghaus 2006; Wood 2009).
Despite the large number of empirical studies on presidential behavior, we cannot
assert whether the president leads and/or responds to the public. Previous empirical
studies on presidential leadership and responsiveness found mixed and contradictory
evidence. This study points out that the mixed and contradictory results might be
caused by two things. One is the reciprocity between the president and the public.
The other possible cause is an omitted variable.
This study argues that the news media are critical to understanding the rela-
tionship between the president and the public because political information generally
flows between the president and the public through the news media.
By considering the potentially reciprocal relationships among the president, the
news media, and the public, this study investigates who affects whom. The Granger
causality test results reported in previous chapters show that the news media signif-
icantly Granger cause the public, but not vice versa. The president and the public
do not Granger cause each other. Neither do the president and the public Granger
cause the news media. The Granger test results show that news stories in the past
significantly affect the public’s current policy sentiments.
Because the Granger test has some limitations, however, this study alternatively
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uses the MAR methods to examine who affects whom. The MAR results generally
support the theories presented in Chapter II. According to the MAR results, the
news media significantly affect the president and the public. When the news media
report more liberal news stories, the public positively responds to them. Likewise,
the president sends more liberal messages after the news media report more liberal
news stories. However, according to the MAR results, the direct relationship between
the president and the public is weak or absent in general.
Along with the topic, who affects whom, this study examines whether and how
the news media affect presidential leadership of and responsiveness to the public.
According to the interaction regression results in Table 10, presidential responsiveness
is likely to be observed when the news media increase news stories consonant with past
public opinion changes. However, when the news media and the public simultaneously
express more liberal or conservative preferences, presidents tend to negatively react
to the movements. Similarly, the public thermostatically reacts to the simultaneous
movement of the president and the news media.
2. News Media: Information Interpreters?
This study argues that the news media interpret objective information, and the in-
terpreted information affects the other actors specifically, the public. This argument
seems to be supported by the VAR results. The public’s responsiveness to economic
conditions may be an example illustrating that the public is affected by the interpreted
information. Previous studies (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Wood 2009)
show that the public responds to different economic conditions in different manners.
The VAR results in Table 17 in the Appendix also show that the public conservatively
responds to high inflation when only Presidential Liberalism and Public Mood are
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included in the VAR system. However, these results are changed by considering the
news media as another endogenous variable in the VAR system (Table 5). When the
news media are considered as another endogenous variable, the inflation rate does not
affect the public’s issue stances.
The change may be caused by the significant responsiveness of the news media
to inflation as reported in Table 4. The news media report more conservative news
stories as the inflation rate increases. The Granger test and MAR results show that
the public is significantly affected by news stories. That is, the public’s significant
response to inflation observed in Table 17 may just reflect the significant response of
the news media to inflation.
These results seem to support the argument that events rarely speak for them-
selves (Page and Shapiro 1992), and the public may be influenced by the interpreted
information. According to the VAR results, the public does not respond to political
events. However, these results do not necessarily mean that the public ignores objec-
tive conditions and relies on interpreted information. In fact, the public significantly
and contemporaneously responds to the general economic state of the nation accord-
ing to the results in Table 7 and 9. Rather, from the results we can infer that the
public tends to respond to objective conditions or events as long as the conditions or
events are easy to perceive and understand. When objective conditions or events do
not have conventional meanings and need to be interpreted, the public may rely on
interpreted information.
This study, in sum, shows that the manner in which the news media interpret
economic and political events is critical to understanding public opinion changes. The
public may not correctly recognize the meanings of political events if the news media
misinterpret or disregard the events (Bartels 1994). These results seem to confirm
the argument that the news media play a role of the public’s eyes and ears.
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3. News Media: Fourth Branch of Government?
The news media are often regarded as a fourth branch of government (e.g., Carter
1959) and can affect policy making (e.g., Graber 2006). Then, do the news media act
like a fourth branch of government or affect policy making in reality? The empirical
findings in this study provide answers to this question.
The expression “fourth branch of government” means that the news media check
a dominant power in the political arena. If the news media act like a fourth branch of
government, the news media may negatively react to a dominant party. For instance,
if the Democratic/Republican party holds both the presidency and Congress, the news
media should report more conservative/liberal news stories to check the dominant
party.
According to the VAR results in this study, the news media independently report
news stories no matter who controls both the presidency and Congress. Moreover,
the news media seem to ignore political conditions in general. These results imply
that the news media do not check a dominant party and act like a fourth branch of
government.
The same results, however, imply that the news media independently report
social issues regardless of who controls the presidency and Congress. That is, the
news media are not influenced by a dominant party and congressional issue positions
and do not just represent the interests of a dominant political power. The independent
news media may reflect the presence of press freedom even though this freedom is not
actively used by the news media: checking a dominant power.
The unresponsiveness of the news media to political conditions does not neces-
sarily mean that the news media cannot be considered as political actors. Rather
than directly reacting to a dominant party, the news media seem to lead society ac-
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cording to the national economic conditions. The news media seem to recognize that
specific economic problems need specific prescriptions. The VAR results show that
liberal news stories are increased as the unemployment rate increases. Also, more
conservative news stories are reported when the inflation rate increases. These re-
sults illustrate that the news media try to guide society and policies according to the
national economic environment.
This study reveals that the news media directly and significantly affect both the
president and the public. The significant effects of the news media on presidential
rhetoric and public opinion imply that the news media can influence politics. As long
as the president is an important policy maker, the news media should be considered
as significant political actors affecting policy making because presidential issue liber-
alism is influenced by news stories. On the other hand, moving public opinion, the
news media can affect policy making as long as lawmakers are concerned about their
constituency opinion (Miller and Stokes 1963).
The findings in this study, in sum, illustrate that the news media may affect
policy making by influencing presidential issue stances and public policy sentiments.
The influence of the news media seems independent from other actors, such as the
president and the public. Neither are the news media affected by a dominant political
power. That is, the news media independently interpret economic and political events,
which in turn affects presidential issue stances and public policy sentiments.
4. News Media in Democracy
In democracy, the news media are often considered as the public’s eyes and ears. That
is, one of the functions the news media perform in democracy is informing the public
about events and issues (Graber 2006; Iyengar and McGrady 2007). Furthermore,
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the news media “is to serve as a ‘watchdog’ on behalf of citizens, scrutinizing the
actions of government officials and blowing the whistle when those officials cross the
bounds of political propriety” (Iyengar and McGrady 2007). The watchdog, civic,
journalism intends to resolving social/political problems by influencing politicians
and/or citizens.
The results in this study show that the news media seem to do their jobs. Or,
at least, the empirical findings illustrate that the news media have potential to affect
policy making. Both the president and the public are significantly affected by the
news media. Then, do the news media use their potential for the public? Certainly,
the private news media do not have to represent the public’s interests even though
the Communication Act states that the media “serve the public interest, convenience,
and necessity.”1 The news media are not the representatives elected by the public.
Even though the news media do not have to represent public interests and can-
not directly participate in policy making, the news media may indirectly enhance
democratic representation. If the news media are more responsive to public opinion
changes, the news media may serve “the public interest” by affecting presidential
responsiveness to the public. As presented in the result chapter, the direct relation-
ship between the president and the public is generally insignificant. In other words,
the president does not directly respond to the public. As Wood (2009) concludes,
presidential representation seems to be a myth. However, this study shows that pres-
idential responsiveness to the public is more likely when the news media report more
news stories consonant with expressed public opinion. In other words, the news media
can increase presidential responsiveness to the public.
If responsive presidents are more likely to be serve “the public interest” than
1The Communication Act does not state about “the public interest” in detail.
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unresponsive presidents, the news media can also serve “the public interest” by sup-
porting/reflecting public opinion changes in news stories. The news media, however,
seem apathetic about the public. In reality, the news media tend to move public
opinion rather than respond to it. If the news media should be the mouse of the
public as well as the eyes and ears, the news media need to be more responsive to
public opinion changes and make more news congruent with them. The responsive
news media may finally improve democratic representation in democracy.
Responding to the public does not mean that the news media need to appeal
the public to raise their ratings and readership. Bennett (2008) argues that the news
media “dramatize” and “personalize” social issues in news stories in order to appeal
their audiences. This sensationalization trivializes social problems and makes the
public ignorant about the problems. In this study, responding to the public means
introducing and supporting public opinion changes in news. By doing so, the news
media can fulfill one of their missions: “serving the public interest.”
This study shows that media power in politics is not a myth or minimal. The news
media significantly affect presidential rhetoric and public opinion. Even though this
does not necessarily confirm that the news media positively work in the democratic
process, the news media seem to do their jobs in terms of “independent journalism.”
Although news stories are often politically biased, the news media are not bossed by
certain political conditions or power. Rather, the news media seem to independently
guide society. This study also reveals that the news media can positively affect
presidential responsiveness to the public, which may imply that the news media can
contribute to democratic representation.
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5. Future Studies
One of the purposes of this study is to address the question: who affects whom
between the president, the news media, and the public? Even though the empir-
ical results of this study shed light on presidential responsiveness and leadership
in the democratic process, there are remaining questions related to presidential re-
sponsiveness and leadership. Focusing on the general aspects of the relationships
between the president, the news media, and the public, this study does not test
the possibility that the relationships between the three actors may vary across is-
sues. According to agenda setting studies (Wood and Peake 1998; Edwards and
Wood 1999; Peake 2001; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2005), the influence of one actor
to others varies across issues. Likewise, presidential responsiveness and leadership
may vary across issues. For instance, if the president generally possesses dominant
information regarding specific issues compared to other actors, the president is likely
to influence other actors with respect to the issues.
Issue salience and difficulty may also affect presidential responsiveness and lead-
ership (Hurley and Hill 2003). Elites are more likely to affect the public when issues
are relatively new and difficult for the public because elites have more and better
information than the public. In contrast, if issues are relatively easy and well known,
elites tend to respond to the public rather than persuade them. Similarly, the rela-
tionship between the president and the news media may also vary across time because
information asymmetry can be altered depending on situations. For instance, when
a new program is issued by the president, the president is likely to have more in-
formation than other actors regarding the program (issue). Also, the information
asymmetry can be changed as the news media index various information sources. In
sum, the relationship between the president and the news media may vary across
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issues and time. These topics are worthy to understand the relationship between the
president and the news media in detail.
Another interesting subject is the consequences of presidential leadership and
responsiveness. Scholars presume that presidential leadership and/or responsiveness
affect presidential popularity. Studies on presidential responsiveness to the public
assume that presidents respond to the public’s issue preferences in order to earn
public support. This study also considers that presidents have incentives to respond
to news stories to earn public support or avoid losing it. On the other hand, presidents
try to move public opinion to earn public support. Successful leadership implies
high popularity for presidents. These assumptions are empirically testable with the
data sets this study utilizes. That is, we can empirically examine whether and how
presidential leadership and responsiveness affect presidential popularity.
Since this study utilizes three actors’ issue stances, it is possible to examine
changes in the three actors’ issue preferences. If the president successfully leads or
responds to the public, they will move to the same direction. Then, the president
may earn public support. Similarly, if the president successfully leads or responds to
the news media, they will move to the same direction. As a result, the president may
earn public support. A future study can investigate whether or not presidents affect
their own popularity by leading/responding to the public and/or the news media.
This subject is important to explaining presidential popularity as well as presidential
responsiveness/leadership.
6. Conclusion
This chapter concludes this study by reviewing the research questions, theories, study
design, and results. In addition, this chapter discusses the implications of the empiri-
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cal findings. From the test results, we can understand that presidential responsiveness
to the public may be indirect through the news media. This also implies that the
news media critically affect policy making and intervene in the democratic process.
The manner in which the news media report social issues and interpret objective
conditions including presidential messages and public opinion changes is critical to
understanding public opinion changes and presidential issue stances.
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APPENDIX 1
PUBLIC MOOD: RULES FOR PUBLIC SENTIMENTS CLASSIFICATION
List of Public Mood indicator survey questions arranged by policy estimate areas
(Stimson 1999).
Education
• Search terms: education; public schools; school busing; teachers; students; ed-
ucation system; vouchers
Gallup:
Some people say that government should give financial help to build schools, es-
pecially in poorer states. Others say this will mean higher taxes and that committees
should build their own schools. Do you favor or oppose federal aid to help build new
public schools? (1957-1961)More liberal would be favor federal aid; More conservative
would be oppose federal aid.
American National Election Survey:
There is much discussion about the best way to deal with racial problems. Some
people think that achieving racial integration of schools is so important that it justifies
busing children to schools out of their won neighborhoods. Others think that letting
children go to their neighborhood schools is so important that they oppose busing.
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought very much about
this? (1972-1984) More liberal would be favoring racial integration; More conservative
would be opposing racial integration.
If the cities and towns around the country need help to build more schools,
the government in Washington ought to give them the money they need. (1956-
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1962) More liberal would be favoring federal funding of school construction; more
conservative would be opposing federal funding of school construction.
Some people think that the government should provide fewer services, even in
areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that
it is important for the government to provide many more services, even if it means
an increase in spending. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t
you thought very much about this? (1980-1996) More liberal would be increasing
government services; more conservative would be opposing government services.
Some people say that the government in Washington should see to it that white
and Negro (black) children are allowed to go to the same schools. Others claim that
this is not the government’s business. Have you been concerned enough about this
question to favor one side over the other? (1964-1986) More liberal would be favoring
government intervention in school integration; more conservative would be opposing
government intervention.
Some people think the government in Washington should help towns and cities
provide education for grade and high school children; others think that this should
be handled by the states and local communities. Have you been interested enough
in this to favor one side over the other? (1964-1968) More liberal would favor federal
assistance for grade and high school education; more conservative would oppose such
federal assistance.
National Opinion Research Center:
Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on improving the
nation’s education system? (1973-1996) More liberal would say too little spending;
More conservative would say too much.
Roper:
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Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on improving
the nation’s education system? (1971-1986) More liberal would say too little spending;
more conservative would say too much spending.
Trendex (General Electric):
Please tell me if you would like government to do more, do less, or do about
the same as they have been on education. (1968-1982) More liberal would say the
government should do more on education; more conservative would say do less.
I notice you said you would like the government to do more on education. Would
you favor this increased activity if it required an increase in taxes? (1972-1982) More
liberal would favor increased government action even if it required an increase in taxes;
more conservative would not.
Health
• Search terms: health; medical costs; hospital costs; insurance; medical care;
hospital care; health care
Gallup:
In some places in the United States it is not legal to supply birth control informa-
tion. How do you feel about this - do you think birth control information should be
available to anyone who wants it, or not? (1959-1968) More liberal would say birth
control information should be available to anyone who wants it; more conservative
would say it should not be available.
American National Election Studies:
There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs. Some
feel there should be a government insurance plan which would cover all medical and
hospital expenses. Others feel that medical insurance should be paid by individuals,
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and through private insurance like Blue Cross. Where would you place yourself on
this scale, or haven’t you thought very much about this? (1970-1996). More liberal
would say a government insurance plan should cover expenses; more conservative
would favor private insurance.
The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost?
(1956-1962) More liberal would say the government ought to help with low cost doctor
and hospital care; more conservative would say the government should not.
Some say the government in Washington ought to help people get doctors and
hospital care at low cost; others say the government should not get into this. Have
you been interested enough in this to favor one side over the other? What is your
position? (1964-1968) More liberal would say the government ought to help with low
cost doctor and hospital care; more conservative would say the government should
not.
Some people think that the government should provide fewer services, even in
areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel
that it is important for the government to provide many more services, even if it
means an increase in spending. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or
haven’t you thought very much about this? (1980-1996) More liberal would favor
increased services; more conservative would not.
National Opinion Research Center:
Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on improving and
protecting the nation’s health? (1973-1996) More liberal would say we are spending
too little in improving and protecting the nation’s health; more conservative would say
we are spending too much.
In general, some people think that it is the responsibility of the government in
Washington to see to it that people have help in paying for doctors and hospital bills.
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Others think that these matters are not the responsibility of the federal government
and that people should take care of these things themselves. Where would you place
yourself on this scale, or haven’t you made up your mind on this? (1975-1996) More
liberal would favor government responsibility for people paying for doctor and hospital
bills; more conservative would favor people taking care of these things themselves.
Roper:
Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on improving and
protecting the nation’s health? (1971-1986) More liberal would say we are spending
too little in improving and protecting the nation’s health; more conservative would say
we are spending too much.
Should the government be making a major effort, some effort, or no effort on
taking steps to contain the cost of health care? (1979-1986) More liberal would say
the government should make a major effort to contain the cost of health care; more
conservative would say the government should make no effort.
Trendex (General Electric):
Would you like the government to do more, do less, or do about the same as they
have been on health measures? (1965-1982) More liberal would say the government
should do more on health measures; more conservative would say the government
should do less.
I notice you said you would like the government to do more on health measures.
Would you favor this increased activity if it required an increase in taxes? (1972-1982)
More liberal would favor government action on health measures even if it raised taxes;
more conservative would not favor action that required increased taxes.
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Race
• Search terms: race; black; blacks; negro; negroes; integration; busing; African-
American; racism; Affirmative Action; ghettos; minority groups
Gallup:
Do you think the **** administration is pushing racial integration too fast, or
not fast enough? (1962-1964) More liberal would say the administration was not
pushing racial integration fast enough; more conservative would say too fast.
American National Election Studies:
There is much discussion about the best way to deal with racial problems. Some
people think that achieving racial integration of schools is so important that it justifies
busing children to schools out of their won neighborhoods. Others think that letting
children go to their neighborhood schools is so important that they oppose busing.
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought very much
about this? (1972-1984) More liberal would favor racial integration/busing; more
conservative would not.
Some people say that Negroes should be allowed to live in any part of town
they want to. How do you feel? Should Negroes be allowed to live in any part of
town they want to or not? (1964-1976) More liberal would favor African-Americans
living anywhere they wanted; more conservative would favor housing restriction for
African-Americans.
If Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the government
should see to it that they do? (1956-1960) More liberal would favor government
intervention in securing fair job and housing treatment for African-Americans; more
conservative would not favor such intervention.
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Some people say that the government in Washington should see to it that white
and Negro (black) children are allowed to go to the same schools. Others claim that
this is not the government’s business. Have you been concerned enough about this
question to favor one side over the other? (1964-1986). More liberal would favor
federal intervention in achieving racial integration in schools; more conservative would
not favor such federal intervention.
Some feel that if Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs the government
in Washington ought to see to it that they do. Others feel that this is not the federal
government’s business. Have you had enough interest in this to favor one side over
the other? (1964-1972) More liberal would favor federal government intervention in
securing fair job treatment for African-Americans; more conservative would not favor
such federal intervention.
Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible
effort to improve the social and economic position of Negroes and other minority
groups. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help
minorities because they should be expected to help themselves. Where would you
place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought very much about this? (1970-
1996) More liberal would favor federal intervention in improving social and economic
position of African-Americans; more conservative would not favor such intervention.
National Opinion Research Center:
Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on improving
the conditions of blacks? (1973-1996) More liberal would say we are spending too
little on improving the conditions of African-Americans; more conservative would say
we are spending too much.
Some people think (blacks/Negroes) have been discriminated against for so long
that government has a special obligation to improve their living standards. Others
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believe that government should not be giving special treatment to (blacks/Negroes).
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you made up your mind on
this? (1983-1996) More liberal would say that the government should have a special
obligation to improve African-American living standards; more conservative would
oppose such government intervention.
Roper:
Should the government be making a major effort, some effort, or no effort on
trying to solve the problems caused by ghettos, race, and poverty? (1974-1987)
More liberal would say the government should me making a major effort to solve
the problems caused by ghettos, race, and poverty; more conservative would say the
government should make no effort.
Trendex (General Electric):
Would you like the government to do more, do less, or do about the same as
they have been on helping minority groups? More liberal would say the government
should do more to help minority groups; more conservative would say the government
should do less.
Urban Problems
• Search terms: urban; urban renewal; ghetto; urban unrest; rioting; big cities;
central cities
American National Election Studies:
There is much discussion about the best way to deal with the problem of ur-
ban unrest and rioting. Some say it is more important to use all available force to
maintain law and order - no matter what results. Others say it is more important to
correct the problems of poverty and unemployment that give rise to the disturbances.
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Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought very much
about this? (1970-1992) More liberal would favor correcting problems of poverty and
unemployment; more conservative would favor using all available force to maintain
law and order.
National Opinion Research Center:
Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on solving the
problems of the big cities? (1973-1996) More liberal would say we are spending too
little on solving the problems of the big cities; more conservative would say we are
spending too much.
Opinion Research Corporation:
Many of our major central cities are experiencing financial difficulty, would you
favor or oppose special federal aid for these central cities? (1976-1979) More lib-
eral would favor special federal aid for central cities; more conservative would oppose
special federal aid for central cities.
Roper:
Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on solving the
problems of the big cities? (1971-1986) More liberal would say we are spending too
little on solving the problems of the big cities; more conservative would say we are
spending too much.
Should the government be making a major effort, some effort, or no effort on
trying to solve the problems caused by ghettos, race, and poverty? (1974-1987) More
liberal would say the government should be making a major effort to solve the problems
caused by ghettos, race and poverty; more conservative would say the government
should be making no such effort.
Trendex (General Electric):
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Would you like the government to do more, do less, or do about the same as they
have been on urban renewal? (1966-1982) More liberal would say the government
should do more on urban renewal; more conservative would say the government should
do less (not totally sure about what urban renewal means).
Welfare
• Search terms: welfare; poor; poverty; standard of living
Gallup:
In your opinion, which is more often to blame if a person is poor - lack of effort on
his own part, or circumstances beyond his control? (1964-1990) More liberal would
say a person is poor due to circumstances beyond his control; more conservative would
say a person is poor due to lack of effort on his own part.
American National Election Studies:
In general, some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it
that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think that the gov-
ernment should just let each person get ahead on his own. Have you been interested
enough in this to favor one side over the other? Do you think that the government:
(1964-1968) More liberal would favor federal intervention in helping individuals get
jobs and a good standard of living; more conservative would favor the government
letting each person get ahead on his own.
Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every
person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think that the government
should just let each person get ahead on his own. And of course other people have
a position somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or
haven’t you thought very much about this? (1972-1996) More liberal would favor
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federal intervention in helping individuals get jobs and a good standard of living; more
conservative would favor the government letting each person get ahead on his own
The government ought to see that every person who wants to work has a job
(1956-1960) More liberal would favor the government seeing to it that every person
who wants to work has a job; more conservative would oppose such federal intervention
(not sure about this one).
Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible
effort to improve the social and economic position of Negroes and other minority
groups. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help
minorities because they should be expected to help themselves. Where would you
place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought very much about this? (1970-
1996) More liberal would feel that government should make special effort to improve
the social and economic position of African-Americans; more conservative would feel
that government should not be making any special effort.
National Opinion Research Center:
Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on welfare?
(1973-1996) More liberal would say we are spending too little on welfare; more con-
servative would say we are spending too much on welfare.
Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything
possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans. Other people think
it is not the government’s responsibility. Where would you place yourself on this
scale? More liberal would say the federal government should act to improve the
standard of living of poor Americans; more conservative would oppose such federal
intervention
Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income
differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government
182
should not concern itself with reducing income differences. What score between 1
and 7 comes closest to the way you feel? More liberal would favor government action
to reduce income differences between rich and poor; more conservative would oppose
such intervention.
Opinion Research Corporation:
Some people have said that instead of providing welfare and relief payments,
the federal government should guarantee every American family a minimum yearly
income of about $3,000. Would you personally favor or oppose such an income guar-
antee? (1969-1972) More liberal would favor a federal guaranteed annual income;
more conservative would oppose such a policy.
Roper:
Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on welfare?
(1971-1986) More liberal would say we are spending too little on welfare; more con-
servative would say we are spending too much.
Trendex (General Electric):
Would you like government to do more, do less, or do about the same as they
have been on improving Social Security benefits? (1978-1982) More liberal would
say the government should do more about improving social security benefits; more
conservative would say the government should do less.
Would you like government to do more, do less, or do about the same as they
have been on expanding employment? (1966-1982) More liberal would say the gov-
ernment should do more about expanding employment; more conservative would say
the government should do less.
I notice you said you would like the government to do more on improving Social
Security benefits. Would you favor this increased activity if it required an increase
in taxes? (1978-1982) More liberal would favor government intervention to improve
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social security even if it resulted in higher taxes; more conservative would not favor
raising taxes.
Size of Government
• Search terms: big government; small government; bigger government; smaller
government; size of government
Gallup:
Do you consider the amount of federal income tax which you have to pay as too
high, about right, or too low? (1952-1996) More liberal would say income tax is too
low; more conservative would say income tax is too high.
In your opinion, which of the following do you think will be the biggest threat to
the country in the future - big business, big labor, or big government? (1965-1985)
More liberal would say the biggest threat is big business; more conservative would say
the biggest threat is either big labor or big government.
American National Election Studies:
Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of the money we pay
in taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste very much of it? (1958-1992) More liberal
would say the government doesn’t waste very much of our taxes; more conservative
would say the government wastes a lot of money.
If the cities and towns around the country need help to build more schools, the
government in Washington ought to give them the money they need (1956-1962) More
liberal would say the federal government should give towns and cities the money they
need to build more schools; more conservative would oppose such federal intervention.
Some people think that the government should provide fewer services, even in ar-
eas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that
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it is important for the government to provide many more services, even if it means
an increase in spending. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you
thought very much about this? (1980-1996) More liberal would favor increased gov-
ernment services on health and education; more conservative would oppose increased
government services.
Some people say that the government in Washington should see to it that white
and Negro (black) children are allowed to go to the same schools. Others claim that
this is not the government’s business. Have you been concerned enough about this
question to favor one side over the other? (1964-1986). More liberal would say that
federal government should intervene in racial integration in schools; more conservative
would oppose such federal intervention.
Some feel that if Negroes are not getting fair treatment in jobs the government
in Washington ought to see to it that they do. Others feel that this is not the federal
government’s business. Have you had enough interest in this to favor one side over
the other? (1964-1972) More liberal would favor federal intervention in securing
fair treatment in jobs for African-Americans; more conservative would oppose such
intervention.
Some people think the government in Washington should help towns and cities
provide education for grade and high school children; others think that this should
be handled by the states and local communities. Have you been interested enough in
this to favor one side over the other? (1964-1968). More liberal would favor federal
assistance for grade and high school education; more conservative would oppose such
federal assistance.
What is your feeling, do you think the government in Washington is getting
too powerful or do you think the government has not gotten too strong? (1964-
1992) More liberal would say the federal government has not gotten too strong; more
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conservative would say the federal government is getting too powerful.
Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible
effort to improve the social and economic position of Negroes and other minority
groups. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help
minorities because they should be expected to help themselves. Where would you
place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought very much about this? (1970-
1996) More liberal would favor federal intervention to improve the social and economic
position of minorities; more conservative would oppose such federal intervention.
National Opinion Research Center:
Do you consider the amount of federal income tax which you have to pay as too
high, about right, or too low? (1976-1996) More liberal would say federal income tax
is too low; more conservative would say federal income tax is too high.
Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to do too many
things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and
think that the government should do even more to solve our country’s problems.
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you made up your mind on
this? More liberal would say the government should do more to solve our country’s
problems; more conservative would say that more problems should be left to individuals
and private business.
Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything
possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans. Other people think
it is not the government’s responsibility. Where would you place yourself on this
scale? More liberal would say that the government is responsible for improving the
standard of living for all poor Americans; More liberal would say the government is
not responsible.
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Crime, Liberties, and Guns
• Search terms: crime; gun control; guns; death penalty; mandatory registration;
police; law enforcement
Gallup:
Are you in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? (1953-
1996) More liberal would not be in favor of the death penalty; more conservative would
be in favor of the death penalty.
In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly
enough with criminals? (1965-1993) More liberal would say the courts are dealing
too harshly with criminals; more conservative would say the courts are not dealing
harshly enough.
In general, do you feel that the laws covering the sale of handguns should be
made more strict, less strict, or kept as they are now? (1975-1988) More liberal
would feel laws covering the sale of handguns should be made more strict; More liberal
would feel that the laws covering the sale of handguns should be made less strict.
Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to obtain a police
permit before he or she could buy a gun? (1959-1996) More liberal would favor a
law that would require a person to obtain a police permit before buying a gun; more
conservative would oppose such a law.
Harris:
Do you favor or oppose a federal law requiring that all handguns people own
be registered by federal authorities? (1971-1984) More liberal would favor federal
registration of handgun ownership; more conservative would oppose federal registration
of handgun ownership.
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Do you favor or oppose federal laws which control the sale of guns, such as
making all persons register all gun purchases with federal authorities? (1975-1990)
More liberal would favor gun control; more conservative would oppose gun control.
American National Election Studies:
There is much discussion about the best way to deal with the problem of urban
unrest and rioting. Some say it is more important to use all available force to maintain
law and order - no matter what results. Others say it is more important to correct
the problems of poverty and unemployment that give rise to the disturbances. Where
would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought very much about
this? (1970-1992) More liberal would favor correcting the problems of poverty and
unemployment; more conservative would favor using all available force to maintain
law and order.
Some people are primarily concerned with doing everything possible to protect
the rights of those accused of committing crimes. Others feel that it is more important
to stop criminal activity even at the risk of reducing the rights of the accused. Where
would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought very much about this?
(1970-1978) More liberal would favor increased protection of the rights of the accused;
more conservative would favor reducing the rights of the accused.
Daniel Yankelovich:
Do you favor or oppose gun control laws? (1983-1984) More liberal would favor
gun control laws; more conservative would oppose gun control laws.
Do you favor or oppose mandatory registration of all handguns? (1977-1985)
More liberal would favor mandatory registration of all handguns; more conservative
would oppose mandatory registration of all handguns.
188
Military Spending
• Search terms: military; defense;
No relevant questions
Environment
• Search terms: environment; environmental protection; environmental regula-
tion; global warming; pollution
National Opinion Research Center:
Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on improving
and protecting the environment? (1973-1996) More liberal would say we are spending
too little on improving and protecting the environment; more conservative would say
we are spending too much.
Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on the environ-
ment? (1984-1996) More liberal would say we are spending too little the environment;
more conservative would say we are spending too much.
Roper:
Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on improving
and protecting the environment? (1971-1986) More liberal would say we are spending
too little on improving and protecting the environment; more conservative would say
we are spending too much.
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APPENDIX 2
PRESIDENTIAL LIBERALISM: KEYWORDS AND RULES FOR
PRESIDENTIAL LIBERALISM
Education
• Keywords: educat, school, teacher, voucher, integration, segregation, busing,
affirmative action
Liberal statements favor increased federal spending on education, increased fed-
erally sponsored or spurred education services, federal intervention to promote school
integration, and generally a larger federal role in education. Conservative statements
favor a decreased role for the federal government in all of these areas.
Health
• Keywords: health; medic; hospital; doctor, physician, disease, illness
Liberal statements support a greater role for the federal government in providing
or supporting health care, opposition to health privatization, greater information on
birth control, efforts to reduce the costs of health care, and greater government versus
private responsibility. Conservative statements favor a decreased role for the federal
government in all of these areas.
Crime
• Keywords: crime, gun, death penalty, victim’s right, sentencing, sentenced,
criminal, prison, penitentiar, capital punishment, death row, Brady bill, trigger
lock
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Liberal statements oppose capital punishment, promote defendant’s rights, gun
control, and a rehabilitation approach to addressing problems of crime. Conserva-
tive statements support capital punishment, oppose gun control, greater spending to
address problems of crime, and get tough approaches in dealing with criminals.
Urban Problems
• Keywords: urban, ghetto, inner city, inner-city, innercity, riot, big city, large
city, big cities, large cities, central city, central cities, barrio, skid row, slum
Liberal statements favor correcting problems of poverty, unemployment, ghettos,
and race in big cities. Conservative statements favor a restricted federal role in these
areas. Conservative statements also favor using force to maintain law and order in
cities.
Welfare
• Keywords: welfare pay, welfare recip, welfare prog, welfare mo, welfare pol,
social welfare, relief pay, single mo, supplemental income, food stamp, AFDC,
WIC, TANF, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, poverty, low incone,
low-income, poor, indigent, destitute, impoverish, deprived, deprivation, needy,
underprivilege, under-privilege.
Liberal statements favor a greater federal role in helping the poor, increased
welfare spending, improving the lives of those in poverty, and promoting greater
economic equality in America. Conservative statements favor federal restraint, and
suggest greater individual responsibility for economic circumstances.
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Race
• Keywords: race, racial, negro, african american, hispanic, latino, native ameri-
can, segregation, affirmative action, minorit, slavery, colored, Jim crow, voting
rights act, discrimination, busing, riot, Black Panther, Martin Luther King,
Malcolm X
Liberal statements imply that the administration should be pushing racial in-
tegration, fair housing, voting rights, equal jobs, education, non-discrimination, and
greater opportunity for minorities. Conservative statements favor a decreased role for
the federal government in all of these areas.
Environment
• Keywords: environment global warming, climate change, pollut, Kyoto, foresta-
tion, acid rain, emission, smog, ozone, greenhouse, pesticide, hazardous waste,
superfund, clean air, clean water, EPA, toxic, noxious, contamin, atmosphere.
More liberal statements advocate greater spending on the environment or in-
creased efforts to protect the environment. Conservative statements advocate reduced
environmental regulation, spending, and approaches grounded in markets.
Military Spending
• Keywords: national defense, national security, military spending, military bud-
get, military expenditure, military outlay, defense spending, defense budget,
defense expenditure, defense outlay, arms spending, arms budget, arms expen-
diture, arms outlay, security spending, security budget, security expenditure,
security outlay.
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Liberal statements favor reducing expenditures for national defense, security, and
the military. Conservative statements advocate increasing these expenditures.
Size of Government
• Keywords: big government, small government, reduce tax, tax cut, cut tax,
lower tax, high tax, over-regulat, over regulat, government waste, bureaucratic
waste, red tape, reduce spend, cut spend, lower spend, excessive regulat, exces-
sive government, limited government, reduce government, reduced government,
wasteful government.
Liberal statements advocate measures that would increase the size of govern-
ment, regulation, spending, or taxation. Conservative statements advocate reduced
government, regulation, spending, taxation, or waste.
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APPENDIX 3
MEDIA LIBERALISM: KEYWORDS AND RULES FOR MEDIA LIBERALISM
These keywords and rules are based on the previous studies (Stimson 1999; Wood
and Lee 2009). Basic rules for all issues except Military Spending and Crime:
1. Liberal/conservative news stories include “more/less active government roles,
more/less spending.” Not just facts, intention matters more. News stories are
coded according to their intentions.
2. If an article praises liberal/conservative programs or policies, it is coded as
liberal/conservative. If an article criticizes/condemns liberal/conservative pro-
grams or policies without other suggestions, it is coded as conservative/liberal.
3. If news stories treat social problems as government/individual responsibility,
they are coded as liberal/conservative.
4. If an article introduces both liberal and conservative arguments, it is coded as
neutral. If a story stresses one over the other argument, this story is coded
according to the stressed argument even though both arguments are introduced
in the story.
5. “Appointment” news stories are not considered as issues as long as they do not
put any specific comments on the appointments.
6. If news stories support (stress) the role of federal/state(local) government rather
than the role of state(local)/federal governments, they are coded as liberal/conservative.
194
7. Reporting just facts are generally coded as neutral. If news stories carry some-
one’s arguments without comments or interpretation, they are coded according
to the arguments.
8. Just indicating social problems without mentioning solutions or suggestions is
generally coded as neutral.
9. Negative phenomenon after liberal/conservative policies are coded as neutral
as long as there is no intention and argument in news stories. Positive phe-
nomenon after liberal/conservative policies are coded neutral as long as there
is no intention and argument in news stories.
10. If articles contain arguments about more/fewer regulations for obtaining gov-
ernment aids (regarding social issues), they are coded as conservative/liberal.
11. Court decisions are not considered as objective policies and not separately
coded.
12. Proposals or plans (which need to be approved by someone) are not considered
as objective policies.
13. If plans/proposals do not need to be approved and can be executed directly,
they are coded as objective policies.
14. Voting results are coded as neutral as long as there is no argument or intention
in news stories (just introducing voting results).
15. Failures of programs (policies) are coded as neutral if there is no suggestion or
intention regarding the failures.
16. News about person (specially, death) is not counted as issues in general.
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Education
• Keywords: aid to student* or aid to school* or aid to education or aid for stu-
dent or aid for school* or aid for education or education aid or education-aid
or educational aid or school aid or school-aid or voucher* or integration or seg-
regation or desegregation or busing or affirmative action or education spending
or school bill* or education bill* or school plan* or education plan* or school
program* or education program* or federal fun education or public fund* edu-
cation or federal fund* school* or public fund* school* or federal fund* student*
or public fund* student* or government fund* education or government fund*
school* or government fund* student* or federal money education or public
money education or federal money school* or public money school* or federal
money student* or public money student* or government money education or
government money school* or government money student*
1. If news stories contain the argument that government should spend more money
(resources) for private (religious) schools, they are coded as conservative.
Health
• Keywords: health care or healthcare or health-care or medicare or medicaid or
birth-control or birth control or birth curb or birth-curb or health program or
health plan or medical-care or medical-aid or medical care or medical aid or aged
care or aged-care or mental care or mental-care or mental aid or mental-aid or
health aid or health-aid or medical bill or health bill or care plan or medical relief
or charity care or managed care or managed-care or State Children’s Health
Insurance Program or children’s health insurance program or emergency care
or emergency-care or Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
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AND NOT: foreign aid or aid program or aid plan
1. If news stories are about health roll, increasing health rolls is coded liberal and
decreasing health rolls is coded conservative as long as there is no comment on
the stories.
2. News stories about birth control are considered as a health issue when they
mention something about government aid for birth control.
3. If articles are about frauds by doctors/hospitals but do not state about more
regulations they are coded as neutral. However, if articles are associated with
the argument that more regulations or sues of doctors or hospitals are needed
to prevent their frauds, they are coded as liberal.
4. If articles state about “health care cost reduction” by more regulations of hos-
pitals or doctors, they are coded as liberal.
5. If articles state about over-billing (as long as these stories imply spending too
much or waste in medicaid/medicare in relation to medicare/medicaid), they
are coded as conservative.
6. If articles state about health costs in private areas, such as private companies,
they are not considered as health issues as long as the stories do not mention
about government roles in health costs in private areas.
Crime
• Keywords: crime* or criminal* or gun* control* or gun* sale* or gun* bill* or
sale* of gun* or gun* lobb* or gun* law* or regist* gun* or gun* curb* or gun*
rule* or gun* restrict* or restrict* gun* or death penalty or victim’s right* or
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death sentenc* or capital punishment* or death row* or death house* or brady
bill or trigger lock* or mandatory registration
AND NOT: contempt* or war crim*
1. News stories supporting/Against gun control policies are considered as lib-
eral/conservative.
2. Conservative news stories stress punishment or law enforcement (such as more
police power) over rehabilitation or prevention. Liberal news stories stress re-
habilitation or prevention over punishment or law enforcement.
3. News stories supporting/Against death penalty are coded as conservative/liberal.
4. If news stories just mention crime problems, they are coded as neutral.
5. News stories attacking or blaming white-collar or business crimes are coded as
liberal.
6. Abortion is not treated as a crime issue.
7. Specific or individual criminal accidents are not treated as crime issues. For
instance, “someone is killed by somebody.” “Someone is sentenced death.”
“Some companies are accused due to frauds.” However, news stories about
interpreting (explaining) specific or individual criminal accidents are treated as
crime stories and coded according to the interpretation (explanation).
8. The issues of overcrowding in jails and judicial system are not considered as
crime issues. However, if news stories try to connect them to solving crime
problems, they are treated as crime issues and coded according the intentions
of the stories.
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Urban Problems
• Keywords: urban or ghetto or inner city or inner-city or big city or large city
or central city or big cities or large cities or central cities or barrio* or skid
row or slum or public housing or low-income housing or low income housing or
empowerment zone
AND NOT: skid* or segregation or desegregation or integration or affirmative
action or welfare
1. If news stories support public (low-income) housing, it is coded as liberal. If
news stories are about against public (low-income) housing, it is basically coded
as conservative.
2. If news stories just mention about crime problems in big cities, they are coded
as neutral. When crimes are connected to urban problems, they are considered
as urban problems. Conservative stories about crimes in big cities are sup-
porting stronger law enforcement. Liberal stories about crimes in big cities are
supporting the argument of enhancing the environment of big cities to prevent
crimes.
3. If news stories are about opposing urban renewal (low-income) housing because
of preserving the environment and historical landmarks, they are coded as neu-
tral.
4. If news stories are about curing urban problems by introducing private funds,
they are coded as neutral. Also news stories about by giving tax incentives to
private companies to cure urban problems are coded as neutral.
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Welfare
• Keywords: welfare or relief pay or single mo* or single mother* or supplemental
income* or food stamp* or AFDC or WIC or TANF or Aid to Families with
Dependent Children or poverty or low income or low-income or indigent or des-
titute* or impoverish or depriv* or needy or underprivilege* or under-privilege*
1. If news stories are about welfare roll, Liberal: increasing welfare rolls. Conser-
vative: decreasing welfare rolls.
2. However, if news stories about welfare roll contain any specific arguments or
intentions, they are coded according to the arguments or intentions.
Race
• Keywords: race or races or racial or negro* or african american* or hispanic
or latino* or native american* or segregation or desegregation or integration
or affirmative action or minorit* or busing or riot or riots or black panther or
martin luther king or malcolm“x‘ or urban league or civil right or slavery or jim
crow or voting rights act or discrimination* or ethnic*
AND NOT: minority party or minority leader* or raceway* or will race or
school* integration or president* race* or governor* race* or gubernatorial race*
or nascar or united nations or age discrimination or school* segregation or
school* desegragation or senat* race* or house race* or elect* race* or human
race* or horse* race* or car* race* or bondage* or mayor* race* or stake* race*
or race* course* or arms race or minority stockholder* or minority stake* or
minority shareholder* or sport* race* or sex* discrimination or jockey
1. If news stories accuse, charge, or blame racial problems or inequalities, they are
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coded as liberal. News stories supporting equality between races are coded as
liberal.
2. If news stories focus on racial violence but do not introduce (or comment on
the violence) the reasons of violence, they are coded as neutral.
3. If news stories are about trials, they are coded as racial issues as long as racial
problems are mentioned in their abstract.
4. If news stories are just about battles between minorities regarding racial equal-
ity, representation, or civil rights, they are coded as neutral. However, if there
are clear intentions or messages regarding racial equality in news stories, they
are coded as liberal.
The Environment
• Keywords: environment* or global warming or climate change* or climate con-
trol* or pollut* or Kyoto protocol or forestation* or acid rain or emission* or
smog* or ozone* or greenhouse* or pesticide* or hazardous waste* or superfund*
or clean air or clean water or EPA or toxic or noxious or contamin*
1. News stories about accidents causing environmental problems (such as leaking
oil, fire in chemical plants, and so on) are coded neutral. However, if environ-
mental problems are caused not by accidents, such as intentionally spreading
pollutants to ocean, they are coded as liberal because they generally imply more
regulations or punishments regarding environmental problems.
2. If news stories are about inspection without comments, they are coded as neu-
tral. If the inspection news stories contain any intention, the intention is used
to code the stories.
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3. If news stories report that some products, such as pesticides, are bad for the
environment, they are coded as liberal because these stories generally imply
more regulations on the products. If news stories are about that some products
are not bad for the environment, these stories are coded as conservative when
these stories imply fewer regulations on the products.
4. If news stories indicate or blame industries because they cause environmental
pollution or problems, they are coded as liberal.
5. If news stories are just about pollution penalty on companies by government,
they are coded as neutral. However, if news stories explicitly state that com-
panies agree to the penalty, they are coded as liberal. If news stories are about
that companies or organizations deny penalties or charges, they are coded as
neutral.
6. If news stories are about accusing companies in relation to environmental pol-
lution or protection, they are coded as liberal.
7. If news stories contain the arguments that there is no environmental problem,
or environmental problems are overrated, they are coded as conservative.
8. If news stories argue that governments should allow companies (groups) to
develop (construct) something in spite of possible environmental dangers, they
are coded as conservative. However, if news stories are about that governments
allow companies/groups to develop (construct) something because of no possible
environmental dangers, they are coded as neutral.
9. Development vs. Conservation argument: Conservation = Liberal. Develop-
ment = Conservative.
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10. Efforts by private organizations/communities improving or solving environmen-
tal problems are coded as neutral.
11. Global environmental problems are coded as neutral. If news stories are about
urging or arguing the U.S.’s roles in relation to global environmental problems,
they are coded as liberal.
Military Spending
• Keywords: national defense* or national security or military spending or mil-
itary budget* or military expenditure* or military outlay or defense spending
or defense budget* or defense expenditure* or defense outlay or arms spending
or arms budget* or arms expenditure* or arms outlay or security spending or
security budget* or security expenditure* or security outlay
1. Liberal statements favor reducing expenditures for national defense, security,
and the military. Conservative statements advocate increasing these expendi-
tures.
Size of Government
• Keywords: big government* or small government* or reduce tax* or tax cut*
or cut tax* or lower tax* or high tax* or over-regulat* or over regulat* or
government waste* or bureaucratic waste* or red tape* or reduce spend* or
cut spend* or lower spend* or excessive regulat* or excessive government* or
limited government* or reduce government* or reduced government* or wasteful
government*
1. Liberal statements advocate the measures that would increase government reg-
ulations, spending, or taxation. Conservative statements advocate the measures
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that would reduce government regulations, spending, or taxation.
2. Supporting a progressive tax is coded as liberal.
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APPENDIX 4
SUPPLEMENTARY STATISTICAL TEST RESULTS
Unit Root Test Results
Table 11. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results (Null Hypothesis: Unit Root) (En-
ders 2004, 183)
Variables Test Statistic Lags Test Value Critical Value (10 %)
President τ 4 −3.16 −3.13
φ2 4 3.33 4.07
φ3 4 5.00 5.47
Media τ 1 −6.42 −3.13
φ2 1 13.81 4.07
φ3 1 20.70 5.47
Public τ 2 −2.77 −3.13
φ2 2 2.66 4.07
φ3 2 3.99 5.47
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Table 12. KPSS Test Results (Null Hypothesis: Stationarity)
Variables Stationarity Type Lags Test Value Critical Value (1 %)
President Mean (µ) 4 0.519 0.739
Trend (τ) 4 0.180 0.216
Media Mean (µ) 1 0.521 0.739
Trend (τ) 1 0.325 0.216
Public Mean (µ) 2 1.606 0.739
Trend (τ) 2 0.393 0.216
Table 13. Bayesian Odds Ratio Test Results (Null Hypothesis: Unit Root)
Variables Squared t Schwarz Limit Marginal Alpha
President 40.87 6.04 0.00
Media 110.53 5.24 0.00
Public 11.13 6.82 0.02
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Explaining Presidential Liberalism
Table 14. Presidents and Presidential Liberalism
Variables Coefficient (t-statistic)
AR(1) 0.296
(3.92)
SAR(1) 0.539
(7.56)
Eisenhower -0.534
(-1.32)
Kennedy -0.012
(-0.05)
Johnson 0.327
(1.86)
Nixon -0.119
(-0.66)
Ford -0.378
(-1.79)
Carter 0.377
(1.93)
Reagan -0.430
(-2.68)
G.H.W. Bush -0.083
(-0.44)
Clinton 1.043
(6.43)
G.W. Bush -0.418
(-2.07)
[-2.5ex] Ljung-Box Q (p) 0.56
Note: This study identifies the presidential issue liberalism series as
an AR(1) and SAR(1) process. AR(1): First order autoregressive
process. SAR: Seasonal first order autoregressive process. Hence,
the model is: xt = βxt−1 + βsxt−s + αiPresident + vt, where x
is Presidential Liberalism, President is each president as a dummy
variable, and vt is the white-noise error term.
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Table 15. Presidential Partisanship and Congressional Issue Positions
Variables Model A Model B
AR(1) 0.476 0.439
(6.86) (6.22)
SAR(1) 0.654 0.671
(10.17) (10.68)
Republican -0.534 -0.752
(-2.83) (-5.57)
House-DW-1st 1.380
(1.45)
Senate-DW-1st -1.711
(-1.47)
House-DW-2nd -2.539
(-1.17)
Senate-DW-2nd -2.995
(-1.31)
Rep.*House-1st -2.408
(-1.85)
Rep*Senate-1st 2.951
(1.61)
Rep*House-2nd 2.312
(1.15)
Rep*Senate-2nd 0.085
(0.02)
[-2.5ex] Ljung-Box Q (p) 0.45 0.21
AIC 601.85 597.53
Note: Rep.*House-1st, Rep*Senate-1st, Rep*House-2nd, and
Rep*Senate-2nd are interaction variables between presidential par-
tisanship (Republican) and the DW scores (1st and 2nd dimension)
of the House and Senate.
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Two Variable VAR Results
Table 16. Two Variable VAR Results: Explaining Presidential Liberalism
V ariables Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
Constant 0.602 0.015 0.011 0.427
(1.71) (0.04) (0.02) (0.85)
Event 0.122 0.115 0.145 0.123
(1.48) (1.38) (1.43) (1.47)
ICSt−1 -0.004 -0.004 -0.000 -0.002
(-1.35) (-1.28) (-0.05) (-0.52)
CICIt−1 0.133 0.130 0.186
(1.03) (1.00) (1.09)
Unemployment(∆)t−1 0.004
(0.03)
Inflationt−1 0.001
(0.06)
Rep. Congress 0.565 0.559
(5.10) (5.02)
Dem. Congress 0.091 0.112
(0.80) (0.93)
Rep. President -0.558 -0.562
(-6.26) (-6.02)
Dem. President/Rep. Congress 1.204
(8.13)
Rep. President/Dem. Congress 0.111
(0.96)
Dem. President/Dem. Congress 0.652
(6.24)
Rep. President/Rep. Congress 0.462
(3.19)
House-DW-1st 0.047
(0.11)
Senate-DW-1st 0.045
(0.05)
House-DW-2nd 0.181
(0.23)
Senate-DW-2nd -0.366
(-0.25)
N 180 180 179 180
p(Q) 0.31 0.28 0.01 0.27
AIC 36.27 41.77 42.49 41.76
Note: The numbers in the table are coefficients and t-statistics (in paren-
theses). All models include the lagged endogenous variables (four lags)
N : Number of observations. p(Q): p value of the Q statistic. AIC:
Akaike’s Information Criterion.
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Table 17. Two Variable VAR Results: Explaining Public Mood
V ariables Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
Constant -0.951 -0.680 -0.188 -0.019
(-2.15) (-1.67) (-0.40) (-0.03)
Event 0.153 0.148 0.158 0.156
(1.47) (1.41) (1.48) (1.52)
ICSt−1 0.006 0.007 0.002 -0.002
(1.57) (1.60) (0.55) (-0.48)
CICIt−1 -0.182 -0.185 -0.158
(-1.11) ( -1.13) (-0.88)
Unemployment(∆)t−1 0.126
(0.95)
Inflationt−1 -0.053
(-2.40)
Rep. Congress 0.138 0.140
(0.99) (1.02)
Dem. Congress 0.273 0.369
(1.91) (2.56)
Rep. President 0.293 0.379
(2.62) (3.29)
Dem. President/Rep. Congress -0.092
(-0.49)
Rep. President/Dem. Congress 0.288
(1.99)
Dem. President/Dem. Congress -0.018
(-0.13)
Rep. President/Rep. Congress 0.056
(0.31)
House-DW-1st 0.325
(0.73)
Senate-DW-1st 0.026
(0.03)
House-DW-2nd 0.748
(0.91)
Senate-DW-2nd -0.110
(-0.07)
N 180 180 179 180
p(Q) 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.69
AIC 36.27 41.77 42.49 41.76
Note: The numbers in the table are coefficients and t-statistics (in paren-
theses). All models include the lagged endogenous variables (four lags).
N : Number of observations. p(Q): p value of the Q statistic. AIC:
Akaike’s Information Criterion.
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Correlation between Residual Series and Variance Decomposition
Table 18. Correlation Coefficients between Residual Series after VAR
ext eyt ezt
ext 1.00
eyt .05 1.00
ezt .11 .21 1.00
Note: ext: Residuals when Presidential Liberalism is the dependent
variable in the VAR system. eyt: Residuals when Media Liberalism
is the dependent variable in the VAR system. ezt: Residuals when
Public Mood is the dependent variable in the VAR system.
Table 19. The Decomposition of Variance
Step PL ML PM
1 100.000 99.318 97.916
2 98.682 98.486 94.963
3 98.044 98.297 92.385
Note: The numbers show the percentage of the variance (of the
forecast error) explained by itself in each step. PL: Presidential
Liberalism. ML: Media Liberalism. PM : Public Mood.
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MAR Results with a Different Order
Figure 11. MAR: Public Mood, Media Liberalism, and Presidential Liberalism
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